In April 2026, a Ghanaian broadcaster known widely by his stage name found himself facing a contempt application before the High Court in Accra over a series of broadcasts on a pending gold deal case. Around the same period, a viral court order involving a former bank executive’s associate, and a separate bench warrant matter concerning a court order that had allegedly been disobeyed, kept the phrase “contempt of court” trending on Ghanaian social media. For many citizens, these episodes raise a genuine question: what exactly is contempt of court, and where does the line sit between holding the judiciary accountable through public scrutiny and undermining its authority altogether?
WHAT THE LAW SAYS
Ghana’s 1992 Constitution does not create the offence of contempt from nothing; it recognises and preserves a power the courts have always held. Article 19(12) permits a Superior Court to punish a person for contempt of itself notwithstanding the ordinary guarantees of a fair trial, while Article 126(2) vests the Superior Courts with the power to commit for contempt to secure due compliance with the judicial process. Beyond these constitutional anchors, however, Ghana has no single, codified statute setting out what conduct amounts to contempt. The offence remains largely a creature of common law and judicial precedent, developed case by case.
Ghanaian courts distinguish two broad categories. Civil contempt arises where a party wilfully disobeys a specific court order or judgment; the remedy is typically compensatory, often a fine or damages payable to the injured party. Criminal contempt, by contrast, punishes conduct that obstructs, scandalises, or interferes with the administration of justice itself, and can attract a fine, imprisonment, or both. The Supreme Court, in the case of Republic v Sito I; Ex Parte Fordjour, laid down the essential elements that must be established before a person can be committed for civil contempt: that a judgment or order existed requiring the person to do or refrain from doing something; that the person knew precisely what was required of them; and that they wilfully failed to comply.
A further, more contested strand is the doctrine sometimes called “scandalising the court” — conduct, including public commentary, alleged to lower the authority or dignity of a court or a sitting judge. In the Effiduase Stool Affairs matter, the courts described contempt broadly as any act or omission tending to obstruct the orderly administration of justice or to impair the dignity of the court and respect for its authority. This broad formulation is precisely what makes the doctrine so consequential in an age of live-streamed commentary and social media broadcasting.
THE CASE FOR THE POWER
Contempt jurisdiction exists for defensible reasons. A court’s orders are only meaningful if they can be enforced; without a credible sanction for wilful disobedience, litigants would have little incentive to comply with judgments, freezing orders, or injunctions. Criminal contempt similarly protects the integrity of ongoing proceedings — a witness intimidated by publicity, a judge subjected to a coordinated smear campaign mid-trial, or court officials threatened for carrying out lawful duties, all represent genuine threats to fair adjudication. In a young democracy still consolidating public trust in its institutions, the ability of courts to defend their own authority against deliberate obstruction is not a trivial or ceremonial power; it is foundational to the rule of law.
THE CASE FOR CAUTION
Yet the very breadth that makes contempt effective also makes it dangerous. Because Ghana lacks a codified contempt statute, the boundaries of the offence are set largely by judicial interpretation, which can vary from one bench to another and can appear, to the public, unpredictable or even self-serving when judges are effectively defining the limits of criticism against themselves. Comparable common law jurisdictions have grappled with this tension directly: England and Wales, for instance, abolished the common law offence of “scandalising the court” through the Crime and Courts Act 2013, concluding that it was rarely used and sat uneasily with modern free expression standards.
For Ghana, the risk is twofold. First, an expansive reading of contempt can chill legitimate journalism and public commentary on matters that are self-evidently of public interest, particularly cases touching corruption, high-value financial deals, or politically connected individuals. Second, because contempt applications can be initiated by well-resourced litigants against ordinary citizens, bloggers, or broadcasters, there is a structural risk that the power becomes a tool of intimidation rather than a shield for justice, especially where the underlying substantive case is itself contested.
TOWARD A BALANCED FRAMEWORK
None of this argues for weakening the judiciary’s authority to enforce its own orders. It argues for clarity. Ghana would benefit from a dedicated Contempt of Court Act that codifies the distinction between civil and criminal contempt, sets out proportionate sanctions, defines the “scandalising” category narrowly and with reference to demonstrable risk of prejudice rather than mere embarrassment, and preserves robust protection for fair comment on matters of public interest under Article 21’s guarantee of free expression. Codification would not weaken the courts; it would strengthen public confidence that contempt is being applied as a shield for justice rather than a sword against scrutiny.
As Ghana’s media environment grows louder and more immediate, the judiciary, the legal profession, and civil society all have a stake in getting this balance right — one that protects both the dignity of the bench and the vibrancy of public accountability that a functioning democracy requires.
Rexford Adjei Darko
Public Relations Practitioner, Governance & AI Advocate and CSR Researcher.
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