Ghana’s Supreme Court is now at the centre of a constitutional contest that could reshape how political power is organised and contested in the country. At issue is the delegate system used by the NPP, NDC and CPP, which critics say may fall short of the democratic standard required under Article 55(5) of the Constitution. But this is not merely a legal dispute about party rules; it is a national governance question with direct implications for accountability, corruption and the deeper structures that allow financial crime to persist.
For years, my professional work has centred on governance systems, financial crime prevention and regulatory compliance across major financial centres, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland and the Netherlands. This has shaped my interest in how political structures influence national integrity systems.
That interest once led me to consider testing Article 55(5) of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution in court myself. The central question was whether Ghana’s political parties, as constitutionally recognised institutions, truly “conform to democratic principles” as the Constitution requires.
When I discussed this idea with senior practitioners and political actors, I was repeatedly advised that “Ghana’s politics and institutions are not ready for this type of reform.” That advice stayed with me — not because I agreed with it, but because it revealed how deeply structural resistance is embedded in our political culture.
That constitutional question is now before the Supreme Court in a petition brought by Dr Nyaho-Tamakloe, Dr Christine Amoako-Nuamah and Prof. Kwabena Frimpong-Boateng. The suit challenges the constitutionality of the delegate system used by the NPP, NDC and CPP — a system that allows a relatively small group of delegates to determine who becomes a parliamentary candidate or presidential flagbearer.
1. Article 55(5): A Constitutional Clause Ghana Has Underused
Article 55(5) requires the internal organisation of political parties to “conform to democratic principles.” Yet for decades, the provision has often been treated as aspirational rather than enforceable (Gyampo, 2017; Boafo-Arthur, 2003).
The result is a political system where:
- a few hundred delegates decide primaries,
- party executives control access to political power,
- financiers influence candidate selection, and
- ordinary party members have little meaningful participation.
This stands in marked contrast to the United Kingdom, where I currently live and work. In major UK parties, including Labour and the Conservatives, ordinary party members play a direct role in leadership elections, even though candidate selection rules differ across parties and constituencies (Bale & Webb, 2020). The point is not that the UK offers a perfect model, but that broader internal participation reduces the extent to which leadership selection can be monopolised by a small, easily influenced group.
This does not eliminate factionalism or political influence, but it ensures that leadership selection is not monopolised by a small, easily influenced group. Ghana’s delegate system, by comparison, creates structural vulnerabilities that feed into the country’s financial crime ecosystem.
2. How Delegate Politics Fuels Financial Crime in Ghana
My work in financial crime and regulatory compliance has taught me that corruption is rarely accidental. It is usually the predictable outcome of structural incentives. Ghana’s delegate‑based political system creates three such incentives.
a. Vote‑buying becomes a rational investment
When a few hundred delegates decide a primary, aspirants often spend large sums to secure their votes. Once elected, they face pressure to recover these costs through:
- inflated contracts,
- procurement manipulation,
- kickbacks, and
- abuse of office.
This dynamic is well‑documented in African political economy literature (Lindberg, 2010; Cheeseman, 2018).
b. Party financiers gain disproportionate influence
Those who fund internal campaigns often expect returns in the form of:
- government contracts,
- appointments,
- policy influence, and
- access to state resources.
This distorts public decision‑making and weakens anti‑corruption institutions.
c. State capture begins inside political parties
Before a politician enters office, they may already be tied to networks that expect financial rewards. This undermines the independence of institutions such as:
- the Auditor‑General,
- the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
- EOCO, and
- CHRAJ.
Internal party structures therefore shape national governance outcomes long before elections are held.
3. The Supreme Court’s Three Possible Paths — and Their Anti‑Corruption Consequences
A. A UK‑Style Ruling: Party Autonomy Prevails
The Court could decide that parties have wide autonomy and that delegate systems are not unconstitutional.
Impact on financial crime:
- Vote‑buying remains entrenched
- Party financiers retain influence
- Anti‑corruption institutions remain politically vulnerable
B. A Kenya‑Style Ruling: Judicial Oversight Without Structural Overhaul
Kenyan experience shows that courts can play a meaningful supervisory role in enforcing fairness and transparency in party processes, even without prescribing a single electoral model (Kanyinga, 2014). Ghana’s Court could adopt a similar path.
Impact on financial crime:
- Delegate selection becomes more credible
- Grassroots members gain more influence
- Party executives face greater scrutiny
- Corruption networks lose some control
C. A South Africa‑Style Ruling: Internal Party Democracy as a Constitutional Right
South Africa’s Constitutional Court has affirmed that internal party processes and political party funding transparency are closely tied to constitutional governance and meaningful political participation (Ramakatsa v Magashule, 2012; My Vote Counts, 2018).
Impact on financial crime:
- Vote‑buying becomes far more difficult
- Party financiers lose disproportionate influence
- Candidates must appeal to broad membership, not elite networks
- State capture becomes harder to sustain
- Anti‑corruption institutions gain stronger political backing
This would be the most transformative outcome for Ghana’s governance architecture.
4. Why This Case Matters — And Why I Studied It
My initial desire to test Article 55(5) in court was driven by a simple academic question: Can Ghana strengthen its democracy without reforming the internal structures of its political parties?
The more I studied the issue — through the lens of governance, financial crime, and regulatory systems — the clearer it became that internal party democracy is not a peripheral concern. It is the foundation upon which national integrity systems rest.
If political parties remain opaque, elite‑controlled, and financially compromised, then no anti‑corruption institution — no matter how well designed — can succeed.
If parties become more democratic, transparent, and accountable, Ghana’s fight against financial crime gains a powerful ally.
Conclusion: A Constitutional Moment With National Consequences
The Article 55(5) case is a rare opportunity for Ghana to rethink the foundations of its political system. Whether the Supreme Court chooses a cautious, incremental, or transformative path, its ruling will shape:
- how leaders are selected,
- how public resources are managed,
- how corruption networks operate,
- how independent institutions function, and
- how citizens participate in democracy.
As someone who once considered testing this issue in court — and who now works professionally in governance, financial crime and regulatory systems — I believe this is a critical constitutional moment. Ghana’s fight against financial crime does not begin only when a politician assumes office. It begins much earlier, inside the political parties that select those who will govern.
Strengthening internal party democracy is therefore not just a constitutional obligation; it is a national imperative.
About Author
Kwadwo is a specialist in law, finance, financial crime, governance and regulation. He has worked with banks and financial institutions in the United Kingdom, Switzerland and the Netherlands.
Kwadwo has appeared on TV3 and contributes to Ghana Broadcasting Corporation programmes such as News, Market Avenue and Talking Point.
He studied Political Science and Philosophy at the University of Ghana, obtained a Graduate Diploma in Law and LLM from the University of Law (formerly College of Law), and holds a postgraduate degree in Financial Strategy from Saïd Business School, University of Oxford.
