The Interim Policy Directives of June 12, 2026, issued by the Director of the Ghana School of Law, expose a practical regulatory vacuum created by the Legal Education Act, 2026 (Act 1170).
A Regulatory Gap in the New Legal Education Regime
The Act introduced a new legal education framework without comprehensive transitional arrangements for continuing final year LL.B. students or for the thousands of graduates with outstanding examination backlogs awaiting progression to the Bar.
The vacuum is particularly urgent. Final-year law students and graduates with unresolved academic deficiencies require certainty about their qualification pathway. At the same time, universities need clear guidance on curriculum alignment, accreditation standards, and implementation requirements under the new regime.
Yet the very body empowered by Parliament to regulate legal education and oversee the transition, the Council for Legal Education and Training (CLET), has not yet been constituted.
Against this backdrop, the interim directives issued by the Director of the Ghana School of Law, reportedly at the instance of the Attorney-General and in consultation with the Chairman of the General Legal Council, raise important questions of law and governance.
The Legal Questions
The first question is whether the Attorney-General, or an official acting on the Attorney-General’s instructions, possesses implied or transitional authority to address a regulatory gap pending the constitution of CLET.
The second question is whether, where Parliament has vested regulatory powers in a statutory body that has not yet been constituted, another authority may temporarily exercise those powers in the interests of continuity, necessity, and administrative efficiency.
The third question concerns the legal significance of consultation with the Chairman of the General Legal Council.
The Legal Education Act appears deliberately to transfer responsibility for legal education from the General Legal Council to CLET. While the Chief Justice retains certain express functions under the Act, neither the General Legal Council nor its Chairman appears to retain an independent regulatory mandate over legal education within the new statutory framework. Consultation may contribute to institutional memory and continuity, but consultation alone does not create legal authority.
The Limits of Interim Regulatory Action
A closely related issue is whether interim directives may lawfully establish requirements, such as a Pre Bar Course, or prescribe subjects where the Act itself does not expressly provide for such a programme.
One view is that necessity may justify temporary administrative measures designed to prevent confusion, disruption, and unfairness during the transition period. The competing view is that where Parliament has assigned regulatory functions to a specific statutory body, executive necessity and institutional convenience cannot substitute for express statutory authority.
The issue, therefore, extends beyond educational policy. It raises fundamental questions of administrative law, statutory interpretation, separation of powers, and the permissible limits of executive action when a statutory framework has been enacted but not fully operationalised.
While a regulatory vacuum plainly exists, whether it can lawfully be filled through the measures adopted remains a serious legal question that may ultimately require judicial clarification.
The Case for Immediate Constitution of CLET
The most prudent and legally sustainable response is the immediate constitution of CLET as contemplated by the Act. Once constituted, the Council can review the interim measures and, under the authority vested in it by Parliament, adopt, modify, ratify, or replace them. Such a course would:
a.Provide statutory legitimacy for transitional arrangements;
b.Give clear and authoritative guidance to students, universities, and other stakeholders;
c.Reduce the risk of litigation, challenging the legality of the interim directives; and
d.Preserve the separation of powers by ensuring that the body designated by Parliament exercises regulatory responsibilities.
Why CLET Can Be Constituted Without Delay
There appears to be no insurmountable obstacle to establishing CLET within a matter of days if the relevant appointing authorities act urgently. The Council’s composition is neither unusually large nor institutionally complex.
Its fourteen members are drawn from a small and readily identifiable group of stakeholders: the President, the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, the Ghana Bar Association, the Ministry of Education, the Ghana Tertiary Education Commission, and the Conference of Law Deans, together with the Director General of Legal Education as an ex officio member.
These institutions are fully operational and capable of making nominations within a short timeframe. With sufficient coordination and commitment, the Council could reasonably be constituted within a week.
If the delay is attributable to budgetary concerns, that challenge is equally manageable.
The forthcoming Mid-Year Budget Review provides an opportunity to regularise any financial implications associated with the Council’s operations. In any event, the cost of constituting the statutory regulator is likely to be modest when compared with the uncertainty, litigation risk, and administrative disruption that may result from a prolonged regulatory vacuum.
Interim Measures and Legal Restraint
Pending the constitution of CLET, any interim administrative measures should be approached with caution. Such measures should be confined to maintaining continuity and preventing immediate disruption rather than introducing substantive regulatory innovations. They should be limited in duration, transparently justified on grounds of necessity, and expressly made subject to review, ratification, amendment, or revocation by the incoming Council.
This approach recognises the practical need for temporary administrative action while respecting the principle that regulatory authority ultimately rests with the statutory body Parliament established for that purpose.
This approach would preserve administrative continuity while respecting Parliament’s clear intention that the governance and regulation of legal education be exercised through CLET rather than through indefinite transitional arrangements.
Conclusion
The central issue is not whether a regulatory vacuum exists. It plainly does. The more difficult question is who may lawfully fill that vacuum pending the constitution of the body Parliament created for that purpose.
The safest legal path is therefore clear: constitute CLET without delay, permit it to assume its statutory mandate, and subject all interim measures to its prompt review and validation.
The author is a Senior member of the Ghana Bar Association and a Law Lecturer at Wisconsin International University College.
