The Director-General, Institute for Police and Security Policy Research, Dr Charles Omole, in this interview with SEYE OLUMIDE, assesses the security and political risks surrounding the 2027 presidential election. He warns of the potentially destabilising consequences of manipulating election results, while examining how economic reforms, worsening hardship, insecurity and declining public trust could shape the contest and test Nigeria’s political stability.
How serious is the threat that the 2027 election could become a trigger for widespread political violence?
THE threat is very serious. I would classify it as a Category-4 risk on a credible national-security matrix. The history is clear: the 2011 post-election violence left more than 800 people dead across 12 northern states within 72 hours, while SBM Intelligence estimated about 620 election-related deaths in 2019. The 2023 election also recorded ballot-box snatching, intimidation and attacks in Rivers, Imo and the Southeast.
The 2027 is more combustible because five security theatres overlap: Boko Haram/ISWAP in the Northeast; banditry and kidnapping in the Northwest; IPOB/ESN-linked militancy in the Southeast; renewed militancy in the Niger Delta; and communal violence across the Middle Belt. Inflation reached about 34.8 per cent in early 2024, the naira fell from roughly N460 to above N1,500 per dollar, and the World Bank estimates more than 104 million Nigerians live in multidimensional poverty. Trust in INEC was about 36 per cent, and in the police, 24 per cent, in the 2024 Afrobarometer data. Social media can turn a disputed result into a national crisis within hours. Intervention must begin now.
What are the likely consequences if Nigerians believe the 2027 election was rigged or manipulated to favour the incumbent, and what should government and political actors be doing now to prevent such a scenario?
The fear is justified. The greatest danger is not simply a disputed result but further delegitimisation of state institutions. Nigeria’s democratic compact depends on citizens believing elections provide a credible route to choosing leaders. The 2023 presidential election left many voters, particularly Peter Obi and Labour Party supporters, deeply aggrieved, while minority opinions in the Supreme Court questioned aspects of the process.
If 2027 is widely perceived as manipulated, national cohesion could weaken amid separatist agitation and youth alienation; confidence in INEC, the judiciary, and security agencies could decline; and international pressure could affect economic and security relations.
President Tinubu should publicly commit to free and fair elections and accept the result if he loses. INEC needs stronger legal protection against interference and late rule changes. Parties should sign a binding peace accord. Civil society and international observers should monitor registration, logistics and security deployment months before voting. Electoral credibility must be built into the process.
What are the major security flashpoints you foresee before, during and after the election? Are there particular regions or categories of voters that security agencies should be paying special attention to?
The threat should be mapped across the electoral timeline. Before the election, politically volatile areas, particularly Rivers, require monitoring. The Northwest also needs attention, as bandit groups can disrupt civic activities.
During voting, the Northeast remains vulnerable. In 2019, more than 20 Borno local government areas recorded near-zero turnout in certain categories due to insecurity. The Southeast faces risks from enforced sit-at-home orders across Anambra, Imo, Ebonyi, Enugu and Abia. Plateau, Benue, Nasarawa and Taraba remain exposed to communal violence.
The most dangerous post-election period may be the first 72 hours after the presidential results. Rapid-response forces should be positioned in Kano, Kaduna, Lagos, Port Harcourt and Abuja. Women, first-time young voters and internally displaced persons require special protection. IDP voting also needs stronger security and logistics planning.
One paradox is that insecurity can prevent people from voting, while political actors can also exploit insecurity to manipulate turnout in particular areas. What safeguards should INEC and the security agencies put in place to ensure that insecurity does not become an electoral weapon?
This is one of the most sophisticated forms of electoral manipulation: using insecurity to suppress turnout in an opponent’s stronghold while allowing supporters elsewhere to vote. Because suppression occurs before counting, litigation may struggle to reverse it.
I recommend five safeguards. First, INEC and the Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on Election Security should conduct independent threat assessments for all 774 local government areas at least six months before voting and match deployment to objective risk.
Second, Nigeria needs dedicated electoral-security units trained for polling, collation and rapid intervention. Third, INEC should operate a real-time incident dashboard using accredited observers nationwide. Fourth, high-risk areas should undergo security audits, with transparent rules for postponement and rescheduling. Quietly cancelling results under vague security claims should be prohibited.
Fifth, post-election reconciliation should be part of security planning. Insecurity must never determine which Nigerians are permitted to vote.
