An investigative analysis of how macroeconomic optics, policy failure, institutional rot, and rotten seeds are conspiring to destroy the livelihoods of over five million Ghanaian smallholder farmers.
There is something deeply obscene happening in Ghana’s fields right now. Across the Bono Region, the Volta Basin, the northern plains, and the rice belts of Pwalugu and Aveyime, farmers who rose before dawn, took out loans, applied fertiliser by hand, and poured entire seasons of their lives into the earth are watching their harvests rot not because the rains failed, not because there was disease or drought, but because the food market has been engineered to exclude them. Imported rice and maize, made artificially cheap by a surging Ghanaian cedi and an open-door import permit policy, are flooding the shelves. And the very institutions that should be buying from these farmers are either looking away or, worse, looking abroad.
But there is a second, even more visceral indignity layered on top of the market failure. Some of those same farmers who toiled against the odds, who cleared their land, hired tractor operators, paid for ploughing, harrowing, and planting, were handed hybrid maize seeds by the government’s Feed Ghana Programme that never germinated. Not because of poor farming practices. Because the seeds were dead before they touched the soil.
The headline numbers tell a different story. A very convenient, polished story. Ghana’s inflation rate declined to 5.4 percent in December 2025, a dramatic fall from 23.8 percent just twelve months earlier. Inflation recorded 12 consecutive months of decline in 2025, with the annual average falling to 14.6 percent from 22.9 percent in 2024. The cedi, once the world’s most battered currency, staged a stunning comeback. The cedi emerged as one of the world’s top-performing currencies in 2025, rallying roughly 35 percent against the US dollar. Government statisticians are beaming. The IMF is pleased. And in the corridors of Accra’s ministries, officials cite these indicators as proof that Ghana is finally turning the corner. Xinhua + 2
But in the farming communities, there is no corner being turned. There is only a wall and the government built it.
The Glut That Was Made, Not Grown
Let us be precise about what is happening, because the language of “glut” can be misleading. When economists speak of a glut, they typically mean excess production, a bumper harvest so large the market cannot absorb it. That is not what Ghana is experiencing. What Ghana has is an artificial glut: a crisis manufactured not by abundance but by policy choices that have systematically shut local farmers out of their own market.
Ghana’s grain sector is on the brink of crisis, with more than 100,000 metric tonnes of maize and rice from the 2024 harvest still unsold, leaving farmers trapped in debt and threatening the survival of local processors. By November 2025, the situation had deteriorated catastrophically. According to the Peasant Farmers Association of Ghana (PFAG), more than 200,000 metric tonnes of unsold paddy rice and maize from the last season remain stuck in warehouses and on farms, with some rice still unharvested, leaving farmers exposed to bird invasions, bushfires, and mounting post-harvest losses. The Chamber of Agribusiness Ghana (CAG) painted an even grimmer picture: Ghana’s grain sector faced an escalating crisis with over 1.2 million metric tonnes of rice, maize, and soya beans remaining unsold across farming communities. Citi Newsroom + 2
The financial cost is staggering. The Chamber of Agribusiness Ghana warned that the glut is destabilizing the sector, with US$330 million equivalent to GH¢5 billion worth of paddy rice alone lying unsold. GBC Ghana
What caused this? According to the Chamber, the glut has been worsened by a surge in cheap imports and rampant smuggling of substandard grains, which has forced many farmers to sell below their production cost. The normal rhythm of agricultural commerce, harvest, store for three to five months, sell, then buy inputs for the next season, has completely broken down. The flour mills, the feed processors, and the institutional buyers that should be drawing down local stocks have instead turned to cheaper imported alternatives. Citi Newsroom
The disconnect between falling prices and rising hunger is a matter of survival. “I have bags of maize stacked to the ceiling, but no one is buying at a price that pays back my fertilizer loan,” explains Naa Dei Okai, a farmer in the Bono Region. GBC Ghana
The Cedi’s Dark Side: When a Nation’s Success Becomes Its Farmers’ Ruin
The appreciation of the Ghana cedi has been celebrated as a macroeconomic triumph. But what the government’s press releases leave out is that a strong currency, in a country with a structurally weak productive base, can be just as destructive as a weak one, just for different people.
