Inside Uganda’s Cabinet: The Ministers Backing Muhoozi’s 2031 Bid — and Those Keeping Their Distance

The political conversation around Uganda’s next presidential succession has entered a new phase following Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba’s declaration that he will seek the presidency in 2031.

Muhoozi, who is also Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) and chairman of the Patriotic League of Uganda (PLU), announced in August that he would stand for the country’s highest office in 2031. The declaration was subsequently formally communicated by PLU leaders in Kampala, setting off a nationwide endorsement campaign.

Since then, ministers, Members of Parliament and other political figures have increasingly made their positions visible through PLU structures, public endorsements and mobilisation activities.

At Ubuntu Times, we examined the current Cabinet and publicly available records to establish who has actually demonstrated support for the Muhoozi project, who has clashed with him and who should simply be classified as not publicly aligned in the evidence reviewed.

One of the strongest indicators is formal involvement in the PLU itself.

Ambassador Adonia Ayebare, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, is among the most notable cases. Muhoozi publicly supported Ayebare for a Foreign Affairs role before the 2026 Cabinet was announced. Ayebare was subsequently appointed full Foreign Affairs Minister. He was later assigned Patriotic Officer number PO 102 within the PLU structure.

The relationship became even more visible this week when Muhoozi singled Ayebare out while announcing his new position on ministerial foreign travel, describing him as a disciplined cadre who does not travel without his permission.

Haruna Kyeyune Kasolo, State Minister for Foreign Affairs in charge of Regional Affairs, is another clear example. He was assigned PO 014 in Muhoozi’s Patriotic Officer structure.

Kasolo has also recently spoken directly about the 2031 transition. At a thanksgiving ceremony in Kyotera on September 20, he said Ugandans calling for a peaceful transfer of power would witness a transition in 2031 under Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba.

His relationship with Muhoozi came into focus again this weekend after Kasolo travelled to Türkiye for official engagements. Muhoozi publicly said he had not cleared the trip and demanded an explanation. Kasolo subsequently responded that he would seek Muhoozi’s guidance and authority in future.

Frank Tumwebaze, Minister of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries, is also formally embedded in the PLU structure. He was appointed to the PLU Central Committee and was assigned PO 013. He has also been appointed alongside Edwin Karugire and Col Christopher Muwumba to administer the Shs1 billion MK Fund.

Kiryowa Kiwanuka, the Minister of Defence and Veteran Affairs, sits on the PLU Central Committee and serves as the organisation’s vice chairman for Buganda. He was also assigned PO 061.

Balaam Barugahara, Minister of Local Government, is one of the most visible political promoters of the movement. He serves as PLU Regional Vice Chairman for Western Uganda and sits on the Central Committee. In September, he went further and publicly said that when President Museveni retires, he would unequivocally endorse Muhoozi to lead Uganda.

Dr Jane Ruth Aceng Ocero, the Government Chief Whip, is another senior figure whose involvement is documented. She was assigned PO 015, while the PLU’s official endorsement archive carries a statement from her as Government Chief Whip concerning preparing the next generation to carry Uganda forward.

Lillian Aber, State Minister for Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees, sits on the PLU Central Committee and serves as the organisation’s Northern Uganda women’s representative.

Minsa Kabanda, Minister for Kampala Capital City and Metropolitan Affairs, has perhaps provided the clearest recent example of an active Cabinet-level endorsement. She was appointed to coordinate Muhoozi’s endorsement campaign in Kampala and has been overseeing the collection of signatures across the capital’s five divisions. She has publicly said that endorsing Muhoozi does not mean leaving the NRM and that PLU and NRM should remain united.

Other serving ministers and ministers of state have also been formally incorporated into the PLU structure.

They include Peter Ogwang, State Minister for Sports, who was assigned PO 041 and has been given responsibility for PLU mobilisation in Teso; Anifa Bangirana Kawooya, State Minister for Health (General Duties), assigned PO 062 and publicly endorsed Muhoozi; Charles Ayume, State Minister for Primary Health Care, assigned PO 063; and Phiona Nyamutoro, State Minister for Minerals, assigned PO 064.

Justine Nameere Nsubuga, State Minister for Local Government, is another recent addition to the public list. On September 22, she visited the PLU headquarters and formally endorsed Muhoozi for president in 2031 and beyond.

The 2026 Cabinet therefore contains a substantial number of officials whom PLU itself identifies as members or allies. Daily Monitor reported in May that PLU regarded at least 17 members and allies as having secured ministerial positions in the new Cabinet.

The most obvious case is Maj Gen (Rtd) Kahinda Otafiire, now Minister of Water and Environment.

Otafiire’s position is considerably clearer than simply saying he has “not supported” Muhoozi.

He has publicly rejected the idea of Muhoozi succeeding President Museveni. In 2024, Otafiire said that he did not personally hate Muhoozi but did not support him becoming president. His disagreements with the younger general have continued into 2026.

