China’s efforts to build up huge business interests across Africa have been accompanied by a careful policy of maintaining neutrality – but the conflict in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo has caused a shift in its approach.
Rwanda has been widely accused of stoking the fighting in the mineral-rich region and Beijing, which has close relations with both DR Congo and Rwanda, has in recent weeks joined the criticism.
But it is trying to walk a diplomatic tightrope to maintain good relations with both countries, while also continuing to operate its businesses – and buy crucial minerals.
How is China’s response to this conflict different?
For decades, China has been careful not to take sides in conflicts in Africa, to avoid causing problems that might interfere with its extensive commercial interests.
Up to now it has shied away from criticising African governments for supporting participants in a conflict.
For example, China has said little about the series of coups since 2020 in West Africa’s Sahel region, except to urge leaders to consider the interests of the people.
Beijing has long pursued a policy of non-interference in another state’s internal affairs, says Prof Zhou Yuyuan, who specialises in African development and security at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS).
It therefore avoids proposing solutions to conflicts, apart from calling for diplomatic or political efforts by international organisations such as the UN or the African Union.
The unrest involving Rwandan-back M23 rebels in eastern DR Congo reared its head again in 2021. The fighters are led by ethnic Tutsis who say they took up arms to protect the rights of the minority group – and because the Congolese authorities reneged on an earlier peace deal.
In its early comments on these developments, China restricted itself to criticising unnamed “foreign forces” for providing support to the M23 fighters.
But in the last few weeks it has broken from its usual practice and referred to Rwanda by name.
This follows major gains by the M23, which since January has captured the key cities of Goma and Bukavu.
“China reiterates its hope that Rwanda will… stop its military support for M23 and immediately withdraw all its military forces from the DRC territory,” China’s UN ambassador said in February.
Prof Zhou notes that though significant, the “wording in general is still relatively mild”.
“China ‘hoped’ that Rwanda would stop its support but did not condemn it,” he says.
However, soon afterwards China backed a UN Security Council resolution which bluntly calls on the Rwanda Defence Forces to “cease support to the M23 and immediately withdraw from DRC territory without preconditions”.
Why has China made this shift?
According to Prof Zhou, China’s statements are likely to have been prompted by UN expert reports, which have provided strong evidence of Rwanda’s support for the M23.
“This is a basic consensus in the UN Security Council,” he added.
“The problem has been going on long enough, and everyone knows in their hearts the basic situation. There’s no need to be hush-hush any more.”
Neither China’s mission to the UN nor its embassy in London responded when asked why China had criticised Rwanda.
But the critical importance to China of DR Congo’s renowned mineral wealth may have been a factor.
Fighting in eastern DR Congo has been concentrated in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu, home to many Chinese-run gold mines.
How these mines have been affected by the fighting is so far unclear.
The M23 has also seized territory containing mines for coltan ore, which China imports in large volumes.
The metal tantalum, used in cars and everyday electronics from TV sets to mobile phones, is extracted from this ore, and DR Congo is the source of 40% of the world’s supply.
A UN expert group said in December 2024 that the M23 had smuggled coltan to Rwanda from DR Congo. It also noted that Rwanda’s coltan exports rose by 50% between 2022 and 2023.
Although Rwanda has its own coltan mines, analysts say they could not account for such a large increase in production.
It is not yet clear whether the volume or the price of coltan imported by China has been affected.
Another mineral that China imports from DR Congo is cobalt, which is crucial for the lithium battery industry.
However, China’s cobalt mining operations are primarily based in southern DR Congo, away from the conflict zones in the east.
Dozens of Chinese companies, many of which are state-owned, are also building roads, telecommunications and hydropower facilities in DR Congo. But it seems that the impact on these activities has so far been minimal.
Does China provide military support to Rwanda or DR Congo?
China’s supplies weapons to both Rwanda and DR Congo.
In the past two decades, the Rwandan military has bought Chinese armoured vehicles, artillery and anti-tank missiles, according to the think-tank Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri).
China posted a military attaché to the country for the first time in 2024.
While UN experts say the Rwandan military has armed the M23, it is unclear whether the rebel group is using any Chinese weapons.
The Congolese armed forces have bought Chinese armoured personnel carriers and drones.
They also own Chinese tanks, which were bought in 1976 but were still in use as recently as 2022.
It is reported that the drones, at least, have been used in the fight against the M23.
Have China’s relations with either country been affected?
The Rwandan embassy in Beijing said ties with China remained “excellent and productive”, and it was not for Rwanda to comment on China’s statement about the fighting in eastern DR Congo.
The Chinese ambassador to DR Congo, Zhao Bin, held discussions with Congolese Senate President Sama Lukonde in early February but no details of the meeting were made public.
China’s economic activities in the two countries go very deep. They are both part of China’s Belt and Road initiative, designed to stitch China closer to the world through investments and infrastructure projects.
In Rwanda, China has funded stadiums, schools and highways. Chinese loans are also funding infrastructure projects – a loan to fund a dam and irrigation system, worth an estimated $40m (£31m), was confirmed in January.
For years most goods imported into Rwanda have come from China.
When it comes to China’s economic ties with DR Congo, the UN Comtrade Database shows that for years China has been DR Congo’s top trading partner.
China has gone to great lengths to secure access to DR Congo’s mineral wealth.
It extended $3.2bn (£2.5bn) of loans to the country between 2005 and 2022, according to the Chinese Loans to Africa Database run by Boston University, mostly to fund road and bridge construction, and the country’s electricity grid.
China has financed and built other large-scale infrastructure projects in DR Congo, including hydropower plants and a dry port.
These investments may suggest it is in China’s long-term interests to find a resolution to the conflict quickly.
File photo of Cedi and US Dollar note
