Matheus Cunha

Matheus Cunha is set to join Manchester United after the season ends this weekend. United are expected to trigger the £62.5m release clause in his contract.

There has been no direct contact yet between United and Wolves but those formalities are anticipated once the season has closed.

Despite interest from other clubs, Cunha wants to play for United and Sky Sports News has been told the deal is almost agreed.

Cunha thinks United are one of the biggest clubs in the world and their current Premier League position – they are currently two places beneath Wolves in 16th – would not put him off a potential move to Old Trafford.

Five Premier League clubs, including United, wanted to sign Cunha this summer. Arsenal and Aston Villa were among the clubs that have held exploratory talks about signing the Brazil international this year. Saudi Pro League clubs were also now willing to trigger his release clause.

The forward, signed from Atletico Madrid in 2022 for a fee of around £34m, has registered 27 goals and 13 assists in 63 Premier League games.

Manchester United are desperate in that position. You think of what Manchester United are playing now, they’ve let Jadon Sancho go, they’ve let (Marcus) Rashford go, they’ve let Antony go, so three players who are natural players who travel with the ball.

Minister of Communication, Digital Technology and Innovations, Samuel Nartey George

The Minister of Communication, Digital Technology and Innovations, Samuel Nartey George, has reaffirmed his commitment to reducing data costs for Ghanaians by the end of 2025.

Speaking at the World Telecommunications and Information Society Day event on Sunday, May 18, 2025, George responded to growing public pressure on social media, particularly on X, where users have called for the removal of tariffs said to be inflating data prices by over 39%.

“I’ve been trending over the weekend on X because people think data costs must be cheaper by just the stroke of my pen,” he said.

George explained that while he shares the public’s concerns, reducing data prices requires a deliberate and strategic approach.

He disclosed that a committee he set up to tackle the issue completed its mandate ahead of schedule.

“I set up a committee whose mandate in 14 days was to develop a roadmap that would lead to a drop in the prices of data.

In 13 days, they delivered that roadmap,” he stated.

The minister noted that the data pricing challenges stem from structural market issues built up over the past eight years, adding that a hasty decision could lead to further market distortions.

“We’re dealing with eight years of distortion of the market.

I wish I could fix it arbitrarily, but it takes a carefully calculated effort,” he explained.

Reassuring the public, he reiterated his pledge: “My promise was that by the end of this year, we will see prices drop—and my promise remains. Just trust the process.”

Telecel Group, a leading telecommunications provider, today reaffirmed its dedication to Ghana’s sustainable development through impactful Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) initiatives focused on digital skills education.

This commitment is formalised through a strategic partnership with the Ministry of Communication, Digital Technology, and Innovations and aligns closely with the national agenda set by His Excellency President John Dramani Mahama.

Central to Telecel’s initiative is the launch of the Startocode programme, a multilingual digital education platform built by Telecel to provide affordable and accessible coding education to students worldwide.

The platform has contributed to the education of thousands of students, especially across Africa, empowering them with critical skills for the digital economy.

Now, Telecel is proud to provide Startocode free of charge to a significant number of Ghanaians who sign up through the Government of Ghana’s One Million Coders Program (“OMCP”), further amplifying its commitment to inclusive and scalable education.

The OMCP, launched by President Mahama in April 2025, aims to equip one million Ghanaians with essential digital skills to meet the demands of the 21st century economy. Telecel’s participation in OMCP through Startocode supports this visionary initiative by enabling large-scale education and training that can reach thousands of students, including those in underserved and rural areas, while maintaining high standards of quality and efficiency.

“We commend President Mahama for his visionary leadership in launching the One Million Coders Program,” said Moh Damush, Group CEO of Telecel Group. “By providing Startocode free of charge to a significant number of Ghanaians who enroll in OMCP, we are proud to support this national effort to empower the youth with vital digital skills that will transform lives and strengthen Ghana’s economy.”

Startocode’s platform is designed to deliver flexible, self-paced learning combined with mentorship and hands-on projects, ensuring an efficient and engaging educational experience. Its multilingual capabilities enable broader access, helping overcome language barriers and reaching a diverse student base across Ghana and beyond.

A joint signing ceremony is proposed to be held under the patronage of the Honorable Minister for Communication, Digital Technology, and Innovations, to publicly announce Telecel’s contributions and the launch of this important initiative.

The Minister for Communication, Digital Technology and Innovation stated that, “The partnership between the Ministry and Telecel Group marks a pivotal moment in our mission to bridge the digital divide and ensure no Ghanaian is left behind in the digital era. The One Million Coders Program is not just about teaching code – it’s about unlocking potential, fostering innovation, and creating pathways to sustainable livelihoods for our youth across the country.”

“We are proud to collaborate with forward-thinking partners like Telecel who share our vision of inclusive digital empowerment. The integration of Startocode into OMCP brings world-class digital education within reach for every Ghanaian, particularly in underserved communities. This initiative is a testament to our commitment to building a resilient, future-ready digital economy.”

Telecel Group looks forward to deepening its partnership with the Ghanaian Government and key stakeholders to promote long-term sustainable development through education and digital empowerment.

This paper was motivated by the launch of the code of conduct for Appointees on 5th May, 2025 by His Excellency President John Dramani. This set me thinking and I asked myself that “if governance is a continuum, what major initiatives had been implemented by previous administrations to ensure that SOEs, JVCs, and other state agencies run  effectively and efficiently to the benefit of the pople of Ghana?”.

I have always had a firm belief that if state entities run optimally, they SHALL oil the wheels of the private sector (the engine of growth) leading to economic development and job creation for our teaming youth.

Relevance and Roles of SOEs in Developing Economies

Economic Development and Employment – SOEs often operate in critical sectors such as energy, transportation, and telecommunications, driving economic growth and providing employment opportunities. In developing economies, where private sector capabilities may be limited, SOEs bridge the gap by investing in infrastructure and providing essential services.

Market Stabilization and Strategic Investments – SOEs can stabilize markets by ensuring the supply of essential goods and services, particularly in sectors where private investment is insufficient. They can also undertake strategic investments that may not yield immediate profits but are crucial for long-term economic stability and growth.

