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Selassie Ibrahim Launches SELPHARMA in East Legon: A Star-Studded Event

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Ghanaian actress and movie producer Selassie Ibrahim has officially opened her new shop, SELPHARMA, in East Legon, a vibrant area known for its upscale lifestyle. The grand launch attracted numerous celebrities, including renowned actress Jackie Appiah, who was spotted in a chic outfit, embodying elegance with her stylish hairstyle.

SELPHARMA offers a variety of products, including medications, toiletries, and confectionery, marking a unique venture for a Ghanaian celebrity. While many female stars have traditionally focused on boutiques and beauty brands, Selassie is pioneering this new business model in the health and wellness sector.

At the launch, Selassie Ibrahim showcased her products and engaged with guests, demonstrating her commitment to customer service. She looked stunning in a long-sleeved top and jeans, complemented by a fashionable blonde curly hairstyle and flawless makeup.

Jackie Appiah and other notable figures congratulated Selassie on her new venture. Social media reactions poured in, with fans and fellow celebrities expressing their support and excitement. Comments included:

– Jackie Appiah: “Awww, I had an amazing time.”

– Gloria Sarfo: “You’re always welcome, superwoman. Keep healing the world with your uniqueness!”

Selassie Ibrahim’s achievements extend beyond her business endeavors. She recently graduated with a master’s degree from a prestigious university in the United Kingdom, showcasing her dedication to both her career and education.

This launch not only highlights Selassie’s entrepreneurial spirit but also reflects the growing trend of celebrities diversifying their careers beyond entertainment. As she embarks on this new journey, it will be exciting to see how SELPHARMA evolves and contributes to the community.

Source [YEN.com.gh](https://yen.com.gh/entertainment/celebrities/275221-selassie-ibrahim-opens-selpharma-mart-east-legon-jackie-appiah-attends-grand-launch/).

Fire Service Seeks Public Support Amid Fires

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The Ghana National Fire Service (GNFS) has raised concerns about the increasing number of commercial fires across the country.

Public Relations Officer (PRO), Desmond Ackak, noted several recent incidents, including fires at the Kantamanto Market, Kwadaso Timber Market in Kumasi, Aboabo Timber Market in Tamale, and Techiman Market.

Speaking in an interview on Guide Midday News, on Guide Radio, Mr. Ackak linked the fires to negligence by users of market facilities, coupled with unfavorable weather conditions.

“The dry and windy weather has exacerbated the situation. People burn refuse or sawdust without ensuring the fire is completely out before leaving, leading to uncontrollable flames,” he explained.

The GNFS also cited delayed calls to report incidents as a major challenge.

“For example, the Techiman Market fire started at 9:30 pm, but we were called nearly 30 minutes later. Despite this, we swiftly deployed resources and managed to save over 700 stalls and nearby structures,” he added.

Mr. Ackak expressed frustration with the public’s tendency to record fire incidents on their phones instead of contacting emergency services.

“Our emergency numbers haven’t changed, yet people prioritize taking videos over calling for help. This delays response times and worsens the situation,” he lamented.

The GNFS spokesperson also noted that some fires, like the one at Kantamanto Market, appear suspicious, with flames igniting at multiple points simultaneously. Preliminary investigations are ongoing to determine the exact causes.

In addition to human factors, logistical challenges hamper firefighting efforts, he said, adding, “Our fire appliances are aged, and water supply issues in some areas complicate our work. Despite these hurdles, we’ve maintained a robust maintenance culture to keep our equipment functional.”

Mr. Adade called on the public, philanthropists, and authorities to support the GNFS with modern fire engines, personal protective equipment (PPE), and functional fire hydrants.

“We need collective advocacy to improve our resources. Without modernizing markets and enforcing safety protocols, these fires will persist, affecting livelihoods and development,” he warned.

The GNFS spokesperson emphasized his commitment to protecting lives and property while urging market managers to implement stricter safety measures.

“Our reports are shared with relevant authorities, and we continue to educate the public on fire prevention to minimize future incidents,” Mr. Adade concluded.

 

By Ernest Kofi Adu

The cost and implications of Member State withdrawals from ECOWAS

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The 2024 withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from ECOWAS represents a significant challenge to regional integration in West Africa.

This research by The GITFiC analyzes the multifaceted drivers behind this unprecedented event, exploring the role of disagreements over democratic transitions, concerns about regional security mechanisms, and economic grievances.

The study examines the potential consequences of the withdrawals, focusing on disruptions to trade flows, foreign direct investment, and regional security cooperation, as well as the broader political and diplomatic ramifications for both the withdrawing states and the remaining ECOWAS members.

The emergence of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) is also considered. The research concludes with practical policy recommendations for ECOWAS, the withdrawing states, and the international community to mitigate negative impacts and promote future regional stability and cooperation.

Introduction

The pursuit of regional integration has become a defining characteristic of contemporary international relations, driven by the understanding that collective action can yield significant economic, political, and security benefits.

In West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975, has served as the primary instrument for regional integration.

Founded in the aftermath of decolonization, amidst the challenges of nation-building and the aspiration for greater economic self-sufficiency, ECOWAS aimed to foster economic cooperation and development among its member states.

Over the ensuing decades, the organization’s mandate has broadened considerably, expanding beyond purely economic objectives to encompass crucial dimensions of peace and security, conflict resolution, democratic governance, and human development.

ECOWAS has played a critical role in mediating conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and other regional hotspots, demonstrating its commitment to maintaining stability and promoting peace.

The Regional Bloc has also made significant strides in facilitating the free movement of people, goods, and services, fostering intra-regional trade and cultivating a sense of shared regional identity.

Despite these notable achievements, ECOWAS has consistently faced a range of challenges, including economic disparities among member states, the slow pace of economic convergence, persistent security threats such as terrorism and cross-border crime, and recurring instances of political instability.

However, perhaps the most significant challenge to the bloc’s integrity in recent times has been the announced withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger in January 2024.

This event marks a critical juncture in ECOWAS’s history and raises profound questions about the future of regional integration in West Africa.

While the ECOWAS treaty stipulates a one-year notice period for withdrawal, the joint declaration by the three military-led states signals a decisive shift in the regional landscape and presents a significant test for the bloc’s resilience.

This withdrawal, driven by a complex interplay of factors including disagreements with ECOWAS over democratic transitions, perceived interference in internal affairs, and a growing sense of regional realignment, represents a significant departure from the organization’s founding principles of unity and cooperation.

Implications

The implications of the withdrawals are far-reaching and multifaceted, extending beyond the immediate economic, security, and political consequences for the departing states and the remaining ECOWAS members.

This unprecedented situation not only disrupts established trade and investment patterns, but also undermines regional security cooperation, weakens existing conflict resolution mechanisms, and potentially damages the bloc’s credibility and influence on the international stage. For Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, the consequences could include economic isolation, reduced access to regional markets and financing, and diminished political leverage within the region and beyond. For the remaining ECOWAS members, the withdrawals could lead to trade disruptions, increased security risks, weakening of the bloc’s collective bargaining power in international forums, and a potential erosion of investor confidence.

