Ndege and now Mariga: Is FKF flushing out dissenters?

The Football Kenya Federation’s leadership crisis has entered a potentially decisive legal phase following the expulsion of Vice-President McDonald Mariga and six other National Executive Committee members, but the latest action cannot be examined in isolation.

It has to be viewed against the earlier removal of former FKF CEO Harold Ndege, the April 2026 attempt by Mariga and his allies to suspend President Hussein Mohammed, FIFA’s subsequent rejection of that suspension, and the latest SGM in Meru on Saturday, November 7, 2026.

Taken together, these episodes reveal a federation increasingly turning to constitutional provisions to fight what is essentially a political and administrative power struggle.

And that raises a fundamental question: are FKF’s constitutional mechanisms being used to protect the federation, or are they becoming weapons in an internal purge?

Harold Ndege was removed as FKF General Secretary/CEO on February 6, 2026, with Dennis Gicheru appointed acting General Secretary/CEO immediately afterwards. FKF said Gicheru would serve pending recruitment of a substantive office holder. 

According to court documents reported at the time, he claimed that FKF had failed to give him adequate notice, had not properly suspended him before removing him, and had not given him a meaningful opportunity to defend himself. His lawyers argued that the process involved less than 12 hours’ notice and that the hearing was conducted virtually.

There is an important constitutional provision here.

Article 63(5) of the FKF Constitution provides that the General Secretary is appointed by the NEC on the proposal of the President and that his services may be terminated by the NEC on the recommendation of the President. 

So the Constitution does give the NEC power to terminate the General Secretary. That means it would be too strong to say Ndege could only be removed by the General Assembly.

But that power does not automatically mean that any removal process is lawful.

Article 8 requires FKF officials to observe the federation’s Constitution, FIFA and CAF rules, while Article 3 commits FKF to internationally recognised human rights. 

If Ndege’s claims about inadequate notice and denial of a proper opportunity to respond are ultimately established, the issue would therefore be not whether FKF possessed termination power, but whether that power was exercised according to due process and the applicable employment and constitutional framework.

The situation became much more serious on April 24, 2026, when nine NEC members led by Mariga attempted to suspend Hussein Mohammed, Acting CEO Dennis Gicheru and nominated NEC member Abdullahi Yusuf Ibrahim.

They invoked Article 87, arguing that exceptional circumstances and the doctrine of necessity allowed the NEC to act.

Their allegations included the controversial Ksh42.48 million CHAN insurance transaction, governance concerns and alleged breaches of public procurement and public finance laws. They also sought a forensic examination of FKF’s finances. 

But this is where the constitutional machinery became extremely important.

Article 38 says the president convenes NEC meetings. If at least 50 per cent of NEC members request a meeting, the president has 21 days to convene it; only if he fails to do so may those members convene the meeting themselves. It also requires agenda items to be submitted at least seven days before the meeting and the agenda to be circulated at least seven days in advance. 

Article 40 requires more than half of NEC members to be present, requires decisions to be made by a majority of valid votes, and requires decisions to be recorded in the minutes. 

And Article 41 provides the disciplinary pathway: a dismissal motion must be justified and circulated with the agenda, the affected person must have a right to defend himself, and dismissal must be decided by secret ballot with a two-thirds majority. 

FIFA subsequently rejected recognition of the April suspension, saying the process did not comply with Article 41 and related constitutional safeguards. 

That is perhaps the most important precedent in the entire saga.

FIFA itself has already demonstrated that constitutional procedure matters more than the political strength of the faction taking the decision.

The Mariga camp therefore cannot simply argue that it was right because it had claims against Hussein. It still had to follow the rules.

This is where the November expulsion becomes particularly interesting.

FKF says the General Assembly removed Mariga, Robert Macharia, Bernard Lagat, Violet Kerubo, Collins Kalee, Gabriel Mghendi and Dan Shikanda because of alleged serious and repeated violations of the FKF Constitution and FIFA regulations.

– the April 24 resolution seeking to remove Hussein Mohammed;

– repeated failure to attend NEC meetings;

– unauthorised communication on behalf of FKF;

– and other alleged constitutional violations. 

On paper, FKF had a constitutional route.

Article 24(c) expressly gives the General Assembly power to dismiss the President and other NEC members.

Article 24(o) also gives the General Assembly authority to revoke the mandate of one or more members of an FKF body. 

So the central question is not whether Congress can remove NEC officials. It plainly can.

The question is whether the procedure used in Meru complied with the Constitution.

This could become the strongest legal challenge.

> “The person of a body in question has the right to defend himself.”