Revenue Generation – SOEs contribute to government revenues through dividends, taxes, and other financial transfers. This revenue is essential for funding public services and infrastructure projects, especially in developing economies with limited fiscal resources. For example, in 2021, 2022, 2023 & 2024 BOST made Ghs161m, Ghs342m , Ghs208m and Ghs360mprofits respectively. Imagine the fiscal impact if 100 SOEs/JVCs combined made a profit of Ghs100m?

Social and Regional Development – SOEs play a vital role in social and regional development by providing public goods and services that are not profitable for private firms. This includes rural electrification, public transportation, and healthcare services.

Leveraging SOEs for Economic Contribution – To maximize their contributions, SOEs in developing economies should focus on improving operational efficiency, adopting good governance practices, and aligning their objectives with national development goals. By doing so, SOEs can become engines of economic growth and development.

Chronology of SOEs Reform Initiatives (IMF SAP to 2025)

Table 1 below shows the summary of the chronology of initiatives since 1983 by Government.

Table 1: Chronological SOE Reform Initiatives (1983–2025)

• 1983 – Economic Recovery Program (SAP) under PNDC: Ghana launched an IMF/World Bank-backed Structural Adjustment Program in 1983 as part of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) under the PNDC military government (led by J.J. Rawlings). A key goal was to reduce the drain of inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on public finances through restructuring and privatization. The government identified 22 strategic enterprises to retain, and began divesting others – 32 SOEs were put up for sale in 1988 and another 44 in 1990. This marked the first major effort to improve SOE performance by exposing them to private capital or closure.
• 1987 – Establishment of State Enterprises Commission (PNDC): The PNDC regime created the State Enterprises Commission (SEC) via PNDC Law 170 in 1987. The SEC was mandated to oversee and improve the performance of SOEs. It introduced performance contracts in the late 1980s – by April 1989, several state enterprises had signed performance agreements with the SEC, setting targets for efficiency and profitability. This initiative (among the first in Africa) aimed to instill commercial discipline in SOEs through formal oversight and accountability mechanisms.
• 1992–1993 – SOE Legal Reforms (NDC): In early 1992, as Ghana transitioned to democracy, the government (PNDC/NDC) announced it would require all SOEs to incorporate as limited liability companies by 1993 to foster competition and commercial behavior. In 1993, the Divestiture of State Interests (Implementation) Act, 1993 (PNDC Law 326) was passed, establishing the Divestiture Implementation Committee (DIC) to systematically privatize or liquidate non-performing state enterprises. These measures by the Rawlings-led National Democratic Congress (NDC) government accelerated SOE reforms through privatization and corporate governance changes.
• 1998 – Public Sector Reforms (NDC): The late 1990s saw Ghana implement the National Institutional Renewal Programme (NIRP) and Public Financial Management reforms (PUFMARP) under the NDC government. These programs included components to improve commercial orientation of subvented agencies and state enterprises. In 1999, the SEC published a comprehensive review of the 1984–94 SOE reform experience with recommendations for 1995–2000. The emphasis was on restructuring remaining SOEs, reducing government subventions, and improving financial reporting – foreshadowing later governance reforms.
• 2001–2008 – Enhanced Privatization and Oversight (NPP): The New Patriotic Party (NPP) government under President J.A. Kufuor continued SOE reforms by accelerating privatizations (e.g. Ghana Telecom in 2008) and attempting to wean agencies off government support. A dedicated Ministry of Public Sector Reform was established (2005) to overhaul public institutions, including commercial state entities. While no single new SOE law was passed, the government enforced existing divestiture plans and introduced the Public Procurement Act 2003 and Financial Administration Act 2003, which imposed stricter financial discipline on public bodies (including SOEs). However, many SOEs remained loss-making, and reforms like performance contracts had lapsed by the mid-2000s.
• 2013 – Renewed Governance Efforts (NDC): Facing persistent SOE under-performance, the NDC government of President John Mahama initiated a governance review of the SOE sector with World Bank support. This review (under the 2018 GEMS-TA project) identified fundamental issues: “lack of a clear framework for state oversight… weak boards and management… weak disclosure practices… and fragmented, uncoordinated management of SOEs by multiple government organizations.”. In response, the government drafted a new Conduct of Public Officers Bill (to curb abuses by public officials) and began developing a consolidated State Ownership Policy, though these would only be realized later. The Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921) was passed in August 2016 (late in Mahama’s term), mandating improved financial reporting by public entities – including requirements for SOEs to submit financial statements to the Ministry of Finance.
• 2017 – State Ownership Reporting (NPP): Upon taking office in 2017, the NPP government under President Nana Akufo-Addo focused on transparency and accountability for SOEs. It launched the State Ownership Report (SOR) initiative – an annual publication consolidating the performance of all entities in which the state has an interest (“Specified Entities”). The maiden State Ownership Report in 2017 was the first of its kind; however, only 5 audited financial statements were available for analysis in that initial edition. This highlighted the dismal state of SOE financial reporting at the time (most had not produced up-to-date audited accounts). The government also created a new Ministerial portfolio for Public Enterprises at the Presidency to monitor these firms. These steps were aimed at shining a spotlight on SOE performance and enforcing the PFM Act’s requirements.
• 2019 – Establishment of SIGA (NPP): A landmark reform came with the passage of the State Interests and Governance Authority Act, 2019 (Act 990) by the NPP government. This law established the State Interests and Governance Authority (SIGA), effectively replacing the 1987 SEC law. SIGA was empowered to oversee all Specified Entities (SEs) – including 47 SOEs, 17 Joint Venture Companies (JVCs), and numerous Other State Entities (regulatory bodies, public corporations) – on behalf of the government. SIGA’s mandate is to monitor performance, ensure good corporate governance, and drive profitability of these entities. It also re-introduced mandatory performance contracts for SOE/JV CEOs and boards. By late 2019, SIGA had negotiated performance agreements to be signed in 2020 with dozens of entities, institutionalizing accountability for meeting financial and operational targets.
• 2020 – Performance Contracts and League Table (NPP): In 2020, SIGA rolled out two major initiatives to improve SOE performance: (1) Performance Contracts: All SOEs and JVCs were required to sign annual performance contracts with agreed KPIs. By the end of 2020, about 41 entities had undergone performance evaluations under this framework. (2) Public Enterprises League Table: SIGA introduced a ranking of specified entities based on their performance scores. The inaugural Public Enterprises League Table (published 2020/21) publicized the top and bottom performers, creating competitive pressure. For example, the 2020 rankings showed TDC Co., ECG, GRIDCo, Bui Power, and GCAA as top 5 performers, while GIHOC, Ghana Railway Co, Ghana Cylinder Mfg Co, PMMC, and New Times Corp ranked lowest. These measures were meant to incentivize management to improve and to enforce remedial action (or sanctions) for under-performing enterprises.
• 2023 – State Ownership Policy and Governance Code (NPP): Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, the government in 2023 approved a comprehensive State Ownership Policy and Corporate Governance Code for SOEs. This policy (a structural benchmark under Ghana’s IMF program) defines the state’s role as owner, performance monitoring guidelines, dividend and financing rules, and standardized board governance practices. It also includes a Code of Corporate Governance for Specified Entities (covering SOEs, JVCs and public organizations) issued by SIGA, consolidating frameworks for board composition, ethics, disclosure and oversight. These documents, approved by Cabinet by mid-2023, aimed to address the persistent governance weaknesses by clarifying responsibilities and enforcing higher standards across all state entities. (Notably, by 2023 the IMF reported that audited financial statements of SOEs must be submitted to MoF in a timely manner and SIGA’s capacity to monitor sector-specific risks was being strengthened.)
• 2025 – Code of Conduct for Public Officers (NDC): On May 5, 2025, the newly returned NDC government (President John D. Mahama) launched a stringent Code of Conduct for all public office holders, including SOE CEOs and board members. This code lays out ethical rules to curb the mismanagement and corruption that often undermine SOE performance. Key provisions include: a ban on accepting expensive gifts or favors from those doing business with government, mandatory asset declarations (with penalties for non-compliance), prohibitions on officials using their office for personal gain or participating in procurements where they have interests, and bars on political appointees purchasing state assets. President Mahama emphasized that this enforceable code is part of a drive to instill “discipline, integrity and accountability in governance”. It complements other measures announced in the 2025 budget, such as refusing bailouts for chronically loss-making SOEs (instead opting to merge, privatize or shut them). The Code of Conduct is intended to improve the governance environment for SOEs by holding their leadership to high ethical standards, thereby indirectly improving performance and public trust.

