The Elections Amendment Bill 2024: What You Need to Know

The Elections Amendment Bill 2024 — formally the Elections (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill, 2024 (Senate Bill No. 29 of 2024) — has been one of the most fiercely debated pieces of legislation in recent Kenyan history. It was introduced in Parliament on July 7, 2024, co-sponsored by Senate Majority Leader Aaron Cheruiyot (Kericho) and Minority Leader Stewart Madzayo (Kilifi). The bill is a direct product of the National Dialogue Committee (NADCO) process, the bipartisan talks formed in 2023 to ease political tensions after the disputed 2022 presidential election. Its original purpose was to fix the unconstitutional framework for recalling Members of Parliament, but it evolved into a wider set of electoral reforms.

The Senate passed the bill on December 5, 2024, and transmitted it to the National Assembly on February 12, 2025. The National Assembly passed it on Thursday, October 22, 2026. Throughout the Senate debate, three senators in particular — Edwin Sifuna (Nairobi), Godfrey Osotsi (Vihiga) and Boni Khalwale (Kakamega) — backed the bill, even as it drew intense criticism from transparency advocates.

The flashpoint is Clause 22, which replaces Section 39 of the Elections Act, 2011. The new provision removes the express legal requirement for the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to livestream results as they are announced at polling stations. That obligation had previously been set out in Section 39(1G) of the Act. The bill does not ban livestreaming outright, but it no longer compels the IEBC to operate a public live feed.

Several transparency measures remain. The IEBC must still electronically transmit presidential results within two hours of declaration at polling stations. It must also publish polling station results forms — the Form 34As — on a public online portal for verification. And figures declared at individual polling stations are still treated as final. Critics argue, however, that these measures are not a substitute for real-time public access to the announcement process itself.

To understand why the bill looks the way it does — and why blame cannot fairly be pinned on one side — it helps to see exactly who sat on NADCO and its implementation machinery. There were two distinct layers.

The core committee was co-chaired by Kalonzo Musyoka (Wiper leader, representing the Azimio opposition) and Kimani Ichung’wah (National Assembly Majority Leader, representing Kenya Kwanza). It was a ten-member body drawn from both sides of the political divide. Kenya Kwanza’s team included Embu Governor Cecily Mbarire, while Azimio’s side included DAP-K leader Eugene Wamalwa, who was a member of the committee. This is the committee that produced the NADCO report and recommended the electoral reforms that later became the Elections Amendment Bill.

After the report was adopted, a separate five-member team was appointed to oversee implementation of NADCO’s 10-point agenda. It is chaired by former Nominated Senator Agnes Zani, with governance expert Javas Bigambo as vice-chairperson. The other members are Fatuma Ibrahim, Gabriel Oguda, and Kevin Kiarie. Both UDA and ODM are represented on this team, and the executive directors of both parties support its secretariat.

Former Chief Justice David Maraga has dismissed this implementation team as a “pata-potea committee,” arguing that it is another bureaucratic layer that will produce little. But whatever one thinks of its effectiveness, the composition is clear: it is a joint UDA–ODM structure, not a vehicle of one side.

The charge that the government “sneaked in” the removal of mandatory livestreaming collapses under the weight of the NADCO record. The opposition was not a bystander to this bill. It was a co-author of the framework, a co-sponsor of the legislation, and an active participant in the corrections made to it before passage.

First, the bill was co-sponsored by the opposition’s own Senate leadership. Stewart Madzayo, the Senate Minority Leader from ODM, was one of the two sponsors of the Elections (Amendment) Bill, 2024. The bill did not arrive in Parliament over the opposition’s objections; it was carried in by the Minority Leader himself.

Second, the NADCO process was co-chaired by the opposition. Kalonzo Musyoka led the Azimio side of NADCO alongside Ichung’wah. The electoral reform recommendations — including the provisions that touched on Section 39 — emerged from a committee he jointly steered. When Kalonzo later said the bill was “one way of stealing the coming elections” and called for NADCO’s implementation, the awkward fact remained that the framework he was demanding be implemented was the same framework that produced the bill. You cannot credibly co-chair the body that recommends a reform, co-sponsor its legislative vehicle, and then disown the clause you dislike as somebody else’s plot.

Third, the opposition caught and corrected the drafting errors itself — inside the NADCO framework. In May 2024, Azimio discovered that the published NADCO bills differed from what the committee had approved. Madzayo protested to Senate Speaker Amason Kingi, leading to the immediate withdrawal of the three bills, including the Elections (Amendment) Bill, 2024, for correction and republication. Madzayo said the bills had been “mutilated” and that “had they not owned up to the errors and withdrawn the Bills, we would be on the streets today”. This is the behaviour of a co-owner of the process, not a victim of it. The opposition had the opportunity — and used it — to fix what it believed was wrong before the bill was finalised.

Fourth, opposition-aligned senators voted for the bill and defended it on NADCO grounds. Sifuna, Osotsi and Khalwale did not support the bill because they were coerced; they supported it because it was the NADCO package. Osotsi publicly pressed for the IEBC amendment bill to be signed without delay, and Sifuna’s entire political argument in early 2026 was that the NADCO reforms had to be delivered, not stalled. The opposition’s own MPs and senators were in the room, on the committee, and on the record supporting the NADCO legislative basket.

Beyond NADCO politics, supporters advanced two substantive arguments. First, they argued that signed results forms, not broadcasts, are the legally decisive record. Form 34A establishes the recorded vote at polling-station level, and a live broadcast should not be confused with the formal verification and declaration process. Second, they pointed to the complicated litigation history of Section 39. The High Court in Katiba Institute and others v Attorney General invalidated several 2017 amendments, including Section 39(1G), and a 2023 Court of Appeal decision upheld findings of unconstitutionality. Supporters presented the bill as a chance to clean up wording affected by court decisions and make the procedure clearer.

Critics were unconvinced. Former Chief Justice David Maraga said the change contradicts Article 86 of the Constitution, which demands an electoral system that is “accurate, verifiable, secure, accountable and transparent.” Former LSK President Faith Odhiambo stressed that the bill is “not a ban on livestreaming” but removes the legal obligation, and urged Parliament to expressly require it. Martha Karua called the move “a sign of fear.” Foreign Affairs PS Korir Sing’oei argued that livestreaming had built public and international confidence and that technological problems should be fixed, not used as a reason to scrap the requirement. Deputy Speaker Gladys Boss Shollei defended the bill, pointing to existing safeguards such as the right to seek a recount.

The bill has now passed both Houses of Parliament. As of late October 2026, it awaits presidential assent. No signing date has been scheduled. The debate it triggered — between those who see it as a necessary NADCO reform and those who see it as a retreat from real-time electoral transparency — will continue well into the 2027 General Election cycle. But on the narrow question of responsibility, the record is clear: the opposition co-chaired the committee, co-sponsored the bill, and corrected its drafts. Blaming only the other side is not supported by the facts.