Furthermore, this coordinated withdrawal raises concerns about the potential for a domino effect, potentially encouraging other dissatisfied member states to reconsider their membership and unraveling decades of progress in regional integration in West Africa.

The formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) by the three withdrawing nations further complicates the regional dynamics.

Consequences of withdrawals

What are the specific economic, security, and political consequences of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’s withdrawal from ECOWAS? By examining the potential disruptions to trade and investment flows, the implications for regional security cooperation and conflict resolution mechanisms, the broader political and diplomatic ramifications for both the withdrawing states and the remaining ECOWAS members, and the impact of the newly formed AES, our study aims to provide a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the costs of this fragmentation. Our research is crucial for several reasons.

First, it fills a significant gap in the existing literature by providing a timely and detailed examination of the consequences of this unprecedented event in ECOWAS history.

Second, it offers valuable insights for policymakers, regional organizations, and international actors involved in promoting peace, security, and development in West Africa.

By understanding the potential costs and consequences of these withdrawals, policymakers can develop more effective strategies for mitigating the negative impacts, strengthening regional cohesion, and preventing further fragmentation within ECOWAS.

Thirdly the research contributes to broader academic debates on regional integration, providing a critical case study of the challenges and complexities of maintaining unity within a regional bloc in a dynamic and often turbulent global environment.

A comprehensive analysis of the motivations behind ECOWAS withdrawals

The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from ECOWAS in 2024 represents a significant development in West African regionalism.

Understanding this decision requires a nuanced examination of the complex interplay of political, security, and economic factors, recognizing that these motivations are intertwined and mutually reinforcing.

Political drivers: Asserting sovereignty in the face of perceived interference

At the forefront of the justifications provided by the juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger is the assertion of national sovereignty and a rejection of what they perceive as undue interference by ECOWAS in their internal affairs. This narrative has several key dimensions:

Rejection of ECOWAS’s democratic conditionality

Following the military coups in each country, ECOWAS imposed sanctions and demanded a swift return to civilian rule within specified timeframes.

The juntas viewed these demands as unrealistic, insensitive to their specific contexts, and an infringement on their right to manage their own transitions.

They argued that ECOWAS’s approach failed to acknowledge the complex security challenges they faced, which they cited as justification for the military interventions.

Narrative of external manipulation

The military regimes have consistently portrayed ECOWAS as being influenced by external actors, particularly France and other Western powers.

This narrative has resonated with segments of the population who harbour resentment towards former colonial powers and perceive Western involvement as neocolonialism. By framing their withdrawal as a rejection of external manipulation, the juntas have sought to bolster their domestic legitimacy and garner public support.

Distrust of ECOWAS institutions and leadership

The juntas have expressed distrust in ECOWAS institutions and leadership, accusing them of bias and a lack of understanding of the realities on the ground.

This distrust has been further fueled by ECOWAS’s imposition of sanctions and its refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the military regimes.

Consolidation of power and domestic legitimacy

By rejecting ECOWAS’s demands and asserting their sovereignty, the juntas have sought to consolidate their power and establish their legitimacy within their respective countries.

This strategy has been particularly effective in mobilizing nationalist sentiments and portraying the military regimes as defenders of national interests.

The critical role of security concerns

Security concerns have played a significant role in shaping the decision to withdraw from ECOWAS. The three countries have argued that ECOWAS has been ineffective in addressing the growing security threats in the Sahel region, particularly the spread of terrorism and violent extremism.

Perceived inadequacy of ECOWAS security responses

The juntas have argued that ECOWAS’s responses to the security crisis in the Sahel have been slow, inadequate, and poorly coordinated.

They contend that the organization has not provided sufficient support to their national security efforts and has failed to effectively address the cross-border nature of the threats they face.

Focus on counterterrorism and military solutions

The military regimes have prioritized counterterrorism efforts and military solutions to the security crisis.

This approach may diverge from ECOWAS’s broader focus on regional security, which includes conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, and addressing other transnational crimes.

This difference in approach has created friction between the juntas and ECOWAS.

Search for alternative security partnerships

The withdrawal from ECOWAS has coincided with the strengthening of security ties with other actors, such as Russia (particularly through the Wagner Group).

This suggests a desire to pursue alternative security partnerships that are perceived as more effective in addressing their specific security concerns. The formation of the AES further solidifies this point.

 The Contributing factor of economic grievances, unequal Benefits and the Impact of Sanctions

While less prominent in the official justifications for withdrawal, economic grievances have also played a contributing role.

Perception of unequal distribution of benefits

There is a perception in some quarters within these countries that they have not benefited proportionally from ECOWAS membership compared to other member states, particularly coastal nations. This perception is fueled by factors such as their landlocked status, limited economic diversification, and the impact of regional policies on their economies.

Exacerbation of economic hardship by sanctions

The economic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS following the coups have had a significant impact on these countries’ economies, further fueling resentment towards the organization.

While the sanctions were intended to pressure the juntas to return to civilian rule, they have also had unintended consequences, exacerbated economic hardship and potentially contributing to the decision to withdraw. This has created a sense of being punished by ECOWAS rather than supported.The Formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES): A New Regional Paradigm?

The creation of the AES by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger is a crucial element in understanding their withdrawal from ECOWAS. The AES suggests a desire to create a new regional security and cooperation framework that better addresses their specific needs and priorities.

Regional realignment and new alliances

The AES represents a significant realignment of regional power dynamics and the formation of new alliances. It suggests a desire to create a new regional bloc that is less influenced by external actors and more focused on addressing the specific challenges facing the Sahel region.

Emphasis on security cooperation

The AES places a strong emphasis on security cooperation, particularly in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. This reflects the shared security concerns of the three countries and their desire to pursue more effective joint security strategies.

Potential for broader cooperation

While initially focused on security, the AES could potentially expand its scope to include other areas of cooperation, such as economic development, trade, and infrastructure. This could lead to the emergence of a rival regional bloc to ECOWAS, further fragmenting West African regionalism.

Economic implications of member state withdrawal

The economic impact of member state withdrawals from ECOWAS is a multifaceted issue that affects various aspects of the regional economy. One of the primary concerns is the disruption of intra-regional trade, which can have far-reaching consequences for economic stability.

When a member state withdraws from ECOWAS, it can lead to a decline in trade between the withdrawing state and other member states, resulting in reduced economic activity and potential losses for businesses and industries that rely on regional trade (Olorunsola, 2017).

Another significant economic impact of withdrawals is the decline in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Reduced economic integration can deter foreign investors who are attracted to the region’s large market and economic potential.