(The above list covers major initiatives from the Structural Adjustment era through to May 2025. It includes legal frameworks, institutional reforms, oversight mechanisms, and governance codes aimed at enhancing the efficiency and accountability of Ghana’s State-Owned Enterprises and Joint Ventures.)

Annual Performance of SOEs and JVs (2016–2024)

This section compiles year-by-year data on the portfolio of State-Owned Enterprises and Joint Venture companies in Ghana, including the number of entities, financial reporting compliance, aggregate financial performance, and other key metrics. “Specified Entities” here encompasses central government SOEs, joint ventures (partial state ownership), and other public entities (regulatory bodies, statutory corporations) under state interest. Table 1 shows a massive improvement in the governance and performance of SOEs post-SIGA.

Table 1: Entities that Signed Performance Contracts Prepared and Submitted Accounts

2016

• Portfolio & Oversight: As of 2016, Ghana had dozens of state-owned firms – approximately 49 major SOEs/JVCs under central government plus many statutory public entities – but oversight was very weak. An initial attempt to compile a State Ownership Report found that only 2 entities had current audited financial statements available in 2016. Most SOEs had not submitted financials to the Ministry of Finance or Auditor-General, in contravention of the law.
• Financial Performance: The consolidated SOE sector recorded an aggregate net loss (approximately GH¢1.47 billion) in 2016 (indicated by later trends) as loss-making enterprises dominated. Total revenues of the portfolio were about GH¢28.5 billion in 2016, but widespread inefficiencies and unprofitable operations (especially in energy and transport SOEs) led to overall losses. No performance contracts were in place in 2016, and there was little to no monitoring of targets. The Auditor-General’s reports in this period frequently noted large accumulated losses and debts in key SOEs (e.g. VRA, TOR, COCOBOD) and highlighted that government often had to support these entities via subsidies or guarantees – a precursor to the fiscal risks acknowledged later.

2017

• Portfolio & Accounts: In 2017 the government began systematically tracking 49 Specified Entities (comprising wholly-owned SOEs and joint ventures). By the end of 2017, there was slight improvement in financial reporting – 5 entities submitted audited accounts for the year (up from 2 previously). Nonetheless, this was out of dozens of enterprises, meaning the vast majority still failed to produce audited financial statements on time. The 2017 State Ownership Report (the first of its kind) covered 49 entities and had to rely on draft or unaudited data for many, underscoring continuing transparency issues.
• Financial Performance: The aggregate performance of SOEs improved in 2017 as economic conditions stabilized. The sector’s overall net loss narrowed significantly to around GH¢0.87 billion, according to Ministry of Finance analyses (an ~40% improvement from 2016). Some major firms like COCOBOD and GNPC turned small profits in 2017, while others (TOR, GRC) reduced their losses. Without complete data, the State Ownership Report 2017 could only indicate a trend of recovery. No consolidated revenue/expenditure figures were officially published for 2017 in that first report. Performance contracts were not yet implemented in 2017, though the groundwork was being laid. Qualitatively, the Auditor-General observed that many SOEs were over-staffed and carried high administrative costs, and urged tighter expenditure control as a way to sustain the financial turnaround seen in 2017.

2018

• Portfolio & Accounts: By 2018, the monitoring scope was expanded to include some Other State Entities (OSEs) (regulatory and statutory agencies). A total of 77 entities were covered in the 2018 State Ownership Report. Financial reporting compliance improved markedly – 44 entities submitted audited financial statements for 2018. This sharp jump reflects the pressure from the Ministry of Finance and Auditor-General for entities to clear audit backlogs. Still, about 33 entities had only draft or no accounts, indicating room for further improvement. The Auditor-General’s 2018 report on Public Boards noted persistent non-compliance by several enterprises despite the new PFM Act, and recommended sanctions for officials of entities that were multiple years in arrears on financial statements.
• Financial Performance: 2018 was a relatively good year for SOEs – in aggregate the sector nearly broke even. The combined net loss was only about GH¢72 million (a drastic improvement from prior years). In fact, many commercial SOEs achieved profits in 2018: e.g. GNPC, GPHA, GCB Bank Ltd (a state-majority JV) all posted positive net incomes.