In February this year, the two again exchanged public remarks, with Muhoozi threatening that Otafiire was close to being arrested and Otafiire responding dismissively. The confrontation followed Otafiire’s criticism of alleged extrajudicial killings within the security system.

That makes Otafiire one of the few serving senior ministers for whom there is direct public evidence of disagreement with the Muhoozi succession project.

Dr Chris Baryomunsi, now Minister of Health, presents a slightly different case.

In 2024, Baryomunsi publicly distinguished PLU from the NRM and said the NRM remained confident in President Museveni’s leadership, arguing that it was premature to discuss PLU’s presidential plans.

His relationship with Muhoozi became particularly tense in early 2026 after Baryomunsi, then Minister of ICT and National Guidance, said statements made by the CDF on social media did not automatically represent the official position of government.

The disagreement escalated publicly, with Muhoozi calling Baryomunsi a traitor and saying he would not remain a minister. Baryomunsi responded that he had risen through his own abilities and was not dependent on holding a ministerial position.

Yet Baryomunsi remained in Cabinet after the reshuffle and was moved to the Health Ministry. That makes his case important: there is documented friction, but that does not amount to evidence that he is organising against Muhoozi.

Names such as Milly Babirye Babalanda, Minister in the Office of the President; Vice President Jessica Alupo; Prime Minister Robinah Nabbanja; and Justine Kasule Lumumba appear regularly in discussions about the balance between the established NRM leadership and the emerging PLU network.

But after reviewing the public material available for this report, we did not find sufficiently clear evidence to place them in the same category as ministers such as Barugahara, Ayebare, Kasolo, Tumwebaze, Aceng, Kiryowa or Minsa.

That does not mean they are opposed to Muhoozi.

It simply means that, based on the public record reviewed, there is not enough evidence to describe them as active public endorsers of his 2031 bid.

For example, the current Cabinet list confirms Babalanda, Alupo and Nabbanja remain senior figures in the 2026–2031 administration, while the PLU-linked figures are increasingly visible through the movement’s own organisational structures.

Silence, therefore, should not automatically be interpreted as resistance.

The importance of these alignments has increased because Muhoozi’s presidential ambition is no longer merely a subject of speculation.

On August 25–26, he publicly declared that he would stand for the presidency in 2031. PLU subsequently launched a nationwide endorsement campaign, with the movement targeting millions of signatures.

That has created a new political calculation for members of the ruling establishment.

Some ministers are now not merely attending PLU events; they hold positions inside its hierarchy, have received Patriotic Officer numbers or are actively coordinating the 2031 endorsement campaign.

Others, particularly some of the older NRM figures, have either challenged Muhoozi directly or maintained a public emphasis on President Museveni and the existing NRM structures.

There is also an interesting middle ground: officials who may work closely with Muhoozi institutionally but have not publicly declared themselves part of his presidential project.

The latest controversy involving Haruna Kasolo adds another dimension.

On September 26, Muhoozi announced that all ministers must obtain his permission and clearance before travelling outside Uganda. He said ministers who travelled without his permission would face a Shs30 million fine and said the Ministry of Finance would implement the arrangement.

The statement followed Kasolo’s trip to Türkiye.

Muhoozi also specifically praised Foreign Affairs Minister Adonia Ayebare as a “disciplined cadre” who does not travel without his permission. Kasolo subsequently responded to Muhoozi by acknowledging his authority and saying his guidance would be sought.

Importantly, Muhoozi’s announcement was made publicly on social media. The reports reviewed did not identify a formal law, Cabinet decision or other administrative instrument establishing the proposed Shs30 million penalty or explaining its enforcement mechanism.

That distinction is important for reporting: it should be described as a directive or announcement by the CDF, rather than automatically calling it a legally established government decree.

The emerging picture is therefore more complicated than a simple “pro-Muhoozi versus anti-Muhoozi” Cabinet.

On one side is a growing network of ministers with direct PLU positions, Patriotic Officer numbers and public involvement in the 2031 endorsement campaign.

On the other are figures such as Otafiire and Baryomunsi, whose public records contain direct disagreements with Muhoozi or with aspects of the political project around him.

Between the two is a much larger group whose public positions on a Muhoozi presidency remain less explicit.

What has changed is that the 2031 question is no longer theoretical.

With Muhoozi openly declaring his presidential ambition and PLU actively collecting endorsements, Cabinet members and other NRM figures are increasingly being observed not only for what they say, but also for which political structures they join, which events they attend and which succession project they publicly associate themselves with.This version deliberately does not put Milly Babalanda, Alupo, Nabbanja or Lumumba in an “anti-MK” list without evidence. That makes the piece much harder to challenge factually, while Otafiire and Baryomunsi have enough documented material to be treated separately.

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