According to economist Prof. Godfred Bokpin, an overly strong cedi could deter Foreign Direct Investment and make imports cheaper than local goods, hurting domestic production. “A strong cedi may not work effectively in our favour because we have a weak productive sector,” he warned. The Vaultz News
This is not abstract theorizing. It is playing out in real time in Ghana’s rice and maize markets. The national president of the Peasant Farmers Association of Ghana, Wepia Addo Awal Adugwala, says the stronger cedi has created a structural paradox: consumers, drawn by lower prices at the market, are choosing imported rice and other commodities over domestic alternatives, effectively routing jobs and productive investment out of the country at the expense of Ghanaian growers who are already operating under severe financial strain. News Ghana
While the stronger currency has lowered the cost of imported inputs like fertilizer, it has created a “price squeeze” for local producers, with farm-gate prices crashing even as rural incomes remain tied to the suppressed prices of unsold local crops. GBC Ghana
And beneath all this lies a structural injustice that no exchange rate movement can fix. Local farmers borrow at rates far above what their counterparts in major exporting countries pay, as banks classify agriculture as a high-risk lending category. Inputs including fertiliser, agrochemicals, and tractor services are largely imported and priced accordingly. By the time land rental and labour costs are factored in, the total cost of producing rice and other staples makes price competition with imports structurally unviable. He noted that farmers in some competing countries access agricultural credit at rates of nearly one percent, a figure that bears no comparison to the lending environment facing Ghanaian smallholders. News Ghana
The Import Permit: A Minister’s Pen, Wielded Against the Farmer
Here is the fact at the centre of this entire crisis, and it deserves to be stated with no ambiguity whatsoever: in Ghana, only the Minister of Food and Agriculture has the authority to grant import permits for milled rice and maize grain. Every bag of imported rice flooding the Ghanaian market, undercutting local farmers, exists because someone in that ministerial office signed off on it.
Even as local farmers struggle to sell their grains, importers continue to flood the market with cheap rice and maize. Weak border controls and poor enforcement of standards have made this worse, undermining national efforts to promote food self-sufficiency. Imani Africa
The Chamber of Agribusiness Ghana expressed alarm over alleged collusion between smuggling syndicates and corrupt border officials, stressing that the government is losing critical revenue through tax evasion. “This not only jeopardises farmer incomes but also weakens the domestic value chain, making Ghana increasingly dependent on foreign imports and eroding food sovereignty,” the Chamber noted. GBC Ghana
The National Seed Trade Association has been explicit about who must be held to account. Its president called on Minister Eric Opoku to issue a directive restricting the purchase of imported rice, especially for government institutions, and to promote Ghana-grown rice. He warned that the financial muscle of the importing cabal makes this a political fight, not merely a technical one, adding that “the guys who are importing have the financial muscle.” Ghanamma
Meanwhile, the Chamber of Agribusiness Ghana has called for nothing less than a moratorium. CAG proposed a three-month moratorium on rice imports, the establishment of a Strategic Grain Reserve Procurement Programme to purchase surplus produce directly from farmers, and a five-year Ghana Rice Production Strategy with expanded irrigation infrastructure. Ghanamma
None of this has happened. Instead, the minister who speaks movingly about smallholder farmers at international forums, Minister Eric Opoku, addressing the Third General Assembly of the World Farmers Markets Coalition in Rome, highlighted the crucial role of smallholder farmers and noted that about 80 percent of Ghana’s farming population consists of smallholder farmers who contribute significantly to the country’s food security, presides over a ministry that continues to grant import permits for the very commodities those farmers grow, while they sit on mountains of unsold grain. GBC Ghana
The cognitive dissonance is breathtaking. The contradiction is policy.
Dead Seeds in Living Fields: The Feed Ghana Betrayal
If the import crisis is a slow economic strangulation, what happened with the government’s hybrid maize seed distribution under the Feed Ghana Programme is an act of acute cruelty. And it is new information that should shake every Ghanaian who believes government exists to serve the farmer.
