Ghana is Africa’s largest gold producer and the seventh-largest in the world, according to the United States Geological Survey. However, the outcomes of the country’s international gold trade ought to be interpreted with stakeholders mindful of the economic trajectories and challenges surrounding the country’s future.
In Ghana, gold is produced through two main streams:
- Long-established Gold Mines (LSMGs), such as Newmont, AngloGold Ashanti, Gold Fields and, until recently, Damang Gold Mine.
- Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASGM).
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its Selected Issues report published in August 2026, estimates that between 2021 and 2023, about 229 tonnes of gold worth $11.4 billion were smuggled out of Ghana.
In 2023 alone, the discrepancy between gold exports reported by Ghana and imports reported by the United Arab Emirates exceeded $4 billion.
In an attempt to materially reduce, and perhaps completely eliminate, gold smuggling, the newly sworn-in Government of Ghana in 2025 established the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) to regulate the gold sector, promote responsible sourcing, generate foreign exchange (FX), and support the accumulation of gold reserves by the Bank of Ghana (BoG).
The statutory mandate of the Bank of Ghana
The Bank of Ghana has statutory objectives under the Bank of Ghana Act, 2002 (Act 612), as amended by the Bank of Ghana (Amendment) Act, 2016 (Act 918) and the Bank of Ghana (Amendment) Act, 2025 (Act 1158).
The primary objective of the Bank is to maintain stability in the general level of prices.
To achieve its statutory objectives, the BoG performs several functions, including:
| No. | Statutory function |
|---|---|
| a | Formulates and implements monetary policy. |
| b | Promotes, through monetary measures, the stabilisation of the value of the currency. |
| c | Institutes measures likely to have a favourable effect on the balance of payments, the state of public finances and the general development of the national economy. |
| d | Regulates, supervises and directs the banking and credit systems and ensures the smooth operation of the financial sector. |
| e | Licenses, regulates, promotes and supervises non-banking financial institutions. |
| f | Promotes and maintains relations with international banking and financial institutions. |
| g | Implements international monetary agreements to which Ghana is a party, subject to the Constitution or any other relevant enactment. |
| h | Does all other things incidental or conducive to the efficient performance of the functions of the Bank under Act 612, as amended, and any other enactment. |
For the purpose of this discussion, the focus is on the first three functions, namely (a), (b) and (c).
Domestic Gold Purchase Programme
In performing these statutory functions, the BoG introduced the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP) in 2021, at a time when Ghana was experiencing a sharp decline in reserve buffers, significant exchange-rate pressures and loss of access to international capital markets following successive credit-rating downgrades.
The main objectives of the DGPP were:
- Gold for Oil (G4O): Using gold acquired to procure oil.
- Gold for Reserves (G4R): Building international reserves through gold.
- Forex intermediation: Using gold transactions to generate foreign exchange.
Under the DGPP, the Bank engages in gold transactions through three primary channels:
- Purchase of refined gold from mining companies at their respective London Bullion Market Association (LBMA)-certified refineries and placement of the gold with international bullion banks as part of the Bank’s reserve management operations.
- Purchase of doré gold from approved gold aggregators for onward shipment to LBMA-certified refineries, where selected quantities are refined into monetary gold and, where appropriate, placed with international bullion banks as part of the Bank’s reserve management operations.
- Purchase of doré gold from artisanal and small-scale miners through GoldBod for export in its unrefined form to off-takers for foreign exchange, mainly for market-intermediation purposes.
Like any institution, the BoG incurs both direct and indirect costs in performing its statutory functions. Management is, however, expected to ensure that such activities are undertaken prudently, cost-effectively and efficiently.
Policy solvency
Policy solvency is therefore an important measure of the Bank’s cost-effectiveness in implementing its policies.
Policy solvency reflects a central bank’s capacity to finance the full cost of its monetary policy operations, principally open market operations (OMO) and other liquidity-management instruments, from internally generated income without recourse to monetary financing or extraordinary government support.
It is measured as the difference between operating income from core activities, excluding dividend income and changes in the fair value of investment property, and the interest cost of sterilisation instruments.
A positive policy-solvency factor indicates that income flows are sufficient to cover the costs of monetary policy implementation. A negative factor signals that the institution is drawing on its capital base or requiring external support to fund what is, by statute, its primary responsibility.
IMF assessment of DGPP losses
Paragraph 17 of the IMF’s Selected Issues report published in August 2026 stated that the DGPP had generated significant losses for the Bank of Ghana.