This can lead to a decline in investment flows, which can hinder economic growth and development. Furthermore, the loss of FDI can also lead to a decline in technology transfer, knowledge sharing, and managerial expertise, which are essential for economic development.

Withdrawals from ECOWAS can also hinder economic growth, affecting living standards and poverty reduction efforts.

Economic integration is a key driver of economic growth, as it allows countries to specialize in areas where they have a comparative advantage, leading to increased productivity and competitiveness.

When a member state withdraws, it can lead to a decline in economic growth, as the country may no longer have access to the regional market and may struggle to compete with other countries that are part of the regional economic community.

In addition to these economic impacts, withdrawals from ECOWAS can also lead to a loss of economic benefits that member states derive from regional integration. These benefits include increased trade, investment, and economic cooperation, which can lead to improved economic performance and development.

When a member state withdraws, it forfeits these benefits, which can have long-term consequences for its economic development.

The economic impacts of withdrawals are not limited to the withdrawing state; they can also affect other member states and the region as a whole.

For instance, a withdrawal can disrupt regional supply chains, leading to increased transaction costs and reduced economic efficiency. This can affect the competitiveness of businesses and industries in the region, leading to reduced economic growth and development.

In terms of sectoral impacts, withdrawals from ECOWAS can affect various sectors, including agriculture, manufacturing, and services.

Disrupted trade can affect agricultural exports and food security, while reduced regional market access can hinder manufacturing growth. The services sector, including financial and transportation services, can also be impacted by reduced regional integration.

To mitigate the economic impacts, ECOWAS can adopt various strategies. One approach is to diversify its trade partners, strengthening trade relationships with other regions to reduce dependence on a single market.

Investing in transportation networks and border infrastructure can also help to reduce transaction costs and improve regional trade.

Fostering regional production networks can promote regional value chains, while strengthening ECOWAS institutions can help to address withdrawal challenges (Cisse, 2018).

In conclusion, the economic impact of member state withdrawals from ECOWAS is a complex issue that affects various aspects of the regional economy.

It is essential for ECOWAS to adopt strategies to mitigate these impacts, including diversifying trade partners, investing in infrastructure, promoting regional value chains, and strengthening institutions. By doing so, ECOWAS can reduce the economic costs of withdrawals and promote economic growth and development in the region.

Political and security impact

The withdrawal of a member state from ECOWAS can have significant political implications for the regional organization and its member states.

One of the primary concerns is the potential loss of regional influence that the withdrawing state may experience. As a member of ECOWAS, a state has the opportunity to shape regional policies and decisions through its participation in the organization’s decision-making processes.

However, upon withdrawal, the state may no longer have a seat at the table, and its ability to influence regional decisions may be significantly diminished.

The withdrawal of a member state can also weaken regional governance, leading to a decline in the effectiveness of ECOWAS institutions. This can be particularly problematic if the withdrawing state has significant economic or political power, as its departure may create a power vacuum that can be difficult to fill.

Additionally, the withdrawal can create political instability, particularly if the withdrawing state has significant economic or political ties with other member states.

The withdrawal can also alter regional power dynamics, potentially leading to a shift in the balance of power among member states.

This can be particularly significant in a region like West Africa, where there are already significant power imbalances between states. The withdrawal of a powerful state can create opportunities for other states to fill the power vacuum, but it can also lead to increased competition and conflict.

Moreover, the withdrawal of a member state can undermine regional integration efforts, making it more challenging for ECOWAS to achieve its goals.

Regional integration is a complex and challenging process, requiring the cooperation and commitment of all member states. When a state withdraws, it can create significant challenges for the organization, particularly if the withdrawing state has significant economic or political power.

In terms of security, the withdrawal of a member state from ECOWAS can have significant implications for regional security cooperation.

One of the primary concerns is the potential disruption of regional security cooperation, making it more challenging for ECOWAS to respond to security threats.

This can be particularly problematic in a region like West Africa, where there are already significant security challenges, including terrorism, piracy, and organized crime.

Furthermore, the withdrawal of a member state can lead to a loss of intelligence sharing, which can undermine regional security efforts.

Intelligence sharing is a critical component of regional security cooperation, allowing states to share information and coordinate efforts to address security threats. When a state withdraws, it may no longer share intelligence with ECOWAS, potentially creating significant security risks.

The withdrawal of a member state can increase the risk of terrorism, particularly if the withdrawing state has significant terrorist threats.

Terrorism is a significant security challenge in West Africa, and the withdrawal of a state can create opportunities for terrorist organizations to exploit.

Moreover, the withdrawal can undermine regional peacekeeping efforts, making it more challenging for ECOWAS to maintain peace and stability.

The GITFiC’s findings

Our study found that member state withdrawals from ECOWAS have significant economic impacts, including disruptions to intra-regional trade, declines in foreign direct investment, and hindered economic growth.

Additionally, withdrawals weaken regional governance, disrupt regional security cooperation, and increase security risks.

It also revealed that withdrawals undermine regional integration efforts, leading to reduced economic benefits and increased transaction costs and identified a lack of strong institutions, inadequate infrastructure, and insufficient regional cooperation as key challenges facing ECOWAS.

Economic impacts

Disruptions to intra-regional trade: Withdrawals disrupt trade flows, reducing economic activity and revenue, declines in foreign direct investment as withdrawals deter investors, reducing capital inflows and hindering economic growth hindered economic growth with limited economic opportunities and slowing growth and development.

Political and security impacts

Weakened regional governance and undermine ECOWAS’s authority and effectiveness, disrupted regional security cooperation and compromise security collaboration with increasing risks.

Impacts on regional integration

Undermined regional integration efforts as it hinders progress towards economic union, reduced economic benefits, with limited access to regional markets and resources, with increased transaction costs.

Key challenges identified by The GITFiC

Lack of strong institutions, ECOWAS needs robust institutions to enforce policies and decisions, inadequate infrastructure: Poor infrastructure hinders trade, investment, and regional connectivity, Insufficient regional cooperation: ECOWAS member states must enhance collaboration to achieve regional goals.

Recommendations

To address these challenges, ECOWAS should strengthen its governance standards by enhancing institutional capacity, transparency, and accountability. ECOWAS should also enhance regional cooperation by promoting dialogue, consultation, and collaboration among member states.

Moreover, ECOWAS should foster economic integration through trade liberalization, investment promotion, and infrastructure development. Developing strategies to mitigate security risks, such as establishing robust security frameworks, intelligence sharing, and counter-terrorism measures, is also crucial. Effective implementation of these measures requires strong political will, commitment, and coordination among ECOWAS member states.

The GITFiCs recommendations for ECOWAS:

Establish a High-Level Contact Group: Immediately establish a dedicated contact group composed of respected elder statesmen, diplomats, and technical experts to engage directly with representatives from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

This group should focus on building trust, exploring areas of common interest, and identifying potential pathways for future cooperation, even outside of formal membership. Practical Action: Appoint specific individuals with proven track records in mediation and diplomacy within immediately.