Maize farmers who were already on their knees from last season’s unsold harvest, who had not eaten the profits of their labour because those profits were trapped in bags piled in storage, dug deep and planted again. They took government at its word. Under the Feed Ghana Programme, they were supplied with hybrid maize seeds and fertiliser. They paid to have their land ploughed. They paid for harrowing. They paid for planting. They placed the seeds in the ground and waited.
The seeds did not germinate.
Not in isolated cases. Not as an unfortunate anomaly. Across multiple farming communities, farmers found themselves staring at bare soil where their maize should have been rising. When investigations traced the seeds back to their source, what emerged was as damning as it is infuriating: seed suppliers revealed that the last batch they provided to government was over a year before the seeds were distributed to farmers.
This is not a minor administrative hiccup. This is an agricultural crime against desperate people.
The science is settled and well understood by every technocrat in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Seed storage life in tropical areas is shortened by high humidity and temperature, resulting in rapid decreases in seed viability in storage as well as a high incidence of fungal and insect infestations. Hybrid maize seeds are particularly vulnerable. Seeds that have been stored for long periods in a storage shed, and seeds of low weight, accelerate the decline of physiological seed quality, especially growth rate and germination percentage. In tropical conditions without controlled temperature and humidity, a seed stored for over a year does not just lose vigour; it loses the fundamental capacity to germinate. nihResearchGate
As seed experts warn Ghanaian farmers directly: “Beware of seeds that have been stored for a long time in hot conditions, as their germination rate may be lower.” This is public knowledge. This is in planting guides. This is what the extension officers and ministry technocrats are trained to know. There is no plausible claim of ignorance. Demeterghana
And yet old seeds, seeds whose suppliers themselves confirm were supplied to government over a year before distribution, were packaged and handed to struggling farmers as a lifeline. As seed scientist Dr. Amos Rutherford Azinu has observed, when poor-quality seed is used, “every other input, fertiliser, irrigation and labour, yields diminishing returns.” The farmers did not just lose germination. They lost the cost of ploughing. They lost the cost of harrowing. They lost the cost of planting labour. They lost the fertiliser applied to soil where nothing grew. They lost another season. And they had nothing to show for it. Ghana Business News
This pattern, it must be noted, is not without historical precedent in Ghana’s agricultural input programmes, and that makes it even less excusable. Research by the Ghana Trade and Livelihood Coalition found that “farmers’ trust in improved seeds supplied under the government’s PFJ programme dropped significantly,” with some complaining of low germination, leading to the rejection of seeds by many smallholders. Research into the original PFJ programme found that “political interferences” were cited as a cause of delayed input distribution, resulting in farmers not being able to benefit fully from the seed component, and that in certain cases, batches of seeds distributed were of poor quality. FrontiersScienceDirect
The ministry knew this history. The ministry knew the consequences. The ministry distributed the seeds anyway.
Across Ghana, farmers have long expressed a persistent concern: they don’t trust the seed market. Reports of poor germination and misrepresented varieties are too common. Once a farmer plants a seed that fails, it may take years before they try certified seed again. This isn’t merely a technical problem; it’s a national productivity crisis. Citi Newsroom
Under the Feed Ghana Programme, the Mahama government has now deepened that crisis with its own hands.
The Feed Ghana Phantom: Grand Words, Absent Action
When the government launched its flagship “Feed Ghana Programme” in April 2025, it was presented as a transformative vision. The programme aimed to enhance local agricultural production, minimize reliance on food imports, and create sustainable job opportunities, with key features including establishing farmers’ service centres, promoting grains and legumes development, and introducing cutting-edge technologies. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Minister himself acknowledged at the programme launch that Ghana’s heavy reliance on food imports, totalling over $2 billion per year, with poultry alone accounting for $300 million, places the country at risk of external market fluctuations and currency instability. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
And yet, even as the ministry announced a programme to reduce food import dependency, import permits for rice and maize kept flowing. The Feed Ghana Programme’s words have not found their way to the farmgate. Its seeds, literally turned to dust. The season turned, and farmers who planted in hope are sitting on empty fields and mountains of old-season grain with no buyers.