The APC appears to have considerably strengthened its political machinery, while the opposition remains divided despite several attempts to form a common front. Beyond personalities, what exactly is the opposition lacking that could ultimately work to the APC’s advantage in 2027?
The APC’s organisational advantage is substantial. It controls the federal government and governs approximately 33 of Nigeria’s 36 states, giving it access to political networks, incumbency resources and mobilisation structures. But the opposition’s deeper weaknesses are organisational.
First, the national grassroots infrastructure is weak. The Labour Party’s 2023 appeal was strong among younger and urban voters, yet its ward-level organisation was insufficient to translate that enthusiasm across rural Nigeria. ADC and NDC face similar problems.
Second is dependence on defectors, which can create a credibility gap. Third is the North-South coalition challenge: a presidential candidate must secure at least 25 per cent of votes in two-thirds of the 36 states — 24 states — as well as the highest overall vote.
Fourth is finance. Reports put the leading 2023 presidential campaign spending at roughly N80 billion to above N200 billion. Opposition parties have struggled to match such fundraising capacity. Organisation, geographic reach and resources convert sentiment into votes.
Do you think the opposition’s biggest problem is a lack of unity, or is it a deeper failure to offer Nigerians a compelling alternative programme on security, the economy and governance? In other words, can simply uniting against President Tinubu defeat the APC?
Simply uniting against President Tinubu cannot defeat the APC. Negative coalitions rarely survive a demanding national campaign without a common programme and credible leadership.
The deeper problem is programmatic weakness. Opposition parties have not sufficiently produced cost-effective, evidence-based plans for security, jobs, economic recovery, and public services.
The security deficit is especially serious. The Northeast conflict has lasted about 18 years and displaced approximately 2.4 million people, according to the IOM’s 2024 Nigeria Displacement Report. UN estimates put the Lake Chad Basin’s economic cost above $9 billion, while conflict-related deaths, including hunger and disease, have exceeded 300,000. In the Northwest, banditry has contributed to an estimated 20,000 kidnappings since 2011 and mass displacement in Zamfara, Kaduna, Katsina and Sokoto.
Turnout in 2023 was only 26.7 per cent, the lowest in the Fourth Republic. The opposition needs serious policy teams, effective communication and credible governing candidates. Unity without substance is theatre.
President Tinubu’s economic reforms, particularly the removal of the fuel subsidy and exchange-rate reforms, were presented as necessary measures to rescue the economy, but they have also imposed enormous pressure on households. From a security perspective, how dangerous is prolonged economic hardship to national stability?
Prolonged hardship is a national security threat because it accelerates recruitment, weakens community resilience and lowers the threshold for protest and political violence.
Food inflation reached approximately 40 per cent in 2024. The minimum wage rose from N30,000 to N70,000, yet N70,000 remained below $45 monthly at prevailing exchange rates. Rice that cost roughly N500 per kilogram in 2022 now costs N1,500 to N2,000 in many markets.
Boko Haram/ISWAP, bandit groups and criminal networks can exploit economic desperation, especially among unemployed young people. At the same time, collapsing livelihoods weaken the community networks that support stability and informal intelligence.
The August 2024 #EndBadGovernance protests, which spread across several states despite limited central coordination, were a warning. The government should therefore treat employment, food security and poverty reduction as security interventions. If hardship remains severe in 2027, political entrepreneurs and armed groups will have a larger pool of vulnerable citizens.
At what point does economic reform become counterproductive from a national-security standpoint? Should Nigeria continue the current reforms despite the hardship, modify them substantially, or temporarily slow some of them to provide citizens with relief?
The direction of the reforms, removing the fuel subsidy and unifying the exchange rate, was economically defensible. By 2022, Nigeria was spending approximately N10 trillion annually on fuel subsidies, while multiple exchange rates created opportunities for rent-seeking. Reversing the reforms could restore an unsustainable cycle.
The problem is sequencing. Reform becomes counterproductive when its social cost destroys the stability required to sustain it. The Conditional Cash Transfer programme targets about 15 million households but has faced weaknesses in funding, administration, and targeting. Ghana’s LEAP, Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net Programme and Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme show how targeted support can protect vulnerable populations during difficult reforms.
The government should continue structural reforms while expanding transparent assistance to the poorest households, especially rural communities and urban informal settlements. Relief must be independently audited and based on vulnerability, not party affiliation.
The security calculation is clear: targeted relief is cheaper than widespread unrest, criminal recruitment and instability.