The seven officials have already disputed the process, saying they were denied an opportunity to defend themselves. 

That allegation is potentially significant.

If the General Assembly was dealing with dismissal of persons from an FKF body, Article 41 requires the affected officials to have a right of defence.

And Article 41(3) requires the dismissal motion to be justified and sent to NEC members and/or FKF members along with the agenda. 

Therefore, the key documents in any legal challenge will be:

What exactly was sent to the seven officials before the SGM?

Were they given sufficient time to prepare a response?

Were they allowed to address the Assembly before the vote?

Those questions are far more important than the 65–1 headline.

FKF President Hussein Mohammed said 65 of 66 Congress members voted for the dismissal. 

But under Article 41(5), the relevant constitutional threshold is a two-thirds majority of valid votes, and the provision specifies a secret ballot. 

The constitution also says General Assembly decisions are normally made by secret ballot, show of hands or electronic count, with the Assembly determining the voting method. 

Therefore, FKF should be able to demonstrate precisely:

– how many eligible delegates were present;

– how the voting method was selected;

– whether the dismissal vote itself was secret;

– how many were invalid or abstentions;

– and how the final tally was recorded.

If that documentation exists, it should be relatively easy for FKF to publish or produce it.

If it does not, the controversy will only grow.

6. There is another potentially important issue: Article 16

FKF has said it acted under Articles 16 and 24.

Article 16 concerns expulsion of an FKF Member. The Constitution defines Members as entities such as Premier League clubs, NSL clubs, counties and recognised associations. 

Article 16 says the General Assembly may expel a Member for serious or repeated violations, and requires a two-thirds vote. 

But Mariga and the six others are natural persons serving on the NEC, not FKF Members in the constitutional sense.

That creates an important legal distinction.

If FKF literally “expelled” them as Members under Article 16, the federation may have to explain exactly what constitutional status it was terminating.

If, instead, the action was a dismissal/revocation of their NEC mandates, then Articles 24(c), 24(o) and 41 appear to be the more directly relevant provisions.

This may sound like semantics, but in a constitutional dispute the legal basis of the decision matters enormously.

Article 31 requires members to be notified of the place, date and agenda of a Special General Assembly at least 14 days before the meeting. It also says that where members themselves request an SGM, the agenda must contain the matters they requested and cannot subsequently be altered. 

Therefore, FKF should disclose the original SGM notice and agenda.

If the disciplinary charges against Mariga and the six were included in the circulated agenda in the prescribed manner, FKF’s position becomes stronger.

If new charges were introduced at the meeting, or if the agenda was materially altered after the notice period, the seven officials would have a much stronger argument that the process was defective.

The scenes at Three Steers Hotel are politically damaging, but the presence of police, tear gas and groups of youths does not automatically invalidate an SGM.

The more important question is whether legitimate delegates were prevented from entering and exercising their constitutional rights.

Mariga arrived under police escort and there were disputes over access to the venue. The expelled officials subsequently said that they were denied the opportunity to defend themselves. 

If accredited delegates were physically prevented from entering the meeting, that could become a much more serious issue.

Article 22 says only a duly convened General Assembly has authority to make decisions. Article 23 says only delegates present can vote. 

So the court or FIFA would potentially have to establish:

Were excluded delegates legitimate representatives?

Did their exclusion affect quorum or the voting outcome?

That is why the attendance register could become one of the most important documents in the dispute.

The most politically awkward aspect of this saga is that the federation’s current leadership has already benefited from the principle that constitutional procedure cannot simply be ignored because officials believe they are acting in the federation’s best interests.

In April 2026, Mariga’s faction said exceptional circumstances justified bypassing ordinary procedure.

FIFA ultimately refused to recognise the suspension because of procedural deficiencies. 

Now the Hussein administration has removed Mariga and six allies.

That means FKF should be prepared to meet the same procedural standard it demanded from Mariga’s faction.

Otherwise, the federation risks creating a dangerous precedent:

one set of constitutional rules for the opposition and another for the administration.

There is not enough publicly established evidence to state as fact that Hussein Mohammed or FKF deliberately engineered the expulsions to conceal wrongdoing or eliminate anyone who disagrees with them.

But there is enough evidence to ask whether institutional retaliation is becoming a feature of FKF governance.

First, Ndege falls out with the president and is removed amid claims of procedural irregularity.

Then Mariga and his allies attempt to remove Hussein and trigger an investigation into financial and governance allegations. Their process is rejected by FIFA. 

Months later, Mariga and six of the NEC members who participated in that challenge are themselves removed from the federation’s leadership. 

That sequence is enough to justify a governance question, even if it does not prove a conspiracy.

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