According to the IMF, losses in 2024 were equivalent to almost $400 million, representing about 0.5% of GDP, with approximately one-third related to Gold for Oil operations.
In 2025, the significant scaling-up of DGPP operations led to losses of more than $1.7 billion, equivalent to about 1.5% of GDP.
The IMF said the 2025 losses were almost entirely related to Gold for Reserves (G4R) doré purchases, amounting to a loss of approximately 17% of the value of doré gold sold by the BoG.
The IMF identified four major components contributing to the losses:
| Loss component | Description |
|---|---|
| Gold for Reserves doré purchases | Losses associated with G4R doré transactions |
| Services and assay fees | Fees paid to GoldBod |
| Discounts on gold sold to off-takers | Discounts applied when gold was sold to exporters/off-takers |
| Foreign exchange losses | Losses arising from the difference between the forex bureau rate used to purchase gold and the cedi reference rate used by the BoG |
The IMF report did not disclose the precise amount attributable to each of these four components. This analysis therefore attempts to estimate the losses associated with them and assess whether they are related to policy solvency and other economic benefits.
A. Gold for Reserves doré purchases
The BoG’s 2025 financial statements provide the following information on gold holdings:
Table 1: Gold holdings — 2025 and 2024
| Particulars | 2025 GH¢’000 | 2024 GH¢’000 |
|---|---|---|
| Balance as at 1 January | 37,872,276 | 15,382,543 |
| Purchases during the year | 15,226,513 | 12,153,551 |
| Transfer of BIS collateralised gold | 2,975,419 | — |
| Gold sold during the year | (30,730,824) | — |
| Price movement reserves for gold holdings | 10,860,544 | 2,456,798 |
| Foreign exchange loss from conversion | (9,174,639) | 7,879,384 |
| Closing balance | 27,029,289 | 37,872,276 |
Source: Bank of Ghana 2025 Financial Statements, Page 70, Note 21a.
According to the BoG’s 2025 Annual Financial Statement, GH¢15.226 billion worth of gold was purchased during the year, while GH¢30.731 billion was sold.
Based on the IMF’s position that the losses amounted to approximately 17% of the value of doré gold sold by the BoG, 17% of GH¢30.731 billion would amount to approximately GH¢5.224 billion.
B. Services and assay fees paid to GoldBod
According to GoldBod’s 2025 financial statements, assay fees amounted to:
GH¢337,426,487
Source: GoldBod 2025 Financial Statements, Page 4.
C. Discounts on gold sold to off-takers
There is limited information in the BoG’s 2025 financial statements regarding the precise value of discounts on gold sold to off-takers.
The analysis therefore does not assign a definitive figure to this component.
D. Foreign exchange losses
The BoG’s 2025 financial statements, particularly Page 70, Note 21a, report a foreign-exchange loss from conversion of:
GH¢9,174,639,000
Summary of estimated losses
Table 2: Summary of losses
| No. | Item | Losses (GH¢) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 17% of gold sold | 5,224,240,080.00 |
| 2 | Services and assay fees paid to GoldBod | 337,426,487.00 |
| 3 | Discounts on gold sold | 0* |
| 4 | Foreign exchange losses | 9,174,639,000.00 |
| Total | 14,736,305,567.00 |
*No separate figure is established in the analysis because of limited information in the BoG financial statements.
From the above, the estimated losses associated with services and assay fees paid by the BoG to GoldBod amount to GH¢337.4 million.
The analysis suggests that the difference between the estimated losses above and the approximately GH¢22 billion in total losses referenced in the discussion could be attributed to discounts on gold sold. However, there is no evidence presented in the source to establish this amount; it is merely a suggestion based on the IMF’s assertion.
How did the BoG incur these losses?
The Bank of Ghana primarily uses aggressive Open Market Operations (OMOs) through its own short-term instruments, known as Bank of Ghana Bills, to execute its sterilisation policy.
These securities include short-term instruments such as:
- 14-day bills;
- 56-day bills; and
- 91-day bills.
The BoG floats these securities for commercial banks to purchase at various rates.
The proceeds from the sale of these short-term securities are then channelled towards the purchase of doré gold from artisanal and small-scale miners through GoldBod. The gold is subsequently exported in its unrefined form to off-takers for foreign exchange, mainly for market-intermediation purposes.