They should also conduct a Comprehensive Sanctions Impact Assessment: Commission an independent assessment of the economic and social impact of sanctions on the withdrawing states.

This assessment should inform a revised sanctions policy that minimizes harm to civilian populations and prioritizes targeted measures against individuals or entities directly responsible for undemocratic actions. Practical Action: Launch the assessment within three months, with findings published within six months.

They should develop a Joint Security Action Plan with Sahelian States (Including AES): Recognizing the shared security threats, ECOWAS should propose a joint security action plan with all Sahelian states, including those in the AES.

This plan should focus on enhanced intelligence sharing, joint border patrols, and coordinated counterterrorism operations. Practical Action: Initiate technical-level meetings with security experts from all relevant countries within four months to develop the framework for the action plan.

Create a Regional Stabilization Fund: Establish a dedicated fund to support economic development and address the root causes of instability in vulnerable regions.

This fund should prioritize investments in education, job creation, and infrastructure development, with a focus on border regions and areas affected by conflict.

Practical Action: Secure initial funding commitments from member states and international partners within six months and establish clear criteria for accessing the fund.

Enhance Transparency and Accountability of ECOWAS Institutions: Implement measures to enhance the transparency and accountability of ECOWAS institutions, including clearer communication of decisions, greater involvement of civil society in regional processes, and independent oversight mechanisms. Practical Action: Conduct an internal review of existing governance structures within six months and implement agreed-upon reforms within one year.

The GITFiC’s recommendation for the withdrawing States

Establish Technical Working Groups with ECOWAS on Specific Issues: Create technical working groups with ECOWAS counterparts to address specific issues of mutual concern, such as cross-border crime, humanitarian assistance, and trade facilitation. This allows for practical cooperation even without formal membership. Practical Action: Propose the formation of these working groups within two months, identifying specific areas of cooperation.

Develop National Transition Plans with Clear Timelines and Benchmarks: Develop and publicly commit to clear national transition plans with specific timelines and measurable benchmarks for returning to constitutional order.

This demonstrates a commitment to democratic principles and can help rebuild trust with ECOWAS and the international community.

Practical Action: Publish detailed transition plans within three months and establish independent monitoring mechanisms to track progress.

The GITFiC’s recommendation for the international community:

Provide Financial and Technical Support for ECOWAS Mediation Efforts: Provide direct financial and technical support to ECOWAS’s mediation efforts, including funding for logistical support, expert consultants, and communication initiatives. Practical Action: Establish a dedicated funding mechanism for ECOWAS mediation activities within three months.

Coordinate Development and Security Assistance with Regional Actors: Ensure that all development and security assistance to the Sahel region is coordinated with both ECOWAS and the AES to avoid duplication of efforts and maximize impact.

This requires establishing clear communication channels and coordination mechanisms between international partners and regional actors.

Practical Action: Hold regular coordination meetings between international partners, ECOWAS, and AES representatives to align strategies and ensure effective use of resources.

 Towards a new era of pragmatic regionalism

The current situation calls for a shift towards a more pragmatic and flexible approach to regionalism in West Africa. This requires recognizing the diverse needs and priorities of all states, prioritizing dialogue and cooperation on shared challenges, and adapting regional institutions to meet the evolving needs of the region.

Conclusion

The study underscores the profound economic, political, and security implications of member state withdrawals on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The findings highlight the imperative for ECOWAS to adopt proactive measures to mitigate these challenges, ensuring the region’s stability, security, and sustainable development.

By strengthening governance standards, enhancing regional cooperation, fostering economic integration, and developing strategies to mitigate security risks, ECOWAS can promote regional prosperity, address complex challenges, and enhance the lives of West African citizens.

Effective implementation of these measures requires strong political will, commitment, and coordination among ECOWAS member states.

This involves fostering a culture of transparency, accountability, and good governance, as well as investing in institutional capacity building and infrastructure development.

Moreover, ECOWAS must prioritize regional cooperation, dialogue, and consultation to address shared challenges and leverage collective strengths.

Ultimately, a resilient and effective ECOWAS is crucial for promoting regional prosperity, ensuring peace and stability, and addressing the complex challenges facing West Africa.

By adopting a proactive and collaborative approach, ECOWAS can overcome the challenges posed by member state withdrawals and emerge stronger, more united, and more determined to achieve its regional integration goals

Regional integration is not a destination, but a journey. It requires constant effort, commitment, and cooperation among nations to achieve sustainable development and prosperity

“The future of Africa is not in fragmentation, but in unity.” – Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah PhD

By Isaac Osei Owusu

Source: GNA

If you know how to talk, go and win an election

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Member of Parliament for Gomoa Central, A Plus Member of Parliament for Gomoa Central, A Plus

Member of Parliament for Gomoa Central, Kwame Asare Obeng, popularly known as A Plus, has slammed individuals who claim that his habit of “talking too much” has worsened since he was sworn in as an MP.

In a video shared on social media on January 13, 2025, A Plus challenged those offering what he described as unsolicited advice, stating that if such people think they know how to communicate, they should focus on winning an election themselves.

“Don’t sit somewhere and say, ‘A Plus, I want to give you some advice. Since you’ve become an MP, you should learn how to talk to people.’ Herh! If you think you know how to talk and haven’t won an election, go and win one,” he said.

Recently, just before A Plus was sworn in as an MP, he took to social media several times to rant about his decisions regarding caucusing with either the NDC or NPP in Parliament.

Initially, he mentioned that he had set conditions for one of the two major political parties, stating that if those conditions weren’t met, he would not caucus with them in Parliament.

A Plus, who felt both parties needed him to increase their numbers in Parliament, claimed to have met with NDC leadership and NPP’s Kennedy Agyapong in an effort to convince him to join their sides.

However, this barrage of talks led netizens to lament that A Plus was doing too much and portraying himself as more important than he actually was at the time.

As the criticisms piled up, he took to social media and went live in a series of videos to hit back at his detractors, a move that was familiar to his behaviour prior to becoming an MP.

In his most recent video, A Plus even claimed to have received advice from Shatta Wale that helped him win his parliamentary seat, along with other comments that many netizens felt were unnecessary.

Netizens have since strongly asserted that being an MP should come with a sense of decorum and a more composed personality, stating that A Plus should have left behind his old habits of discussing irrelevant matters and engaging in social media disputes.