Total revenue for the SOE/JV portfolio in 2018 was about GH¢32–33 billion (continuing a steady growth trend) while expenditures were roughly in line, yielding the small net deficit. The improved results were partly due to energy sector debt restructuring – government’s assumption of some legacy energy debts (via the ESLA bond) reduced interest burdens on energy SOEs. It’s noted, however, that profitability gains were not uniform – some entities like Ghana Railway and TOR still made significant losses.

No formal performance contracts were yet in effect in 2018, but the Ministry of Finance had begun setting financial targets in budget statements for key SOEs. The qualitative assessment in 2018 was cautiously optimistic: the Policy Evaluation and Oversight Unit of MoF lauded the “modest surplus” in the SOE sector and pointed to improved governance as a factor, while the IMF urged Ghana to solidify these gains with deeper reforms in SOE management.

2019

• Portfolio & Accounts: The coverage of state entities extended further in 2019 – the 2019 State Ownership Report covered 106 entities (all SOEs, JVCs, and more public boards). Compliance with reporting continued to rise: 64 out of 106 entities had audited financial statements for 2019, while others provided draft accounts.

By end-2019, the Auditor-General still flagged that 42 Specified Entities had not honored their financial reporting obligations to the Ministry/ SIGA, even if some had submitted to sector ministries. This led to MoF directing all SOEs to route statements through SIGA as required by the new law. In summary, data quality improved but a sizeable minority of entities remained non-compliant.

• Financial Performance: After two years of improvement, 2019 saw a sharp downturn in SOE finances. The consolidated net loss ballooned to GH¢5.16 billion for 2019. This steep loss was driven by the energy sector: Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) and Volta River Authority (VRA) both recorded huge losses in 2019 due to technical and commercial inefficiencies and the burden of IPP capacity payments.

COCOBOD (a statutory corporation) also registered a large loss in the 2018/19 season, owing to high financing costs and fixed farmer prices that exceeded export prices. As a result, the aggregate figures deteriorated. Total revenues for SOEs, however, hit GH¢37.91 billion in 2019 (a continued growth in top-line), but expenditures surged to roughly GH¢43.1 billion, outpacing revenues.

Key loss-makers included ECG, VRA, Ghana Cocoa Board, and Tema Oil Refinery, which collectively outweighed profitable entities like GNPC and mining JVs. On the positive side, Joint Venture Companies (JVCs) (partially state-owned firms) actually posted an aggregate net profit of GH¢1.05 billion in 2019, thanks largely to profitable banks and mining ventures.

Performance contracts were not yet fully operational in 2019 (SIGA was still setting them up), but some pilot evaluations were done. Qualitative assessments by oversight bodies in 2019 were blunt: the Ministry of Finance’s report noted “more urgent and collective work is needed”, calling the overall results “unsatisfactory”. The IMF, in its 2019 review, highlighted the fiscal risks from SOEs – especially the energy SOEs’ losses and rising debts – urging Ghana to enforce credit limits and cost-recovery tariffs.

2020

• Portfolio & Accounts: By 2020, all significant state entities (132 in total) were under SIGA’s oversight – comprising 47 SOEs, 17 JVCs, 54 Other State Entities, and 14 minority-owned firms. There was notable progress in financial reporting despite the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic: 79 entities submitted audited 2020 financial statements, 19 provided draft statements, and 34 provided at least management accounts.

This was a marked improvement from just a few years prior (for context, only 5 audited accounts were available in 2017). By end of 2020, SIGA’s enforcement (and PFM Act sanctions) meant most large SOEs were up to date on audits, though a few laggards remained. The Auditor-General’s 2020 report still pointed out that 41 entities had not settled statutory obligations or had issues of going concern, but overall transparency was better.

• Financial Performance: The COVID-19 shock made 2020 a difficult year, yet many SOEs showed resilience. The SOE portfolio’s consolidated net loss was GH¢2.61 billion in 2020, a substantial improvement (49% reduction) compared to 2019’s loss. In effect, about half of the prior year’s losses were recovered due to cost-cutting, government support, and some rebounding commodity prices.

Total revenue generated by SOEs surged to GH¢45.23 billion in 2020, nearly 20% higher than 2019. However, costs remained high, and certain sectors continued to drag: notably, JVCs saw profits collapse – JVCs together made only GH¢11.8 million net profit in 2020 (down from over 1 billion in 2019) due to pandemic-related slowdowns.

On the other hand, a new category defined as “Minority Interest” (firms where GoG holds <10% stake, mostly mining companies) yielded an outsized GH¢11.25 billion net profit in 2020, thanks to booming gold prices and dividend payouts. Excluding that anomaly, the core SOEs still reduced their losses significantly.

A major factor was the government’s Energy Sector Recovery Program which began to reduce the financial shortfall in ECG and other utilities by end-2020. Performance Contracts: 2020 was the first year all SOE and JV CEOs signed performance contracts with SIGA. Despite COVID disruptions, SIGA conducted performance evaluations – about 41 entities were formally assessed on 2020 targets, and results were used to produce the Public Enterprises League Table 2021.

Qualitatively, the Minister for Finance noted that “collective work must be harnessed to ensure sustained impacts” of reforms, praising the fact that aggregate revenue grew strongly even in a pandemic year. The IMF’s 2021 Article IV report also acknowledged steps taken to improve SOE oversight and transparency (e.g. the publication of SOR 2020) while stressing the need to tackle remaining losses in the energy and cocoa sectors.

2021

• Portfolio & Accounts: In 2021, Ghana’s SOE/JV portfolio remained roughly the same size (around 130+ entities). Financial reporting gains were maintained: according to SIGA, 86 Specified Entities submitted 2021 audited accounts, representing about 74% coverage. (Some smaller entities and newly categorized ones still lagged.) The 2021 State Ownership Report – prepared in 2022 – continued to build on better data.

One development was the integration of the SIGA reporting system (Smart Workspace) which streamlined how SOEs report financials to the Authority. The Auditor-General’s audit of 2021 accounts (published in 2022) found persistent issues in certain SOEs (procurement irregularities, unsupported payments, etc.), but also noted an uptick in compliance with audit recommendations by many SOEs.

• Financial Performance: Official aggregate figures for 2021 were not published at the time of writing (the State Ownership Report for 2021 was under review in 2023). However, IMF estimates and partial data indicate that SOE losses widened again in 2021, driven by the energy sector and Cocobod. The IMF reported that the budgetary deficit including SOE energy costs jumped, and “large losses in certain SOEs” contributed to Ghana’s fiscal stresses in 2021.