The process can be simplified as follows:
BoG Bills → Funds raised from commercial banks → Gold purchased through GoldBod → Gold exported to off-takers → Foreign exchange generated → Increased FX supply → Cedi support
The BoG gains foreign exchange from the sale of the gold. When sufficient foreign exchange is generated, the increased supply of FX can contribute to a depreciation in the value of foreign currencies against the cedi and support appreciation or stability of the cedi.
However, the policy intervention also creates several costs.
First, the BoG incurs interest costs on the BoG Bills purchased by commercial banks.
Second, the Bank incurs assay fees payable to GoldBod for laboratory testing and valuation of the gold.
Third, when the cedi strengthens as a result of increased foreign-exchange supply, the foreign exchange realised from gold sales may not provide the same cedi equivalent as the amount initially used to purchase the gold. This can create foreign-exchange losses.
Policy intervention solvency
The next question is whether, having incurred these losses, the BoG achieved policy solvency, or whether it had to resort to additional monetary financing.
Table 3: Policy solvency estimation — Bank of Ghana
| Item | 2025 GH¢’000 | 2024 GH¢’000 |
|---|---|---|
| Interest income calculated using the effective interest method | 8,457,241 | 7,472,450 |
| Net income from other financial instruments at FVPL | 1,125,659 | 1,057,599 |
| Fees and commission income | 704,322 | 464,793 |
| Other operating income | 2,373,061 | 394,248 |
| Net gain from sale of refined gold | 9,571,094 | — |
| Income from operations | 22,231,377 | 9,389,090 |
| Cost of open market operations | (16,730,526) | (8,595,549) |
| Operating income less cost of OMOs | 5,500,851 | 793,541 |
Source: Bank of Ghana 2025 Financial Statements, Page 7.
The policy-solvency estimation indicates that income from core operations, excluding dividend income and fair-value changes in investment properties, amounted to GH¢22.2 billion in 2025, compared with GH¢9.4 billion in 2024.
The cost of policy intervention, reflected in the cost of open market operations, amounted to GH¢16.7 billion in 2025 and GH¢8.6 billion in 2024.
Despite these costs, the Bank recorded a positive operating surplus of GH¢5.5 billion in 2025, compared with GH¢793.5 million in 2024.
This suggests that although the BoG incurred significant costs from its policy interventions, it also generated sufficient related income to end both years with positive operating surpluses.
The key question, therefore, is what economic benefits were generated by the policy interventions that resulted in these substantial costs.
Economic outcomes
The following indicators provide a basis for assessing the broader economic outcomes associated with the interventions.
Table 4: Selected economic indicators
| Indicator | 2025 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Inflation | 5.40% | 23.80% |
| Real GDP growth, including oil | 6.00% | 5.80% |
| Real GDP growth, excluding oil | 6.10% | 7.80% |
| Monetary Policy Rate | 18.00% | 27.00% |
| Interbank rate | 16.30% | 27.00% |
| Exchange rate (GH¢/US$) | 10.45 | 14.70 |
| Depreciation/Appreciation | 40.70% | -19.80% |
Source: Bank of Ghana 2025 Financial Statements.
Conclusion
Based on the financial statements of the Bank of Ghana and GoldBod, as well as the IMF’s Selected Issues report, the analysis concludes that the losses associated with the gold-trading operations were incurred by the Bank of Ghana, rather than GoldBod.
The central argument is that GoldBod received fees, including assay fees, in the process of facilitating the gold transactions, while the BoG bore the broader financial costs associated with the policy intervention.
The analysis therefore argues that the losses should appropriately be viewed as expenses incurred by the BoG in implementing its monetary and foreign-exchange policy interventions, rather than losses attributable to GoldBod as an institution.
At the same time, the interventions coincided with significant improvements in several economic indicators in 2025, including a sharp decline in inflation, a reduction in the Monetary Policy Rate and interbank rate, stronger real GDP growth including oil, and substantial appreciation of the cedi against the US dollar.
The key policy question is consequently not simply whether the BoG incurred losses, but whether the costs of the interventions were justified by the broader economic and monetary benefits generated for Ghana.
Author
Dickson Dziwornu Tawiah
CA, MPhil Finance, BSc Accounting, HND
References
- Bank of Ghana. (2025). Annual Report 2025. Bank of Ghana.
- Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod). (2025). 2025 Audited Financial Statements. Ghana Gold Board.
- Valerio, A., Guillaume, D., & Concha, A. (2025). Ghana: Selected Issues. International Monetary Fund.
- International Monetary Fund, African Department. (2026). Ghana: Selected Issues. IMF Staff Country Reports, 2026(213), 1.