The private seed sector, crucial for innovation, remains hamstrung by regulatory bottlenecks, scarce investment, and a lack of incentives. Few companies dominate production and distribution, stifling competition and leaving farmers with limited access to high-quality seeds. Compounding these issues, public institutions tasked with seed regulation and research operate with outdated infrastructure and insufficient funding. News Ghana
This is the ecosystem into which the Feed Ghana Programme was launched, and from which it sourced its dead seeds.
The NAFCO Black Hole: Where Did the Money Go?
The government, under pressure from farmers and agribusiness groups, released funds to the National Food Buffer Stock Company (NAFCO) to intervene in the grain market. The amounts announced were significant: an initial GH¢100 million, followed by a further GH¢100 million. In the 2026 Budget Statement, government directed an emergency release of GH¢200 million to NAFCO, which also set a floor price of GH¢5 per kilogram for paddy rice to protect farmer incomes. GBC Ghana
The money was announced. The floor prices were set. And then, nothing the farmers could see or touch.
Farmers reported they had not seen any real purchases by approved buying companies. According to the PFAG, there was no information or data on which districts benefited, raising serious concerns about accountability and transparency. Business Day Ghana
The PFAG called on NAFCO to publish a list of contracted companies, indicating purchase locations and quantities. Farmers wanted direct access to aggregators or millers for timely lifting of their grains, demanding clear timelines and transparency. Adomonline
If government allocated GH¢200 million to buy local grain, and local farmers report they have seen no buyers, the question must be asked plainly: did this money flow to imported cheaper alternatives instead of local farmers? Is this how the procurement budget that was supposed to rescue smallholder farmers ended up reinforcing the very import cycle that is destroying them?
The historical record of NAFCO does not provide reassurance. NAFCO’s former Chief Executive Officer and his wife were arrested and prosecuted for the alleged embezzlement of GH¢78 million, funds earmarked for national food programmes and buffer stock maintenance, with investigations revealing a web of fraudulent transactions spanning several years. Accra Street Journal
Most damning of all: after fifteen years of existence, NAFCO only established its first legally mandated audit committee in October 2025, with its CEO acknowledging that prior to this, the company did not even have an internal auditor, a major governance gap that exposed the company to operational lapses. Graphic Online
Civil society organisations confirmed the unlawful diversion of over GH¢78.2 million in funds earmarked for national food programmes, noting that “these cases don’t represent isolated errors, they expose institutional vulnerabilities in our budget-execution systems and demonstrate that access to data alone is insufficient when citizens cannot trace how funds move, who is accountable, or whether any action follows.” Ghana
This is the institution that Ghana’s five million smallholder farmers are now depending on to save them. A fifteen-year-old institution that, until last year, had never once held a mandatory audit. An institution whose former leadership is before the courts for embezzlement. An institution whose proclaimed procurement of local grain has produced no visible benefit in the farming communities it was designed to serve.
Eight Million Hungry in a Nation Swimming in Grain
Perhaps the most damning statistical indictment of this entire policy failure comes from AGRA’s November 2025 Food Security Monitor. While national harvests are surging, 23.96 percent of Ghanaians, approximately 8 million people, now struggle with insufficient food consumption. GBC Ghana
The Ghana Statistical Service itself reports food insecurity at 38.1 percent as of Q3 2025, an increase of 2.8 percentage points from Q1 2024, even as food inflation was falling. Cheaper food prices on paper have not translated into food security in practice. Ghana Statistical Services
The statistical optics and the lived reality have completely diverged. The GSS Government Statistician acknowledged this plainly: “Lower inflation does not mean lower prices. Prices are still high; they are simply rising more slowly.” And for farmers, lower farm-gate prices do not mean economic relief. They mean ruin. Modern Ghana
Food prices and utility costs were the biggest drivers of Ghana’s annual inflation in 2025, accounting for a combined 66.3 percent of overall price increases, with food and non-alcoholic beverages alone contributing 52.3 percent to total inflation, making it the single largest driver of rising prices. Meanwhile, the farmers producing that food are being crushed. The system is extracting value from both ends, charging consumers more and paying producers less. MyJoyOnline
The Coming Famine Is Being Planted Now
This crisis has a time dimension that makes it even more alarming than its present scale suggests. The farmers who failed to sell last season cannot service their loans. The farmers who planted government seeds that failed to germinate have lost another season entirely, spending their last resources on empty ground. Neither group can easily justify planting next season.