Some Nigerians argue that the Tinubu administration inherited a deeply damaged economy and security architecture and therefore needs more time for its reforms to produce results. Others say Nigerians cannot be asked to endure indefinite hardship on the promise of future benefits. Where do you stand in this debate?
Both sides have important truths. The inheritance argument is supported by data. Nigeria’s fiscal deficit averaged about 4.6 per cent of GDP between 2016 and 2022, while domestic debt reached approximately N46 trillion. The Tinubu administration also inherited foreign-exchange obligations and a security architecture under pressure across the Northeast, Northwest and Southeast.
But the endurance argument is equally compelling. A household struggling to buy food cannot experience macroeconomic improvement through government balance sheets. National security depends on living conditions because they influence whether citizens remain peaceful, protest, migrate or become vulnerable to recruitment.
The government should reject the false choice between reform and relief. First, reduce the cost of governance across the executive, legislature and judiciary. Second, pursue an industrial policy that creates jobs in manufacturing, agricultural processing, and technology. Third, implement an anti-inflation programme focused on food, combining strategic imports where necessary with incentives for domestic production and stronger competition.
Political capital is finite. The government must demonstrate tangible improvements before the election.
If you were advising President Tinubu strictly from a national-security perspective, what are the three most important things you would tell him to accomplish between now and January 16, 2027?
First, deliver visible and measurable security improvements in major conflict theatres. Nigerians need to see safer communities, reopened markets, the return of displaced populations, and falling kidnapping rates. The government should set specific security targets and publicly measure progress.
Second, protect INEC’s independence and credibility. The President should publicly commit to non-interference and ensure adequate funding, institutional autonomy, and accountability for security personnel involved in electoral manipulation. An APC victory in a genuinely free election strengthens democracy; a victory perceived as manipulated could destabilise the country.
Third, implement a transparent economic-relief programme for the most vulnerable households. It should be independently audited and free from partisan targeting. Economic relief that becomes an electoral patronage scheme would be counterproductive.
How important is the credibility of the security agencies themselves? If opposition parties and citizens believe that the police, military, or intelligence agencies are taking sides, can Nigeria realistically hold a peaceful election, even if INEC performs professionally?
The credibility of the security agencies is a load-bearing pillar of the electoral system. INEC can conduct a technically sound election, but if voters believe the police or military are partisan, the legitimacy of the entire process can still collapse.
Security agencies operate throughout the electoral cycle, during campaigns, at polling units, while results are transported and during post-election disputes. Allegations that security personnel protect ruling-party interests, intimidate opponents or fail to act against political violence can therefore destroy public confidence.
There must be a clear and publicly enforced code of conduct for all security agencies, with individual accountability for violations. The leadership of the police, military, and intelligence services must demonstrate neutrality, while credible, independent bodies should be able to investigate and report on complaints.
Looking beyond Tinubu, Atiku, Obi and the other presidential contenders, what is really at stake for Nigeria in 2027? Are we simply choosing another government, or approaching a defining moment for national unity and democracy?
We are approaching a defining moment. What is at stake is larger than who occupies the presidency. It is about whether Nigeria’s institutions, elections, courts, security agencies, and the federal structure can sustain genuine democratic competition in a deeply plural society.
Nigeria’s young population is increasingly connected, politically conscious and impatient with institutions it believes have failed it. If that perception becomes stronger in 2027, the consequences could include deeper political alienation, emigration, radicalisation and stronger ethnic, regional and religious identities.
Nigeria’s unity is not guaranteed. It depends on institutional credibility and the belief that the national project remains worthwhile. A credible election, regardless of who wins, can renew that belief. A fraudulent or widely contested election could weaken it for years.
If you had to identify one thing that could make the 2027 election dangerous — not politicians’ rhetoric, but a specific weakness in Nigeria’s security or political architecture — what would it be, and what can still be done?
I would identify the credibility of results transmission and verification. Nigeria’s most dangerous electoral moments arise when there is a gap between what voters believe happened at polling units and what is eventually declared.
BVAS and IReV were important technological advances in 2023, but technical failures and inconsistencies created room for suspicion, disinformation and conspiracy theories. The system must therefore become more transparent and independently verifiable.
Before January 2027, INEC should strengthen end-to-end electronic transmission of results, provide citizens with simple ways to verify polling-unit results, and subject the entire results architecture to an independent technical audit before election day.
If the government and INEC are prepared to accept a results system that is transparent even when it produces an outcome they dislike, Nigeria will have taken a major step towards a credible election for Nigerians.