See the post below:

Watch a compilation of the latest Twi news below:

JHM/EB

Today at the newsstand January 14, 2025

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Stack of newspapers | File photo Stack of newspapers | File photo

Below are some of today’s major news headlines:

DAILY GRAPHIC

Finance Minister designate promises economic relief

Spare parents SHS funding burden – Child Rights

Govt will explore private participation in ECG

THE DAILY DISPATCH

How the NDC swept ‘the King of political swing regions’ Central (1)

The task ahead of Ghana’s 9th Parliament

NPP guru on building a united & resilient NPP

THE CHRONICLE

Road tolls will be brought back – Ato Forson

‘Energy sector debts hit a record $bn & still counting’

I endorse Mahama’s 24-hour economy …says Joseph Siaw Agyepong

THE NEW CRUSADING GUIDE

I’ll scrap E-Levy, betting tax in 2025 budget

PUWU rejects ECG privatization

Energy sector debt exceeds US$3 billion – Energy minister-designate

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Minister of Energy-designate, John Abdulai Jinapor play videoMinister of Energy-designate, John Abdulai Jinapor

The country’s energy sector debt has surged past US$3billion, rising from the approximately US$2billion recorded under the previous administration of President John Dramani Mahama, according to Minister of Energy-designate, John Abdulai Jinapor.

During his vetting before parliament’s Appointments Committee, Mr. Jinapor cited a document titled ‘Summary of Energy Sector Debt and Lenders’ which detailed the debt trajectory.

He noted that in August 2017, ESLA PLC conducted a full audit of the energy sector debt, revealing a total liability of US$2.1billion – validated as the debt level when the National Democratic Congress (NDC) government exited office in 2017.

Mr. Jinapor disputed claims suggesting the debt stood at US$5billion at the time, explaining that reconciliations during the 2024 transition of power placed the debt stock at US$2.5billion as of September 30, 2024.

He said data from the Ministry of Energy, the Energy Commission and the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) confirm the current figure at just over US$3billion.

“The Energy Sector Levies Act (ESLA) generated approximately GH₵45billion, which has been used to clear part of the debt including interest payments amounting to GH₵9.4billion,” Mr. Jinapor said.

He attributed the rising debt primarily to unpaid bills for electricity that has been supplied and consumed.

“If you take most of our debt, a chunk of it is power sold, delivered and revenue not collected,” he emphasised.

The ballooning energy sector debt has long been a significant financial challenge, placing immense pressure on state utilities and posing a threat to the country’s economic stability.

To address this issue, Mr. Jinapor outlined his vision to prioritise revenue collection and improve operational efficiency in the energy sector.

He also noted the need for private-sector participation, particularly in areas such as billing and revenue collection for the ECG – a process he had previously spearheaded.

“We need private-sector participation at the distribution level,” he stated.

He argued that this is essential to strengthen efficiency, enhance collection rates and reduce revenue losses in the energy sector.

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Bright Simons reacts to controversy surrounding removal of betting tax

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Bright Simons is the Vice President of IMANI Africa Bright Simons is the Vice President of IMANI Africa

Vice President of IMANI Africa, Bright Simons, has stated that calls to remove the betting tax are justified.

According to him, although some stakeholders believe the betting tax is necessary because it deters people from engaging in gambling, his research suggests otherwise.

Simons noted that taxing gambling does not necessarily deter individuals from indulging in the activity, contrary to the government’s goal of discouraging youth involvement.

He emphasized that the revenue generated by the betting tax, approximately $3 million per year, would not significantly impact the economic sector, as the government could replace it with alternative measures.

This statement follows Minister-designate for Finance, Dr. Cassiel Ato Forson’s assurance that abolishing the betting tax would be one of his first actions in office.

Read Bight Simons’ analysis on the scrapping of betting tax below

At any rate, the new government must conduct another review of the public revenue framework for the digital economy as a whole and determine how it makes more money from the sector without undermining productivity.

Removing betting tax divides analysts. Some say that because gambling is harmful, a tax on betting is not only necessary (because the government desperately needs the money) but smart. My sense is that the evidence tilts towards removing it.

The most rigorous assessment I have seen of the effect of gambling tax hikes is that they are counterproductive. Professor Matthew Rockloff of Central Queensland University and Dr. Philip Newall of Bristol University present compelling evidence that gambling taxes simply increase the cost of addiction and do nothing to curb the urge to gamble. The betting companies just find other inducements to get gamblers to keep gambling but now with harsher financial effects on addicts.

There is no reason why removing betting tax and foregoing the ~$3 million per year it brings should lead to revenue losses because the government can simply tighten the regime for the betting companies themselves.

Read Bright Simons’ comment in the post below:

SB/EK

Wetin Defence HQ, Airforce tok about airstrike wey kill civilians for Zamfara

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Nigerian Air Force don confam say dem truly carry out airstrike attack for one village for Zamfara Nigerian Air Force don confam say dem truly carry out airstrike attack for one village for Zamfara

Di Nigerian Air Force don confam say dem truly carry out airstrike attack for one village for Zamfara state wit claims say dem target terrorist wey dem find for dat area.

Dis na afta tori come out say civilians dey among dose wey di air force strike hit and dem don die.

About 16 civilians na im tori tok say dem die from di attack- and e include local vigilantes for di community.

Dis latest airstrike na for Tungar Kara in Zurmi Local Government Area of Zamfara State and di Air force say dia main target for di operation na bandits.

Wetin di Air force come add be say dem dey concerned about di report say civilians die during di airstrike.

Dis no be di first time wey air strike go kill civilians wen Air force dey carry out dia operations for Northern Nigeria.

Director Public Relations and Information to di Air Force, Air Vice Marshal Olusola Fakinboyewa say dem wan start investigation to get di truth about di reports becos life of civilians get meaning to dem.

“Di Nigerian Air Force (NAF), for di recent airstrikes at Tungar Kara in Zurmi Local Government Area of Zamfara State, deal decisive blow to bandits terrorizing villages for di area.”

“Howeva, while di operation bin successfully eliminate several bandits and lead to di recovery of some kidnap victims, di NAF view wit grave concern reports of di loss of civilian lives in di course of di operation.

Dis airstrike, according to report also claim lives of some local vigilantes wey dey for di area wia di airstrike happun.

“As a responsible and professional custodian of airpower for di security of di nation, di NAF get believe for di absolute value of di life of evri Nigerian.”

Meanwhile, di All Progressives Congress (APC) for Zamfara state don send condolences to di civilians wey loss dia live for di strike.

Oda times wey accidental airstrike don happun

Sokoto Airstrike 2024

On 25 December 2024, tragedy for Rumtuwa and Gidan Sama for Silame local goment area for Sokoto State, northwest Nigeria wen military airstrike hit di village and kill pipo.

Dat Nigerian military airstrike kill 10 pipo and and injure six odas.

Sokoto State Govnor Ahmad Aliyu wey bin attend di burial of dos wey die for di attack say di “military carry out di attack by mistake” as e add say di “situation na fate, dis officials act in error, and dem do am to protect dis community.”

To compensat dem, di govnor say e don deliver about 100 bags of food aid and about 20 million naira to di affected community.

‘Na air force and ground force carry out di attack’

Silame local goment chairman Abubakar Muhammad tell BBC say na both air force and ground force carry out di attack as “di air force enter di area wit heavy tanks.”

