Abdi Dirshe
8 December 2011
The illegal invasion of Somalia exposes Kenya as a client state in the US empire building agenda, argues Abdi Dirshe. While political elites benefit from aid as a reward for their proxy status in the war against terrorism, the people will pay dearly for it.
‘For all students of human society, sympathy with the victims of historical processes and skepticism about the victor’s claims provide essential safeguards against being taken in by the dominant mythology.’ -Barrington Moore
With much bravado and arrogance, Kenya declared invasion of Somalia on October 18, 2011 in what it justifies as ‘a hot pursuit of al-Shabaab’. Several kidnappings of foreign tourists and several other shootings along the Kenyan border with Somalia presumably by al-Shabab led to the decision to engage full military invasion of Somalia to ‘inflict trauma’ on al-Shabab, according to the Kenyan authorities. Kenya invokes Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allows all countries to defend themselves against an armed attack by another state. In this perspective, Kenya’s claim of pursuing a terrorist group contradicts the letter and the spirit of Article 51.
Kenya is not attacked by Somalia, so Article 51 can’t be applied in this situation as confirmed by the International Court of Justice 2005 Advisory Opinion in the DRC v. Uganda Case (Democratic Republic of Congo V. Uganda, 2005 ICJ (Dec. 19)). Al-Shabab is erroneously used as a legitimating factor for the invasion of Somalia without any legal basis. In this view, Kenyan leadership could be charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity as a result of civilian deaths caused by Kenyan military invasion. Moreover, this action underscores the rapidly deteriorating international approach of the Somali conflict and the intricate political choices Somalis have to make.
In this context, the presence of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) represents the collective choice of the African Union, EU, US, and the UN with regards to the political crisis in Somalia and the war against al-Shabab. Similarly, the Somali people have a shared resolve to defeat al-Shabab but in the face of the Kenyan aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, all bets are off and we may see renewed support for al-Shabab as happened during the Ethiopian invasion in 2006. However, it is pertinent to point out that the Kenyan invasion is ill timed as it takes place while al-Shabab’s leadership is in disarray as they had suffered a deeply humiliating defeat in Mogadishu in the hands of the African Union and Somali forces. The tide against al-Shabab is significantly tied to the vast public support in Somalia for the defeat and elimination of al-Shabab for its violence against the civilian populations.
Moreover, since the collapse of the central State of Somalia in 1991, the Somali community in Kenya has been growing significantly and many Somalis have established their businesses there, bringing a relatively cordial relationship between the Kenyan and Somali people. For the political class of Kenya to claim that they are invading Somalia to prevent kidnappings in Kenya contradicts the interest of the two states and the action is politically dangerous and costly in the long-term for both Kenya and Somalia. At present, Somalia is facing haunting massive economic and political crises in which many people are dying from hunger and many more are displaced by endless wars. This invasion imposes new restrictions on the movement of refugees who are fleeing from these multiple threats which, if not eased immediately, may lead to significant loss of life. Similarly, Kenya’s confusion over its war aims emanates from, in part, the deep divisions within the elites and the fact that key international actors have divergent strategic objectives in the Horn of Africa that are designed to control the political decision-making processes in these countries.
In this context, recent events in Kenya can only be explained in conjunction with the broader globalisation agenda that informs particular foreign policy. As Robinson (1996) explains, after the end of the Cold War ‘diverse forces battle to reshape political and economic structures as a new world order emerges’. He argues that the focus increasingly shifted from ‘power concepts’ to ‘transnationalisation of civil society and of political processes’. This means that new political and social relations are formed to assist the emergence of a single global society in which no hostile or power vacuums are acceptable like those in ‘Somalia, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and the former Libya’ as disclosed by General Wesley Clark of the United States. In this perspective, the invasion of Somalia by Kenya can only be understood ‘as part of a broader process of the exercise of hegemony’ where Kenya and Somalia are less significant in the overall strategic objective.
This analysis seeks to discover the intricate emerging political class in East Africa and their participation in reshaping this region as part of the broader hegemonic agenda. Moreover, this analysis intends to explore crucial policy options for Kenya and Somalia to prevent extensive bloodshed in their pursuit of internal security and economic progress. In conclusion, I’ll present a compelling argument that presents alternative policy options in support of a lasting political solution in Somalia, which doesn’t threaten continued regional stability and also leads to regional security cooperation.
WRONG WAR STRATEGY
Kenya fails to consistently clarify the goals of its military adventure in Somalia. The Guardian (Nov. 8, 2011) reports that this invasion was planned long before with military advice from Western states. ‘Several sources agree, however, that the Kenyan intervention plan was discussed and decided in 2010, then finalised with input from western partners, including the US and to a lesser extent France. Nairobi seems to have seized on kidnappings of foreign nationals by Somali groups on Kenyan territory as an excuse to launch an operation ready and waiting.’ The rationale behind the Kenyan invasion of Somalia is to control parts of Somalia for political and economic motives. More importantly though, it is part of the broader US strategy to presumably ‘promote stability and prevail over extremism’ in this region in its war on terrorism and to bring the countries in the region under its political domain. In this view, for the US war has been strategically essential for the promotion of these ideals.
The current aggression against the Somali state is promoted by the US and Kenya as a limited security measure. However, this war is seriously flawed as its objectives may lead to a greater humanitarian disaster in Somalia and will surely spur new tensions between the Somali and Kenyan people. As Stoessinger (2011) puts it, war is a manifestation of organised insanity and sickness. In this context, those who wage war insanely believe that it would lead to successful resolution. This notion, Stoessinger advises, goes against the reality of war as he illustrates that ‘no nation that began a major war in this century emerged a winner’. In this context, Hitler of Germany, Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Milosevic of former Yugoslavia are all examples of aggressions that failed to achieve their objectives. Inadvertently, Kenya has succumbed to this temptation and has become fully merged with the US cause and accepts the conceptualization of US security framework.
In this perspective, Kenya has joined the US in its treatment of international law as what Bobbitt calls as ‘an inconvenient obstacle’ to be cast aside to pursue its state interest as it violates Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter and gravely misrepresents Article 51 in its claim to have the right to invade Somalia according to this article. From the US security perspective, Somalia poses a great challenge as it is considered to host multiple threats to US interest including a political vacuum that offers bases for terrorism and piracy that threatens international trade. Moreover, the Somali people have endured continued violence internally and suffered from complex political crises owing to external interference and military interventions for two decades. As a result, Somalia has become the object of contradictory international policy instruments; all seeking to, simultaneously, resolve humanitarian, political, social, economic, and security issues.
In this effort, the US has effectively enlisted the support of the countries surrounding Somalia to assist the US policy towards Somalia. These are Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti where the US has been building military bases such as Manda Bay in Kenya, Camp Lemonier in Djibouti and the remote southern Ethiopia airfield in Arba Minch where Reaper drones are flown to attack targets in Southern Somalia at present. In this context, the mission to deal with the ‘Somalia problem’ as the State Department describes it has created a joint battle by all government agencies in these countries, military and non-military actors. As the US government increased its Foreign Military Financing program (FMF), the countries surrounding Somalia have also received large military financial assistance as part of counterterrorism funding according to the US Defence Department.
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