In particular, ECG and NEDCo (power distributors) struggled with revenue shortfalls due to fixed tariffs, and Cocobod incurred a substantial loss as cocoa production fell – these factors likely caused the consolidated net result to be deeply negative in 2021. Indeed, Ghana’s 2023 IMF program documents reveal that Cocobod’s operations added 1.4% of GDP to public debt by end-2022 due to losses and quasi-fiscal activities, implying significant 2021–2022 losses.

On the positive side, several SOEs in other sectors remained profitable in 2021: e.g. mining JVs, BOST, Ghana Gas, Ghana Airports Co., and some financial JVs (ADB, NIB) turned profits after restructuring. Performance Contracts: By mid-2021, 71 specified entities had successfully negotiated and signed performance contracts for the year, in a high-profile ceremony with the President (for the first time including some regulatory bodies in addition to commercial SOEs).

SIGA’s Director-General noted this was to ensure “each entity’s objectives align with government’s performance expectations.” The Public Enterprises League Table for 2021 (released in late 2021) spurred competition: it ranked Volta River Authority (VRA) as the best-performing SOE and Ghana Cocoa Board among the poorest performers for that year, reflecting the divergence in management effectiveness.

In sum, 2021 saw mixed results – improved compliance and oversight, but still poor financial outcomes in key sectors. Observers (e.g. the IMANI Center and the IMF) urged Ghana to accelerate reforms – such as tariff adjustments and restructuring of insolvent SOEs – to prevent these losses from undermining fiscal stability.

2022

• Portfolio & Accounts: By 2022, Ghana’s SOE oversight had fully institutionalized. SIGA and the Ministry of Finance jointly monitored 175 entities (including some minority-owned firms and newly added regulatory agencies).

The Auditor-General’s Report for year ending 31 Dec 2022 covered financial audits of 50+ major SOEs and public boards. Many entities that previously lagged (like some state universities and smaller funds) were brought into the reporting framework. Audited accounts submission remained strong in 2022 – a majority of entities submitted on time despite Ghana’s economic crisis that year. However, a handful of entities (e.g. some tourism and arts funds) still had audit arrears, which the Auditor-General highlighted for sanction.

• Financial Performance: 2022 was an exceptionally challenging year for Ghana’s economy and its SOEs. The country faced a severe fiscal and debt crisis, and SOEs were no exception. While consolidated data for 2022 are not yet officially published, preliminary indications are that the SOE sector’s net losses continued to mount in 2022.

The energy SOEs in particular accumulated more losses due to the still-unresolved issue of below-cost tariffs and high finance costs. The IMF’s debt sustainability analysis (2023) noted energy sector SOE debt (including arrears and legacy bonds) remained a major burden.

Cocobod also reported another year of heavy losses for the 2021/2022 season amid global price volatility. On the other hand, global commodity price spikes in 2022 likely boosted profits for mining-related JVs and upstream oil/gas SOEs (e.g. GNPC may have recorded improved earnings from petroleum liftings with oil prices high).

One specific positive note: Ghana’s mining sector SOEs/JVs (like AngloGold Ashanti in which Ghana holds a stake) delivered strong dividends in 2022, contributing to government revenue. Performance Contracts: All specified entities signed 2022 performance contracts, but many targets were thrown off by the economic turbulence (inflation exceeded 50% and cedi depreciation hit finances).

SIGA’s internal assessment (reported to Parliament in early 2023) conceded that only about 50% of SOEs met their 2022 performance targets, with shortfalls mainly in financial outcomes due to macroeconomic shocks.

Qualitatively, the year underscored the vulnerability of SOEs to macro-fiscal conditions – e.g. rising interest rates dramatically increased debt service costs for SOEs with external loans, and currency depreciation caused forex losses at companies like ECG and VRA (which have dollar-denominated obligations).

By end-2022, the government began negotiations for an IMF program, which explicitly included conditions to “sustainably reduce losses in the energy sector” and improve SOE management as a part of fiscal consolidation.

2023 (Interim up to May 2023)

• Portfolio & Accounts: In 2023, the NPP government (in its final year of term) and SIGA continued to enforce compliance. The 2023 State Ownership Report (covering FY2021 data) was finally published, and work was underway on the 2022 edition.

Ghana’s Cabinet, as noted, approved a new State Ownership Policy and guidelines in June 2023 to strengthen governance. Early 2023 also saw SIGA begin training boards on the new Corporate Governance Code. By May 2023, audits for 2022 were being completed for all major SOEs, albeit a few (like GNPC’s 2022 account) were awaiting finalization due to exchange rate adjustments.

• Financial Performance: No full-year 2023 data is yet available. The 2023 budget projected that aggregate losses of SOEs would start narrowing from 2023 onwards as reforms take hold. Indeed, measures such as electricity tariff increases (in September 2022 and February 2023) and a moratorium on new loans for SOEs were implemented, aiming to improve the financial outlook of entities like ECG, GWCL, etc.

The IMF program (effective 2023) includes performance criteria for SOE finances – for example, by Q1 2023 the government was injecting cash to clear some SOE arrears and strictly limiting new non-concessional borrowing by SOEs. The expectation is that 2023 will show some recovery: e.g. Cocobod’s losses are hoped to reduce after a producer price adjustment, and the energy sector might see a smaller shortfall due to tariff hikes and fuel price normalization. However, these outcomes remain to be verified.

Performance Contracts: The new government in 2025 will evaluate 2023 performance contracts as part of its transition. Notably, in the 2025 Budget (presented in March 2025), the government indicated that several SOEs failed to meet 2023 targets and would face corrective action – consistent with the stance of no bailouts for under-performers. In summary, 2023 is seen as a turning point where robust policy measures were deployed to set SOEs on a sustainable path, but the actual data on net profits/losses for 2023 will become clear when audits are finalized later in 2025.

2024 (Outlook)

• Outlook for 2024: As of May 2025, detailed data for 2024 are not yet available. The 2024 budget (the last by the outgoing NPP administration) forecasted improved performance contracts outcomes and even modest aggregate profits for the SOE sector by 2024 – premised on ongoing reforms and economic recovery. It projected that at least 10 SOEs would post profits in 2024, up from 6 in 2022, and that the overall net losses would drop markedly. The incoming government has signaled a continuation of reform: President Mahama’s early 2025 statements declared that loss-making SOEs will not receive blank-cheque bailouts but instead must shape up or face restructuring.