Meanwhile, Defence Headquarters (DHQ) bin blame wetin dem describe as a “secondary explosion” for di death of about 10 pipo afta airstrikes for Sokoto State, northwest Nigeria.

Kaduna state bombing 2023

Di Kaduna state goment tok say na Nigerian Army carry out di air strike for Tudun Biri village wey hit Tudun Birni for December 2023.

For statement, Samuel Aruwan wey be commissioner wey dey oversee ministry of internal affairs for Kaduna tok say Nigerian army don siddon wit deputy govnor Hadiza Balarabe to yarn say ‘na mistake’.

Buwari village bombing 2021

Nigerian Air Force [NAF] bin admit for September 2021 say dia fighter jets kill civilians for Buwari village, Yobe state for Nigeria northeast.

NAF say di fighter jets kill 9 pipo and wunjure about 20 for Yobe State and na by mistake.

Air Commodore Edward Gabkwet, di tok tok pesin for Nigeria Airforce say dem regret wetin happun.

Port Harcourt helicopter strike 2021

One heavy strike bin hit cargo boat wey bin dey carry pipo and goods from Port Harcourt for River state to Bonny Island.

Meanwhile, Nigeria Defence Headquarters bin deny tori say di military fire di boat.

For statement from di Director Defence Information, Benjamin Olufemi Sawyerr sign, e explain dat time say di Air component of di Joint Task Force Operation Delta Safe (OPDS) bin get report from di ground troops wey bin dey do clearance operations say dem get resistance so dem send di combat helicopter to go support dem along Cawthorne Channel.

Eyewitness say pipo wunjure for di attack as bullet touch dem.

Jubilee House must be the name for Ghana’s Presidential Office and Villa for Reasonable Causes

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Jubilee House

Flagstaff House especially those in the Gold Coast now Ghana, Nigeria, India, Hong Kong etc is a colonial relic thus represents the symbol or faces or vestiges of imperialism.

It was built with similar or same architecture (especially that of Ghana, India and Hong Kong). 

Flagstaff Houses were military facilities in the colonial era and were used as the official Residences and Offices of the Senior Military Officers Oversea especially the Flag Generals, these were the General Officer Commanding of the British Military Forces and other Senior Military Officers.

 So, they were termed as the Houses for Military Star Flag Officers or Flag Staff Officers of the British Military Forces or Senior Military Officers who can fly a flag in front of their vehicles.  Otherwise, the Flagstaff House may be said as an Administrative building of the Colonialists in the colonial days with a colonial or national or Corporate Flag hoisted in front of the House to denote as such.

For the avoided of doubt let me say again, the Flagstaff Houses in India, Gold Coast now Ghana and Nigeria became the Official Residences of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Military Forces. This later on became the residences of the first Prime Minister of India namely Hon Mr Jawaharlal Nehru, also the residence of the First President of Ghana namely His Excellency Dr Kwame Nkrumah on attainment of Republican status in 1960. In Nigeria, it was initially occupied by the First and only Prime Minister of Nigeria namely Hon Sir Abubakar Tafawa Belawa. 

The Flagstaff House in Nigeria as Government House was built in 1896 by the Governor of Nigeria, and it housed Governor Lord Lugard, then Governor of Nigeria. It later on, housed the first and only Prime Minister of Nigeria as stated, then several Presidents (Civilian Heads of State) and Military Heads of State of Nigeria. The Flagstaff house in Nigeria was one time named as the Number 6 Marina Mansion and designated as the Official Residence of the Army Commander of the Nigeria Army. I envisaged this was so when the new Presidential Mansion was built as Aso Villa in Abuja as the Presidential Palace of Nigeria and was occupied by the President of Nigeria effective 1991.

I envisaged these Flagstaff Houses or buildings became the residences of the first Prime Ministers of affected Countries because they were the iconic buildings in the early days of post-independence of the affected Countries and they were the only available residences which befitted the status of a Head of Government, Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief of the National Armed Forces. 

The Flagstaff House were not built by the post independent leaders as their Palace and Offices but they only occupied them with the view to constructing a new Presidential villa and relegate the buildings as museum when time and resources permit.  

The only aberration in History from the Flagstaff Houses in the British Colonies is the Flagstaff House Museum in Pakistan which was the initial residence of the Prime Minster of a Country not built by the Colonial Administration.

 In Pakistan, the Flagstaff House was originally built in 1890s by Moses Somake, an alleged British Jew and named it as Flagstaff House. It was bought by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the Founder of Pakistan and named it as QuadieAam House in 1944.  It was later on bought from the Sister or family of Mohammed Ali Jinnah by the Government of Pakistan in 1985, renovated it and the name was changed to Flagstaff Museum.        

In Hon Kong, the Flagstaff House which was the residence of the Commander of the British Forces in colonial era is today named as the Flag Staff Museum of Tea Ware. 

The Flagstaff House in Ghana became Headquarters of the Ghana Armed Forces after the 1966 Coup and remained so until it became the HQ of the National Development Planning Commission, later on as the Offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

  Let me reiterated that the Flagstaff House in Ghana in the era of the PNDC was occupied by the Ghana Armed Forces as Offices of the then General Officer Commanding (GOC) namely General Arnold Quanno, who at that time  doubled as the Army Commander, the GOC was there with his Official staff. I visited the place during the PNDC era as a very young Officer in the Ghana Army to see some officers including my mate then Captain Adu, who was then serving under a Senior Officer responsible for confiscated vehicles at the Agric Mechanization, Accra near Air Force Officers Mess.

 For historical reasons, let me add that my mate’s office was near the Main Gate facing the Liberation Road leading to the Military Hospital or opposite the 31 December Cenotaph or Christ the King Catholic Church.  This office building which he occupied and other old buildings are no more at the Site.  I visited the place in 2014 during the era of both President Mahama and President Nana Addo, I did not see some of the Old buildings. But I gathered from a Facebook message that some old buildings are still at the place, then these should be those nearer to TV3 with a separate gate. Further and better details later.

The Offices of the GOC, now CDS of the Ghana Armed Forces and that of the Army Commander and their Staff were moved to Burma Camp in 1992.  It was later on allocated to National Development Planning Commission in the era of President Rawlings. . 

In Ghana, the Seat of Government has been the Osu Castle until President Kofour changed the narrative. Details below.

The NDC regime of President Rawlings initiated actions to build Official Residences for the President of Ghana that of the Vice President. Google for ‘NDC gave out contract for Presidential Mansion’ as published by the Ghanaian Chronicle dated Monday 26 March 2001,  by Kafui Gale Zoyiku. That was when the then Minister of Works and Housing namely Hon Mr Kwamena Bartels told Members of Parliament that a Contract for the building of new residences for the President and his Vice was initiated by the former government to replace the abandoned flagstaff House. 