The PFAG has warned explicitly: “Without urgent intervention, many farmers, particularly the youth, may abandon cultivation next season due to growing frustration and financial distress.” Thebftonline
Many farmers are already planning production cuts for next season to avoid further debt, a move that could flip today’s surplus into a future shortage. GBC Ghana
Some mills and processing plants are already operating far below capacity, while others have shut down completely due to a lack of sales. When those mills close permanently, the value chain collapses, and no amount of future production will restore it quickly. GBC Ghana
The ghost of the Feed Ghana Programme’s dead seeds haunts this calculus most darkly of all. A farmer who spent their last resources on ploughing, harrowing, planting and fertiliser for crops that never grew has not just lost money. They have lost faith. They have lost a season. They have lost the input costs they cannot recover. And they may lose the will to plant again. When that happens, across tens of thousands of farms simultaneously, Ghana does not just lose a season. It loses a generation.
The Verdict
The government of Ghana, its Minister of Food and Agriculture, and the National Food Buffer Stock Company owe the public clear answers to a set of unambiguous questions that cannot be deflected with press releases and policy launches:
How many import permits for rice and maize have been issued since January 2025, and to whom? What quantities do those permits authorise, and when were they signed? Who supplied the hybrid maize seeds distributed under the Feed Ghana Programme, when were those seeds originally produced, and who in the ministry approved their distribution knowing they had exceeded safe storage viability? What is the timeline for NAFCO’s GH₵200 million procurement, which districts have actually received payment, and what volume of locally produced grain has been purchased? Why are flour mills and feed processors purchasing imported grain instead of local produce, and has the ministry used its regulatory authority to mandate otherwise?
As the seed scientist Dr. Azinu has said, the seed “is the genesis of every harvest, the origin of every meal, and the bedrock of every farming economy.” Every dollar invested in agricultural research and seed quality, he argues, yields returns of between six and twenty dollars. What the Ministry of Food and Agriculture delivered to Ghana’s desperate farmers was the precise opposite of that investment: expired seeds dressed up as government support, planted with borrowed money in borrowed time. Ghana Business News
The Feed Ghana Programme cannot be both a national transformation agenda and a cover for distributing dead seeds. A minister cannot travel to Rome to champion smallholder farmers and return home to sign import permits that destroy them and approve seed distributions that betray them. A buffer stock company cannot absorb hundreds of millions of cedis in government funds and leave farmers unable to identify a single buyer in their district.
The food glut should be a wake-up call, not just for government but for all stakeholders in the sector. Agriculture is no longer just about growing food; it is about managing value chains efficiently from farm to market. Imani Africa
Ghana’s farmers did not fail their country. Their country failed them, at the market, at the border, in the ministry’s permit office, and in the very seeds placed in their hands. The rot in Ghana’s agriculture is not in the soil. It is in the governance. And until the government reverses course, suspending import permits, mandating institutional procurement from local sources, enforcing transparency at NAFCO, and treating seed quality as the sacred public trust it is, that rot will continue.
The statistics will look better. The cedi will be strong. The inflation figures will impress the IMF.
And in the fields of Bono, in the paddy belts of the Volta, across the northern breadbasket, farmers will keep looking at bare soil and unsold grain, wondering whether the country that gave them dead seeds will give them anything worth planting for at all.
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DISCLAIMER: The Views, Comments, Opinions, Contributions and Statements made by Readers and Contributors on this platform do not necessarily represent the views or policy of Multimedia Group Limited.