Thus, for 2024 one can expect intensified oversight. Performance Contracts for 2024 were signed in early Q1 by all Specified Entities under the new regime, with even stricter provisions (including quarterly reporting to SIGA and penalties for non-performance). While actual 2024 results will only be known in 2025, the policy trajectory suggests an aim for breakeven or surplus in key sectors and a reduction of fiscal risks emanating from SOEs.

Table 2: SOE & JV Portfolio and Financial Performance Summary (2016–2023)

(Data sources: Aggregated figures and narrative sourced from Ghana’s State Ownership Reports (2017–2023), Auditor-General’s reports, SIGA disclosures, Ministry of Finance budget statements, and IMF assessments. All financial amounts are in Ghana Cedi (GH¢). Note that 2021–2024 figures are based on the best available reports and projections, as official consolidated data for those years were pending completion.)

Causes of Persistent Under-Performance of SOEs in Ghana

Despite decades of reforms, many Ghanaian SOEs have chronically under-performed. Key reasons repeatedly highlighted by the IMF, World Bank, Auditor-General, and government reviews include:

1. Weak Corporate Governance and Accountability: Until recently, there was no clear framework defining the state’s ownership role. Boards and management of SOEs often lacked autonomy and professionalism, and political interference was common. A 2018 governance review found “weak boards and management that lack autonomy in commercial decision-making” and “weak disclosure practices” in SOEs. Government agencies did not consistently monitor SOEs, and fragmented oversight (by sector ministries, MoF, and others) led to poor accountability. As the IMF noted, these “weak institutional arrangements” meant problems went unaddressed. Until SIGA’s establishment, performance contracts and sanctions for non-performance were absent or ineffectual.
2. Political Interference and Patronage: Many SOEs have been plagued by frequent leadership changes tied to political cycles, appointments based on patronage rather than merit, and directives to pursue non-commercial agendas. This has undermined long-term planning and efficiency. The new Code of Conduct in 2025 is in part a response to these issues – it seeks to curb officials from using SOEs for personal or political gain (e.g. by banning conflict-of-interest dealings and gift-taking). Historically, however, such abuses have drained resources and eroded enterprise performance.
3. Financial Indiscipline and Poor Management: Auditor-General reports detail numerous cases of mismanagement – from procurement irregularities to bloated payrolls and ineffective controls. Many SOEs simply did not operate with the financial rigor of private companies. For example, large receivables and losses were allowed to accumulate (in 2018 the AG cited GH¢5.2 billion lost to mismanagement across public boards). Cost overruns, project delays, and operational inefficiencies have been common. As a result, even high-revenue SOEs (like utilities) often posted losses due to unchecked operating expenses and weak internal controls.
4. Underpricing and Quasi-Fiscal Activities: A number of Ghana’s biggest SOEs operate in sectors where government has kept prices below cost-recovery levels for social reasons. Notably, energy utilities and fuel companies have long sold electricity or petroleum products at tariffs that do not fully cover production and financing costs, leading to persistent losses (the “revenue shortfall” problem). Similarly, COCOBOD buys cocoa from farmers at fixed prices and undertakes social projects, incurring costs that are not fully covered by its sales – effectively performing quasi-fiscal roles. These policy mandates, without compensation, have severely strained SOE finances. The IMF has repeatedly flagged that resolving “subsidies to reduce the revenue shortfall” in the energy sector is critical to stop the bleeding.
5. High Debt and Fiscal Burden: Many SOEs took on heavy debts (often with government guarantees) to finance infrastructure investments or cover operational deficits. Weak performance meant they struggled to service these debts, causing government to step in. This created a vicious cycle of bailouts. Ghana’s IMF program documents identify SOE debt as a major fiscal risk, including off-balance-sheet borrowing by SOEs and special-purpose vehicles that later end up on the public debt. The energy sector SOEs alone amassed billions in arrears by late 2010s, leading to bailouts via the ESLA bond. Such debt overhang further hampers the SOEs (as financing costs eat into their income) and weighs on the national budget.
6. Multiplicity of Oversight and Lack of Clear Objectives: Prior to recent reforms, SOEs answered to various entities (sector ministries, State Enterprises Commission, MOF’s Financial Division, etc.) with sometimes conflicting goals. There was no single ownership policy, leading to unclear performance expectations. The World Bank noted the “fragmented and uncoordinated management of SOEs” as a key issue. In practice, some SOEs were treated more as extensions of ministries (focusing on social delivery) while others behaved like private companies – but without a unifying strategic vision or profit motive. This inconsistency bred under-performance.
7. External Factors and Market Constraints: It should be noted that some under-performance reasons are sector-specific. For instance, volatility in commodity prices can hurt SOEs like GNPC and Cocobod (as seen in downturn years). Exchange rate depreciation has greatly affected SOEs with foreign loans or inputs (e.g. ECG’s losses ballooned when the cedi fell, since power purchase costs are dollar-linked). Additionally, aging infrastructure and lack of investment have hampered efficiency (e.g. Ghana Railways’ poor service). While these factors are sometimes beyond management control, the inability of SOEs to adapt or innovate has often turned challenges into crises.

In summary, Ghana’s SOE under-performance has been a result of governance deficiencies, political and institutional weaknesses, and structural financial imbalances. Recent interventions – from the SIGA Act and Ownership Policy to the strict Code of Conduct and IMF-backed reforms – explicitly target these root causes. For example, the new state ownership guidelines approved in 2023 address issues like clarifying the state’s commercial expectations of SOEs, instituting cap on remuneration, enforcing dividend policies, and improving transparency. The hope is that by fixing the foundational problems (governance, accountability, and financial discipline), Ghana’s SOEs can finally deliver on their potential without being a drag on the public purse.

References:

Official Ghana government reports and audits (State Ownership Reports, Auditor-General’s Reports) and assessments by international institutions (IMF Article IV Reports, World Bank studies) have been used to compile the above analysis. Key references include the 2020 State Ownership Report (Ministry of Finance/SIGA), the Auditor-General’s Report on Public Boards for 2018–2022, IMF Country Report No. 23/168 (2023), and recent media coverage of policy changes,. These sources uniformly underscore the need for continued reforms to ensure Ghana’s SOEs contribute positively to development rather than impede it.