Hon Mr Bartels was then moving a motion for the approval of the budget as awarded by the NDC regime of President Rawlings. To quote him, he said that the ‘demolishing of the old building which was occupied by Dr Nkrumah has already been demolished and the contractor paid part of his entitlements’’. This narration made in Parliament was/is enough to say that the Flagstaff House as the residence of President Nkrumah was demolished before March 2001, as alleged by the then Sector Minister when he appeared before Members of Parliament. 

As part of the 50th Independence Celebration of Ghana dubbed as the Golden Jubilee Celebration, the then President of Ghana saw the Government of India for support, which was granted and he constructed the ionic building in the image of the golden stool and other facilities with a grant of not less than 30 million US Dollars from the People and Government of India. The Government of Ghana named the new Presidential Mansion as Jubilee House in November 2008. It was then 80 percent complete, but the office of the President which was ready at that time was used as the Seat of Government by the regime of President Kofour. 

President Mills in 2009 moved out the Seat of Government to the Osu Castle and changed the name from Jubilee House to Flagstaff House with the excuse of Security concern and the name not backed by Legislative instrument or law. 

This new Presidential Mansion was used as temporary houses for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when this Ministry’s buildings/Offices were burnt by fire outbreak.

On completion of a new place at the Airport for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry moved out.  So in 2012, the Vice President of Ghana, Dr Amissah Arthur was the first to move from the Osu Castle to the Presidential Villa after the elections in December 2012.  President JD Mahama moved to the Flagstaff House in January 2013, maintained the name as Flagstaff House and handed over to President Nana Addo in January 2017 and due to our usual buffoonery acts, he changed the name to Jubilee House. President Mahama has indicated that he will occupied the seat of Government when the name is changed to Flagstaff House. This ‘chechekulae Kofi Sa langa’ or Kweku Ananse story must be halted by our matured and respected statesmen.

So, from the above narrations, anyone with a critical mindset may have the reasonable cause to conclude that Ghana must maintain the name JUBILEE HOUSE’ otherwise we should use Presidential Villa or Palace or Executive Mansion, in order to honor the kind gesture of the People and Government of India for their contributions for a named project of both Presidential Office and Presidential Residence to mark Ghana’s Golden Jubilee Celebration. 

The India Government supported Ghana towards the 50th Independence Celebration dubbed as Jubilee Celebration and for the very good work of President Kofour, the name Jubilee House  was made by him, President Kofour is appropriate.  So, our leaders must demo sense of gratitude and maturity by agreeing with a name based on facts.  As stated the facts are that the site was a colonial Military facility, same after the overthrow of Dr Nkrumah and CPP regime and it was President Kofour who built the Presidential Mansion and Office with the help of the Indians and this was in the name of Golden Jubilee Celebration of Ghana.

If the old buildings of the Flagstaff House are still at the area as alleged by some people,  let us conduct risk assessment, come out with control measures and label the affected or limited area as Flagstaff House within the perimeter fenced wall of the Jubilee House and designate the area as restricted Tourist Centre. Bur the general area must be Jubilee House.

Boys Haircuts: Cute Ideas to Try

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Boys’ hairstyles are evolving with fresh, fun ideas that blend comfort, style, and personality. From edgy cuts to classic looks with modern twists, there’s no shortage of options for young boys who want to express themselves through their hair. Here are some of the cutest and trendiest boys’ haircuts to try.

1. The Modern Fade

The fade remains a top choice for boys, offering a sleek and clean look. A low, mid, or high fade works well with various hair types and can be combined with different styles on top. The fade gives a sharp contrast to the longer top, and it can be styled in a spiky, textured, or combed-back fashion for a cool, polished look.

2. The Textured Crop

For a fresh and trendy option, the textured crop is a great haircut for boys. With short sides and a slightly longer, choppy top, this style gives volume and movement. The textured crop is easy to maintain and perfect for boys who want a stylish but low-maintenance haircut. It’s versatile enough for both casual and more polished looks.

3. Curly Top with Tapered Sides

Boys with curly hair can embrace their natural texture with a curly top and tapered sides. This cute and playful style highlights the curls while keeping the sides neat and short. The tapered sides create a balanced contrast to the volume on top, and it’s ideal for boys who want to manage their curls while still showing them off.

4. The Buzz Cut

For a fuss-free and timeless look, the buzz cut continues to be a popular choice. In 2024, this short, all-over style can be personalized with a little fade or line work around the temples for added interest. It’s perfect for active boys who prefer minimal upkeep but still want to look sharp.

5. Pompadour with Short Sides

For a more stylish and unique option, the pompadour hairstyle is making a comeback. This involves short sides with a voluminous top that can be styled up and back. It’s a great way to give your boy a polished, fun look that works for both formal events and casual playdates.

6. The Bro Flow

For boys with medium-length hair, the bro flow is an effortlessly cool style. With hair flowing naturally from the top to the back, the bro flow gives off a laid-back yet trendy vibe. It works especially well for boys who like to keep their hair a little longer but still enjoy a neat, manageable cut.

7. Undercut with Side Part

The undercut with a side part is another stylish and cute choice for boys. With short sides and a longer, parted top, this haircut offers a sharp contrast and can be styled in different ways. Whether swept over or kept messy, the undercut gives a modern, fashionable edge.

In conclusion, this year offers a wide range of cute, stylish, and practical haircuts for boys. Whether your little one prefers short and easy-to-maintain styles or longer, more creative looks, there’s a haircut out there that will suit his personality and lifestyle. From fades to curls and undercuts, these trends will keep your boy looking sharp, fresh, and on-trend throughout the year.

‘E-Levy Will Be Abolished Within 120 Days’

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Dr. Cassiel Ato Forson

 

The Finance Minister-Designate, Dr. Cassiel Ato Forson, has vowed to abolish the controversial Electronic Transfer Levy (E-Levy) if he is approved as Minister.

He has accordingly reaffirmed his opposition to the levy, describing it as an improperly conceptualized tax that hinders the development of Ghana’s cashless economy and fintech growth.

“I championed the opposition against the E-Levy and still stand by that position,” he stated during his vetting in Parliament.

“The E-Levy is neither a direct tax, an indirect tax, nor an excise tax—it defies proper classification. While I acknowledge the revenue it generates, the E-Levy is counterproductive to achieving a cash-light economy,” he added.

Dr. Forson assured Ghanaians that, if approved, the E-Levy would be abolished within 120 days as part of the first budget of the Mahama administration.

He reiterated the National Democratic Congress (NDC)’s commitment to this goal, pointing out that it aligns with President John Dramani Mahama’s 120-day economic agenda.

On replacing the revenue lost from the E-Levy, Dr. Forson stressed the importance of expenditure control.

“It’s not always about revenue; we must also look at expenditure. We will implement a strong, expenditure-based fiscal consolidation agenda without harming growth or the vulnerable,” he explained.

He emphasized that the NDC’s approach would protect social protection programmes and prioritize inclusive growth.

