AG, EOCO & OSP under pressure to deliver answers over AKSA bribery scandal

The conviction in the United States of the ex-Managing Director of the Tema Oil Refinery (TOR), Asante Kwaku Berko, in connection with the AKSA power plant deal should have marked an important turning point in Ghana’s efforts to confront corruption in the awarding and management of public contracts. Instead, it has raised a broader question about the state’s commitment to accountability: what happens after the public announcements, expressions of concern, and promises of investigation?

Following the US jury’s decision on 6 August 2026, the Attorney General’s office indicated that it was engaging its American counterparts to pursue persons implicated in the alleged bribery scheme. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) also publicly acknowledged its role in assisting the FBI with investigations that contributed to Berko’s conviction. These statements raised expectations that Ghana would pursue the domestic dimension of the case with the same seriousness.

There has since been some clarification. On 17 August, the Deputy Attorney General explained that the Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO) was leading Ghana’s local investigation, with the Attorney General’s office coordinating aspects of the engagement with US authorities. He also cautioned against hastily cancelling the AKSA agreement, arguing that the government first needed to establish the legal consequences of the bribery allegations and assess the possibility of a judgment debt.

On 27 August, the Special Prosecutor, Kissi Agyebeng, also addressed the matter publicly. He stated that the OSP’s investigation into the Ghanaian dimension was ongoing and identified five principal persons of interest, alongside other current and former officials whose conduct was being examined. He was careful to distinguish between a person of interest and a suspect, and to emphasize that the US conviction did not automatically establish criminal liability under Ghanaian law.

These are important clarifications. But they do not answer the fundamental question facing the Ghanaian public: what concrete progress has been made, and what should the country expect next?

An investigation cannot be expected to unfold entirely in the public domain. There are legitimate reasons for protecting evidence, respecting due process and avoiding disclosures that could compromise investigations or prejudice the rights of individuals. Neither the Attorney General nor the OSP should be pressured into making premature disclosures or announcing prosecutions before the evidence is ready.

However, confidentiality cannot become a permanent substitute for public accountability. Where a matter concerns a major public power agreement, allegations of bribery involving public officials and the potential exposure of the state to substantial financial obligations, citizens are entitled to periodic and meaningful updates. The public should not have to rely on occasional press conferences or isolated media reports to understand whether the institutions responsible are making progress.

The distinction between the US proceedings and Ghana’s domestic investigation is important, but it should not become an excuse for inaction. The US jury convicted Berko of conspiring to pay and paying more than US$1 million in bribes to Ghanaian officials between 2014 and 2015 in connection with the development and financing of the 370MW AKSA power plant. That conviction is a significant development. It establishes criminal conduct on the part of the convicted individual under the laws applied in the United States. It does not, by itself, establish the guilt of every Ghanaian official or other person mentioned in the proceedings. Those cases must be investigated and prosecuted on their own evidence.

Yet the conviction raises questions that Ghana cannot afford to leave unanswered. Who received the alleged payments? What roles did public officials play in facilitating the transaction? Were procurement, approval and due diligence processes compromised? Were public institutions used to advance private interests? Did the state receive value for money from the agreement? And what legal options are available if the circumstances surrounding the transaction are found to have undermined its integrity?

These questions are not simply about criminal liability. They concern the governance of public contracts, the protection of public resources and the credibility of institutions responsible for managing the country’s energy sector.

There is also a danger that the debate could become narrowly focused on whether the AKSA agreement can be cancelled without triggering a judgment debt. That is a legitimate legal and fiscal consideration, but it cannot be the only consideration. The state must examine the circumstances under which the agreement was negotiated, the commercial terms, the allocation of risks, the actual cost to consumers and taxpayers, and whether the contract remains in the public interest. The possibility of a judgment debt should not prevent scrutiny; equally, the desire to terminate a controversial agreement should not override sound legal and financial analysis.

What would be unacceptable is for the initial public attention generated by the US conviction to gradually disappear while the underlying questions remain unresolved. It would be equally troubling if announcements of investigations became a convenient way of deflecting public scrutiny without a clear institutional commitment to deliver results.

The public deserves answers from the Attorney General, EOCO and the OSP. Which institution is responsible for which aspects of the investigation? What progress has been made in obtaining and examining evidence from the US proceedings? Have the relevant financial transactions, communications and public sector decisions been traced? Is the review of the AKSA agreement proceeding alongside the criminal investigation? What are the expected milestones, and when can the public expect a further update?

There is no suggestion that investigative agencies should conduct their work through media commentary. But they must recognise that public confidence depends not only on the existence of investigations, but also on credible evidence that those investigations are being pursued independently, professionally and without selective treatment.

The AKSA case is also a test of Ghana’s institutional maturity. Corruption in major public contracts is rarely sustained by one individual acting alone. It often involves networks of private interests, intermediaries, public officials and institutional failures. Addressing only the individual convicted abroad, without examining the domestic systems and decisions that made the transaction possible, would leave the deeper governance problem unresolved.

The question, therefore, is not whether the Attorney General or the OSP issued statements after the US conviction. They did. The question is whether those statements will lead to demonstrable accountability.

Ghanaians should not have to choose between protecting the state from an avoidable judgment debt and demanding accountability for possible corruption. Both are legitimate public interests, and the government has a responsibility to pursue them together.

Several months after the US conviction, the country needs more than assurances that investigations are ongoing. It needs evidence of institutional progress, a credible account of the process and, ultimately, decisions that demonstrate that public office and public contracts are not beyond scrutiny.

The AKSA case must not become another episode in which public outrage produces official statements, official statements produce temporary reassurance, and the passage of time quietly brings the matter to an end.