President John Dramani Mahama has directed newly sworn-in members of the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) to harmonise existing national development strategies into a single, coherent, and inclusive long-term plan.

Speaking at the swearing-in ceremony of new NDPC held at the Jubilee House on Tuesday, 20th May, President Mahama underscored the importance of a unified national vision to guide Ghana’s development trajectory.

He stressed that the new plan must not only be forward-looking but should also reflect a broad national consensus, incorporating the views of Parliament and the citizenry.

President Mahama recommended that the eventual development framework be subjected to regular reviews to ensure it remains relevant and responsive to evolving national needs and global dynamics.

The NDPC, as mandated by the Constitution, is tasked with advising the President on development planning policy and strategy and coordinating national development activities across sectors.

The newly constituted Commission is expected to play a central role in shaping Ghana’s medium- to long-term development agenda, with a focus on sustainability, inclusivity, and resilience.

DISCLAIMER: The Views, Comments, Opinions, Contributions and Statements made by Readers and Contributors on this platform do not necessarily represent the views or policy of Multimedia Group Limited.

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Transport fares to go down on May 24

The Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU) has announced a 15% reduction in transport fares effective Saturday, May 24, 2025.

This decision follows a meeting between the Union’s National Executive and the Minister of Transport, amid favorable economic trends, including a strengthening of the cedi against the US dollar, which has led to lower fuel prices.

The Public Relations Officer of the GPRTU, Abbas Ibrahim Moro, confirmed the development in an interview with Citi News.

“We just had a meeting with the Minister of Transport and we have agreed that effective Saturday, May 24, transport fares must be reduced by 15%,” he disclosed.

According to him, the fare adjustment is a direct response to an 18% drop in fuel prices.

He explained that although the Union typically applies a third of the fuel price decrease, they have opted for a 15% cut this time to ease the burden on commuters.

“We normally use one-third of the fuel price reduction to adjust fares, but we opted for 15% this time to reflect the fuel price trend. We also expect our counterparts in the spare parts industry to follow suit and reduce their prices,” he noted.

“We want to place on record that we did not wait for the other components of our cost build-up to reduce before the 15% reduction,” he added.

He also warned that GPRTU members who refuse to implement the fare cut will face consequences, adding that, “If your Union has decided, you have no option but to comply.”

SP/VPO

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Thomas Partey (in red jersey) waving at Arsenal fans with his family at the Emirates Stadium

Black Stars midfielder Thomas Partey and his family were present at the Emirates Stadium during Arsenal’s 1-0 victory over Newcastle United on May 18, 2025.

Declan Rice’s goal in the 55th minute secured a crucial win over Newcastle that sealed their second position in the Premier League table, booking qualification to the 2025/2026 UEFA Champions League.

After the game, the players shared some moments with the fans as it was their last home game.

The midfielder was accompanied by his wife, Janine Mackson, a British-born model and social media influencer, who was carrying their baby.

The couple shared moments with some of the players and fans at the stadium and after some time, they waved to the fans before finally departing the premises.

This has sparked mixed reactions from Arsenal fans who are concerned about the player’s future as his contract expires at the end of the 2024/2025 season.

Meanwhile, reports suggest that the English club is in negotiations with the Ghanaian midfielder to extend his contract following his impressive performances this season.

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Thomas Partey and family after full time at the Emirates yesterday ❤️🥺

pic.twitter.com/LVM0xhNCvy

— THOMA5 (fan) (@ParteyHive) May 19, 2025

Watch scenes from the opening ceremony of the 2025 Western Region Inter-Schools event

SB/AME

The President of the Greater Accra Market Association (GAMA), Mercy Naa Afrowa Needjan, has declared strong support for the Accra Metropolitan Assembly’s (AMA) ongoing decongestion campaign in the Central Business District (CBD), describing it as a “good agenda” that deserves collective backing from traders.

Her remarks followed the launch of a joint clean-up and decongestion operation on Tuesday, May 20, between the AMA and the Korle Klottey Municipal Assembly. The initiative is focused on removing unauthorised street trading and reducing traffic congestion, beginning with key locations including Kinbu Road, Railways, ECG Junction, King Tackie Tawiah Statue, Opera Square, and Adabraka.

Appearing on JoyNews’ News Desk, Madam Needjan stressed the urgent need to restore order in the city, noting the growing encroachment of streets and pavements by traders.
“We’ve all seen what’s happening on the roads — no parking for vehicles, no walkways for pedestrians. Every part of the street is occupied,” she lamented.

She drew attention to the underutilisation of existing market facilities in Accra, observing that many traders have abandoned designated spaces such as Makola, Adabraka, Osu, and Circle Markets in favour of selling on the streets, where foot traffic is higher.
“It’s shocking because there are several markets around these areas, yet they’re empty,” she said.

“I’m at Makola Market, and it’s now being used to store wholesale goods instead of serving customers. Traders are preparing to sell outside, because that’s where the customers are — and every trader follows the money.”

Madam Needjan issued a passionate appeal to traders to return to the markets, which she described as more conducive for business and better structured to support safe and orderly commerce.

“I’m pleading with the traders. I know many of those operating on the streets are from Makola or the surrounding areas. Adabraka Market is empty. Osu Market is also empty. Even Circle Market, which was built specifically for pedestrian trading, remains unused.”

She noted that the successful implementation of the AMA’s efforts would benefit all stakeholders — traders, customers, motorists, and pedestrians alike.

“We are pleading with them. We want to go inside the market so the streets will become vacant for cars to move freely and for those selling on pavements to find proper trading spaces.”

Madam Needjan reiterated the Greater Accra Market Association’s full support for the decongestion campaign and called on market leaders and traders to cooperate fully with city authorities.
“This is not just about the AMA or the government. It’s about all of us — creating a safer, cleaner, and more functional Accra.”

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Otumfuo Osei Tutu II was reportedly close to Osagyefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah when he was a child

Acclaimed historian, Yaw Anokye Frimpong, has given a historical background to the role Ghana’s first President, Osagyefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah, played in the upbringing of the Asantehene, Otumfuo Osei Tutu II.

Speaking in a recent interview on Max TV, on May 14, 2025, Anokye Frimpong disclosed that the Asantehene and Ghana’s first president had a unique son-and-father relationship.

