Explainer: Why Mariga’s expulsion from FKF could face a legal fight over due process

The Football Kenya Federation (FKF) General Assembly may have delivered a decisive political blow to Vice-President McDonald Mariga and six other National Executive Committee (NEC) members, but the manner in which the decision was reached could leave the federation facing another battle before the Sports Disputes Tribunal (SDT).

Mariga, Robert Kenneth Macharia, Bernard Korir Lagat, Violet Kerubo Momanyi, Collins Opiyo Kalee, Gabriel Mghendi and Daniel Akala Shikanda were expelled from the NEC during Saturday’s, November 7, 2026 Special General Meeting (SGM) in Meru.

The federation said the seven were removed over serious and repeated violations of the FKF Constitution and applicable FIFA regulations. Among the matters considered was the April 24, 2026 NEC resolution that sought to remove FKF President Hussein Mohammed and other officials, as well as claims that the seven repeatedly failed to attend NEC meetings and communicated on behalf of the federation without authorisation.

The vote was overwhelming: 65 of the 66 delegates present supported the removal, with AFC Leopards chairman Boniface Ambani reportedly being the only delegate to oppose it.

On the surface, FKF argues that the General Assembly had the constitutional authority to dismiss the officials.

Article 24(c) of the FKF Constitution gives the General Assembly the power to elect, ratify and dismiss the President and other NEC members. Article 41 also states that the General Assembly may dismiss a person of a body.

But that does not necessarily end the matter.

The crucial question is whether the power to dismiss was exercised through a fair and constitutionally compliant process.

That is where several potential weaknesses emerge.

One of the strongest arguments available to Mariga’s camp concerns the role played by Hussein Mohammed.

The central allegation considered by the Assembly was the April 24, 2026 NEC resolution that attempted to remove Mohammed, Acting Secretary-General Dennis Gicheru and nominated NEC member Abdullahi Yusuf.

That April resolution had already triggered legal proceedings. On April 27, 2026, the SDT issued interim orders restraining Mariga and others from implementing the resolutions, effectively freezing the attempted leadership change.

Yet the SGM that subsequently considered the conduct of Mariga and the other six was chaired by Mohammed.

That creates an obvious question of perceived impartiality.

The argument is not necessarily that Mohammed had no constitutional right to chair the General Assembly. Article 42(5) expressly provides that the FKF President shall preside over the General Assembly.

The problem is more specific: can the person who was the target of the disputed April 24, 2026 resolution preside over a proceeding where that same resolution is one of the principal grounds for removing the people who passed it?

A football lawyer identified this as a possible breach of the basic principle that nobody should effectively sit in judgment over his or her own cause.

Even where there is no express constitutional clause automatically disqualifying the president, the appearance of bias can become important when the legality of a disciplinary process is challenged.

The issue becomes more complicated because Mohammed himself had been placed under scrutiny by a section of the FKF General Assembly.

On October 27, 2026, delegates issued Mohammed with a six-count show-cause notice raising questions about governance, financial management, appointments, league administration and the handling of NEC minutes. The notice asked him to explain why disciplinary action, including possible removal, should not be considered.

The proposed SGM was therefore not simply a one-sided disciplinary exercise.

There were competing claims against both sides of the FKF leadership.

The delegates who issued the notice against Mohammed had sought to have those claims considered at the same November 7 meeting. Yet the eventual FKF communiqué focused on the conduct of the seven officials led by Mariga.

That creates a potentially important procedural question: was the SGM genuinely a neutral forum for determining misconduct, or had it effectively become a forum for resolving one side of an internal power struggle?

If Mohammed was entitled to defend himself against the six grounds, the same principle of procedural fairness would ordinarily be expected to apply to the seven officials facing removal.

This is perhaps the most important distinction in the entire dispute.

FKF will rely heavily on Article 24(c), which clearly gives the General Assembly the power to dismiss NEC members.

But Article 41 sets out a specific dismissal procedure.

It says the motion must be justified, the person facing dismissal has a right to defend himself or herself, and the motion must be decided by secret ballot. It further requires a two-thirds majority of valid votes for the motion to pass.

At the same time, Article 64 establishes the Disciplinary Committee, Ethics Committee and Appeals Committee as FKF’s judicial bodies. Article 65 gives the Disciplinary Committee power to impose sanctions under the Constitution and Disciplinary Code, while Article 66 gives the Ethics Committee disciplinary powers over officials and other persons under its jurisdiction.

That creates a possible jurisdictional argument.

If the Assembly merely exercised its constitutional power to dismiss elected NEC officials, FKF has a strong textual basis for saying the action was within its authority.

But if the Assembly went further and effectively investigated allegations, determined guilt and imposed a punitive disciplinary sanction, Mariga’s lawyers could argue that the federation used the wrong forum.

The distinction matters because the Constitution itself recognises judicial bodies for disciplinary matters.

The Sports Disputes Tribunal has previously emphasised the importance of properly constituted FKF judicial bodies and natural justice. In March 2026, the Tribunal quashed decisions of FKF committees after finding that the disciplinary body had not been properly constituted and that the process had violated natural justice.

That precedent does not automatically invalidate the Meru decision, but it demonstrates that procedural defects within FKF’s disciplinary machinery can have serious consequences.

The timing of the Assembly’s decision could provide another line of attack.

Mariga had already gone to the Sports Disputes Tribunal challenging disciplinary proceedings initiated against him by FKF.

In May, the SDT granted interim protection after Mariga argued that disciplinary proceedings against him should be stopped. The Tribunal said the matter disclosed sufficient urgency and that he had demonstrated a prima facie case warranting interim protection.