“As a Social Democrat, I will ensure that spending is targeted, wasteful expenditures are cut, and the vulnerable in our society are safeguarded,” he said.

Dr. Forson also highlighted his extensive experience in the country’s economy, promising policies that reflect the needs of ordinary citizens.

“I understand the dynamics of the political economy and the needs of our people. Any policy we introduce will drive inclusive growth and help all Ghanaians,” he assured.

 

By Ernest Kofi Adu

“Pay me my money” – Dammy Krane calls out Davido hours after receiving $20k gift from producer

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Nigerian singer, Dammy Krane has called out artist Davido to pay him his money a few hours after the latter received $20k from a producer.
Davido took to his Instagram stories to disclose that a producer he worked with on his “Timeless Album” years back recently received his publishing check, only to show up at his house to personally hand him $20,000 as a token of appreciation.
Davido, Nigerian artist
According to the singer, the producer’s thoughtful gift melted his heart, showing how grateful he was

Be cautious in handling ORAL matters – Former UN Governance advisor counsels

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Former United Nations Governance Advisor, Professor Baffour Agyeman-Duah, has cautioned the Operations to Retrieve Assets and Loot (ORAL) team to exercise caution in their efforts to recover state assets.

Speaking on Joy FM’s Super Morning Show, Prof. Agyeman-Duah raised concerns about the potential legal and reputational consequences of the team’s approach to exposing alleged misconduct involving state assets.

While acknowledging the importance of retrieving stolen state assets, he emphasised the need for legal and procedural caution. “The initiative to retrieve stolen properties of the state and address illegal acquisitions is commendable, and I fully support it. However, we must be careful about the legality of this process,” he said.

Prof. Agyeman-Duah questioned the publicisation of the team’s activities, suggesting that it could undermine the credibility of future legal proceedings.

“If they are gathering information for possible prosecution by the appropriate legal authorities, then why are they advertising their efforts? Publicising their work could hurt the process if these cases eventually go to court,” he argued.

He also warned against premature accusations, noting that publicly sharing unverified allegations risks damaging reputations. “You are exposing information that may not be substantiated in court, indirectly accusing people of actions they may not have committed,” he added.

Prof. Agyeman-Duah expressed concern about the lack of legal standing for the ORAL team, referencing earlier statements by the team’s chairperson, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, who clarified that the group lacks prosecutorial powers. “Their role is to gather and pass on information to the appropriate authorities, which is fine. But the way they are dramatizing their work could backfire legally,” he cautioned.

Highlighting similarities to past asset retrieval efforts under the AFRC and PNDC regimes, Prof. Agyeman-Duah highlighted the dangers of mishandling such initiatives. “History reminds us how people were harassed, abused, and ultimately found innocent, but their reputations and in some cases, their lives were destroyed,” he said

He concluded by urging the team to remain guided by democratic principles and the rule of law. “This is democracy, and we must adhere to our legal frameworks. I support their work wholeheartedly, but I advise them to exercise caution in their approach to avoid undermining their efforts,” he said.

He advised the team to focus on pursuing justice while ensuring that their actions align with the law and protect the reputations and rights of individuals, by upholding the nation’s democratic principles.

This year’s New Supreme award is hereby conferred on all Ghanaians

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First, for shaming the fire-breath­ers in our midst, who did not care whether we descended into civil warfare or not, despite their knowing full well that we are surrounded by countries in which civil unrest is barely hidden.

One HIGHLY-PLACED person in the NPP was in fact heard ranting to the effect that his political party had more than “one million ways of winning the election!” How could such a person reach such a sensitive position in a party with democratic aspirations?

I warmly congratulate Dr Bawumia on the national award presented to him by President Akufo-Addo on December 30, 2024, namely “Order of the Star of Ghana” (officer Divi­sion).

I also warmly congratulate the entire populace of Ghana on our largely peaceful conduct during the elections. Such a demeasnour, when so much was at stake, deserves very high commendation indeed.

But I must award all of us “The order of the dead vul­ture” for the way we seem to have made elections and normal party politics irrelevant to our chances of surviving as a nation. For, have we not allowed our rivers, streams, forest reserves and farms to be destroyed by merciless galamsey marauders?

Hypocritically, we pretend that it is not happening!

The outvoted Government knew that what the marauders were doing was evil. Indeed, it has honoured Erastus Asare Donkor, the TV journalist, for the brave and vivid manner in which he has consistently brought to our TV screens, the hellish harm the galamseyers have been doing to our inherit­ed, vry rich natural resources.

Our nation, as such, has not fully realised that it must put on its full military armour to fight against the galamseyers and defeat them in the forthright manner necessary taught to us by our forefathers.

Agya Koo Nimo tells us, in one of his inimitably sagacious songs, that our forefathers coined aphorisms that declare:

“Me hye3 ni y3 csa adwuma!

Mafuo ni y3 csa adwuma!” (‘This is my boundary is not to be said with words only, but must be affirmed by war if nec­essary. That determination also applies to “This is my farm”!)

No, we must not allow our means of survival, water, to be destroyed by galamsey maraud­ers. It doesn’t matter who they are — they must be fought and defeated.

Why did ouf forefathers leave us asafo groups and taught us how not rob organise them and make them the vanguard of our defence of our natural resources?

BY CAMERON DUODU

Rationalise Ghana’s tax system – AGI tells government

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Chief Executive Officer of Association of Ghana Industries, Seth Twum-Ak­waboah Chief Executive Officer of Association of Ghana Industries, Seth Twum-Ak­waboah

The Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) has de­scribed Ghana’s tax system as unfair and counterproductive to the growth of local businesses.

Chief Executive Officer of the Association, Seth Twum-Ak­waboah, said Ghana’s current tax regime is a disincentive to the private sector, a situation contrib­uting to low revenue generation for the state.

Speaking on PM Express business edition, he stated that simplifying and streamlining the tax system makes it more efficient, easier to comply with, to boost revenue collection.

The situation in Ghana now is that our tax regime is not in the best of shape. It is very high. If you import raw materials and when you look at the declaration, over 52 per cent of the value of items goes into taxes,” he com­plained.

Mr Twum-Akwaboah also noted that it is time to review the current VAT system since it does not help private businesses.

“The other aspect is the unfairness in it, if I am a major distributor or operator and I’m selling and because I am in the formal sector, I put VAT on it when you go to the next door, and someone is selling the same item, there is no VAT on the same item so I’m saying we need to rationalise our tax regime,” he stressed.

He recommended that the surest way to improve revenue for the country and have the full benefits is to deepen engagement in the rationalisation of the tax regime.

Meanwhile, President John Dramani Mahama has pledged to streamline the tax regime to reduce waste with the ultimate goal of reposi­tioning Ghana as a prime destina­tion for businesses.

This move, he said, will attract and motivate more investors to the country to help in absorbing the teeming unemployed youth.

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