He indicated that the Asantehene was introduced to Dr Kwame Nkrumah when he was a young child by one of his advisers, the Paramount Chief of Sefwi-Wiawso, Nana Aduhene, who was the caretaker of the Asantehene, Otumfuo Osei Tutu II.

“Otumfuo was very close to Dr Kwame Nkrumah. I’m sure people will be wondering how someone born in 1950 would be close to Kwame Nkrumah, who gained independence for Ghana in 1957 and was overthrown in 1966.

“The truth is that Kwame Nkrumah became the Leader of Government Business in 1951. So, he was a leader from 1951 till he was removed in 1966. One of the advisers of Kwame Nkrumah was the Paramount Chief of Sefwi-Wiawso, Nana Aduhene.

“The current Otumfuo (Barima Kwaku Duah) was staying with this chief (Nana Aduhene). This chief was grooming him (Barima Kwaku Duah) to take the stool (to be Asantehene). So, anywhere he went, he took him along,” the historian narrated.

He stated that Dr Nkrumah used to play with the Asantehene anytime he was brought to the Flagstaff House by Nana Aduhene.

He added that the Asantehene and Dr Nkrumah’s firstborn son, Gamal Nkrumah, also became close and played with each other like they were siblings.

“So, when he took him (the current Otumfuo) to the Flagstaff House, Kwame Nkrumah would take him and put him on his lap. So, Dr Nkrumah really liked Otumfuo when he was a child.

“History also has that Nkrumah married Fathia on the last day of 1957. The following year, he had his firstborn, Gamal. When Barima Kwaku Duah, who is now Nana Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, went to the Flagstaff House, he played with Gamal as if he were his junior brother. So, Nana knew Nkrumah very well,” he said.

BAI/VPO

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Dr Johnson Asiama, Bank of Ghana Governor

The central bank is tightening its grip on liquidity faster than it did a year ago, significantly scaling up its open market operations in the first four months of 2025 as inflation stays sticky around the 20 percent range amid fiscal pressures.

The Bank of Ghana mopped up a total GH¢79.8billion through its liquidity absorption operations between January and April 2025 – marking a 76.6 percent jump from GH¢ 45.1billion during the same period last year.

The surge in tightening was most pronounced in April, when the central bank drained a record GH¢33.3billion from the financial system following it’s 123rd Monetary Policy Committee meeting in March 2025.

The aggressive absorption comes as BoG contends with enduring inflationary momentum and a need to sterilise excess liquidity carried over from an expansionary 2024 fiscal stance. This also signals a firm commitment to anchor inflation expectations and maintain macroeconomic stability under Ghana’s IMF-supported reform programme.

“The need for a policy reset has become more compelling to re-anchor inflation expectations,” the central bank’s Monetary Policy Committee said in its March statement.

BoG added that tight liquidity management, reinforced by complementary policy tools, is crucial to keeping disinflation on track.

The data indicate a possible shift from a relatively conservative approach in 2024 to a more aggressive stance in 2025. The total mop-up in just four months of 2025 represents nearly 60 percent of the entire 2024 total of GH¢134billion, underscoring BoG’s intensified effort to control money supply and stabilise the macroeconomic environment.

While January 2025 saw a dip in mop-up compared to the previous year, February and March 2025 reversed that trend with auctions rising to GH¢15.5billion and GH¢21.6billion respectively. These are well above 2024 averages for the same months and indicate heightened liquidity-tightening measures.

The sharp uptick reflects a deliberate policy stance aimed at draining excess liquidity from the banking system and aligning short-term rates with tighter monetary conditions.

OMO instruments, once a routine tool of liquidity fine-tuning, have taken centre-stage in BoG’s tightening toolkit. The central bank recently introduced a 273-day sterilisation bill and launched a review of the cash reserve ratio framework to further strengthen monetary policy transmission.

Despite the liquidity tightening, short-term yields on Treasury bills have been on a decline. Last week’s auction saw the 91-day and 182-day bills ease 7bps each to 15.16 percent and 15.70 percent respectively, while the 364-day bill fell 15bps to 16.80 percent w/w.

Inflation softens, but core pressures persist

The central bank’s aggressive mop-up appears to be bearing early fruit. Headline inflation eased to 21.2 percent in April from 22.4 percent in March – well below the 41.2 percent rate recorded a year earlier. The deceleration was largely due to falling food prices, a steady cedi and favourable base effects. Still, month-on-month inflation edged up to 0.8 percent from 0.2 percent – signalling that price pressures remain embedded in the system.

Core inflation- which strips out volatile food and energy prices – remains elevated, underscoring BoG’s cautious tone.

“While headline inflation has declined marginally, it remains a concern,” the MPC warned, pointing to persistent second-round effects from supply shocks and fiscal policy spillovers.

With the disinflation path still fragile, BoG delivered a 100-basis point policy rate hike in March – its first increase in several months – bringing the benchmark rate to 28 percent. The move reinforced a hawkish pivot after a brief pause, as policymakers stressed that a tighter stance would help cement inflation expectations and discourage speculative pressures on the currency.

Cedi resurgence

Investor appetite, however, remains robust. Strong demand at auctions has been driven by improved macroeconomic sentiment and relatively stable exchange rate conditions.

The cedi’s resurgence, after depreciating 19.2 percent against the US dollar in 2024, has been a central factor in this turnaround. Since the start of 2025, the currency has appreciated by 10.5 percent – strengthening from GH¢14.71 to the dollar in December 2024 to GH¢13.31 by end of the first week in May 2025. The gains have also been felt against the British pound and euro, with respective year-to-date appreciations of 5.9 percent and 5.8 percent.

OMO tightening has also served to shore-up the cedi among other contributing factors such as the gold for reserve programme, which has over the past weeks been appreciating against all major currencies… especially the US dollar.

At close of the last week’s trading – Friday, May 16, 2025 – the cedi gained 2.26 percent w/w against the US dollar, 3.50 percent w/w against the British pound and 3.68 percent w/w against the euro. The exchange rates quoted at the mid-rates of GH¢13.30/$ (+16.73% YTD), GH¢17.15/£ (+12.24 percent YTD) and GH¢14.95/€ (+7.69 percent YTD).

The central bank’s strategy of absorbing surplus liquidity has helped stem speculative currency pressures while preserving external balance.