The dispute therefore did not begin at the Meru SGM.

There was already a legal process concerning Mariga’s disciplinary exposure.

The question now becomes whether FKF could bypass, supersede or duplicate that process by taking the same underlying conduct to the General Assembly and obtaining a dismissal.

That is the basis of the forum-shopping argument raised by football lawyer @sikri_.

If the Assembly was simply exercising its separate constitutional dismissal power, FKF could argue that there was no duplication.

But if the Assembly was effectively determining the same disciplinary allegations that were already before the SDT or FKF judicial bodies, Mariga’s lawyers could argue that the federation created two parallel tracks for the same conduct.

Another potentially significant issue is the circumstances under which the seven were excluded from the SGM.

Reports from Meru said the meeting was disrupted by a police operation, with tear gas fired at the venue as delegates gathered. The meeting, scheduled for 9am, was delayed before eventually proceeding.

Citizen Digital reported that the seven were voted out in their absence after allegedly being barred from accessing the SGM venue.

That is potentially serious because Article 41(4) expressly says that a person facing dismissal has the right to defend himself.

FKF President Hussein Mohammed has given a completely different account.

After the vote, Mohammed said the seven had been invited to make submissions, had not responded in writing and had neither appeared nor sent legal representatives.

That creates a factual dispute that could become central to any court or tribunal case.

If FKF can produce evidence showing that each of the seven received adequate notice of the charges, was given reasonable time to prepare a defence and voluntarily chose not to participate, the federation’s position becomes considerably stronger.

But if the seven can establish that they attempted to attend, were prevented from entering the venue or were otherwise denied a meaningful opportunity to defend themselves, the constitutional argument becomes much more serious.

The Constitution does not simply say that an NEC member can be removed by an ordinary majority.

Article 41(5) provides that a dismissal motion must be decided by secret ballot and requires a two-thirds majority of valid votes.

Reports from Meru state that 65 of 66 delegates voted for the removal.

That figure appears to comfortably satisfy the two-thirds threshold.

But the question is not only the arithmetic.

The Constitution specifically says the dismissal motion shall be decided by secret ballot. If the Meru vote was conducted openly rather than secretly, that could present a direct procedural challenge.

Available reports have described the result as 65-1 but have not independently established the precise voting method used.

That detail could therefore become critical if the seven challenge the resolution.

The events preceding the vote were extraordinary for a constitutional meeting of a national sports federation.

The SGM was disrupted by the presence of large groups of youths, followed by the deployment of the Rapid Deployment Unit and the use of tear gas at the Three Steers Hotel.

Mariga was escorted to the venue by police.

The question for a tribunal would not simply be whether there was disorder outside the meeting.

It would be whether the disorder materially affected the ability of delegates and the officials facing dismissal to participate in a fair constitutional process.

If the seven were physically unable to access the meeting while the delegates proceeded to determine their political future, they could argue that the circumstances undermined the fairness of the process.

Again, this is an evidentiary question rather than an automatic ground for nullification.

Any serious analysis must acknowledge the other side.

It would be incorrect to claim that the General Assembly had no authority to remove Mariga and the six.

The FKF Constitution expressly gives the General Assembly the power to dismiss the President and other NEC members under Article 24(c). Article 41 also expressly provides that the General Assembly may dismiss a person of a body.

Furthermore, Article 65(3) expressly says the disciplinary provisions are subject to the disciplinary powers of the General Meeting and NEC concerning the suspension and expulsion of Members.

“The General Assembly cannot dismiss Mariga because only the Disciplinary Committee can discipline him.”

The Constitution makes that proposition too broad.

“The General Assembly had the power to dismiss him, but it had to exercise that power in accordance with the procedural safeguards contained in the Constitution and principles of natural justice.”

That is a much more difficult argument for FKF to defeat.

There is another provision that deserves attention.

Article 34 of the FKF Constitution states that decisions passed by the General Assembly ordinarily take effect 60 days after the close of the General Assembly, unless the Constitution provides otherwise or the Assembly fixes another effective date.

This could become relevant to the implementation of the Meru resolution.

FKF has said it will communicate further on implementation and the resulting administrative arrangements.

Therefore, the expelled officials could potentially ask the SDT to stop the implementation or registration of the resolutions while the legality of the process is tested.

Yes, it is legally arguable, but it is not yet possible to say that it is automatically null and void.

Mariga and the six have several potentially serious grounds to challenge the decision:

The strongest point is therefore not that the General Assembly lacked power to dismiss the seven. It plainly has such power under the FKF Constitution.

The potentially stronger case is that the power may have been exercised through a procedurally defective process.

And that distinction could determine what happens next.

The logical next move for Mariga and the six would be to challenge the implementation of the Meru resolutions before the Sports Disputes Tribunal and seek interim orders preventing the Sports Registrar and FKF from acting on the resolutions until the dispute is determined.

There is already a history of the SDT intervening in the FKF leadership dispute.

In April 2026, the Tribunal froze the resolutions that had sought to remove Mohammed from office.

The Tribunal has also demonstrated in another 2026 case that it will scrutinise whether FKF bodies were properly constituted and whether proceedings complied with natural justice.

That does not guarantee Mariga victory. But it means the 65-1 vote in Meru may not be the final word.

The decisive issue will ultimately be whether FKF can demonstrate that the Assembly’s overwhelming vote was reached through the procedure required by its own Constitution.

In football administration, numbers can settle a vote. They do not necessarily settle a constitutional dispute.

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