TL;DR: Live stream Gabon vs. Ivory Coast in the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations for free on Channel 4. Access this free streaming platform from anywhere in the world with ExpressVPN.

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It’s the final day of group games in the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations and defending champions Ivory Coast are in action against Gabon. Ivory Coast are one of a handful of teams who could realistically win the whole tournament, along with the likes of Morocco and Senegal, and they have Manchester United’s Amad Diallo in the squad.

Though Gabon aren’t quite at that level there are a few players, such as Mario Lemina and Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang, who can cause problems for any top team.

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If you want to watch Gabon vs. Ivory Coast in the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations from anywhere in the world, we have all the information you need.

When is Gabon vs. Ivory Coast?

Gabon vs. Ivory Coast in the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations kicks off at 2 p.m. ET on Dec. 31. This fixture takes place at Stade de Marrakech.

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How to watch Gabon vs. Ivory Coast for free

Gabon vs. Ivory Coast in the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations is available to live stream for free on Channel 4.

Channel 4 is geo-restricted to the UK, but anyone can access this free streaming platform with a VPN. These tools can hide your real IP address (digital location) and connect you to a secure server in the UK, meaning you can unblock Channel 4 to stream AFCON for free from anywhere in the world.

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Grace Agyemang Asamoah

 

The District Chief Executive (DCE) of the Atwima Kwanwoma District Assembly, Grace Agyemang Asamoah, has expressed confidence that the district is on course for improved living standards as residents celebrate Christmas and prepare for the New Year.

In a Christmas and New Year goodwill message to the people, Madam Agyemang Asamoah prayed for peace, joy and renewed hope in every home, while wishing residents a prosperous year ahead.

She urged families and communities to use the festive season to promote unity, tolerance and peaceful coexistence.

“May this festive season bring peace, joy and renewed hope to every home. Merry Christmas and a prosperous New Year. God bless Atwima Kwanwoma,” the DCE stated.

*Development Drive*
Madam Agyemang Asamoah noted that the District Assembly, under her leadership, has continued to implement programmes aimed at improving the quality of life of residents.

Priority areas include road infrastructure, education, sanitation and healthcare delivery, which she described as critical to sustainable development.

The Assembly has supported the rehabilitation of feeder roads to enhance access to farming communities and facilitate the movement of goods and services.

In the education sector, efforts have been made to improve basic school infrastructure, including classroom renovations and the provision of essential learning materials.

Sanitation and environmental cleanliness have also received attention, with intensified public education and community-led initiatives to promote a healthy living environment.

The district has further benefited from government flagship programmes, notably Planting for Food and Jobs, as well as youth and women empowerment interventions.

*Brighter Outlook*
The DCE, who is known for her inclusive and collaborative leadership approach, reaffirmed her commitment to working closely with traditional authorities, assembly members, opinion leaders and development partners to ensure equitable development across the district.

She called on residents to continue supporting the Assembly’s programmes and to remain law-abiding, stressing that collective effort and unity are essential for progress.

As the year comes to an end, Madam Grace Agyemang Asamoah expressed optimism that the New Year would bring greater development, improved livelihoods and better living conditions for the people of Atwima Kwanwoma.

FROM David Afum, Kumasi

As a father of two with others I care for, I am clear that my spending is not aimed at generating profit for myself. Instead, it is to ensure these dependants have a social, economic, and spiritual life that makes them impactful and productive members of society.

As an entrepreneur, my expenditure is to deliver responsible profits for myself and my shareholders, along with a constructive economic impact that often requires patience to realise. I prioritise value delivery and development, focusing on short-term financial sustainability, with the hope that it will serve as a foundation for medium- to long-term profits. Although these goals are different, they are similar in that both aim to achieve their respective objectives.

The recent debate about the reported US$214mn loss by the BoG in its Gold-for-reserves programme, also known as the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP), has been quite fascinating. It has been passionate, sentimental, and technical all in one. Some contend it is a loss, while others argue it is not. So, what exactly is a loss? Can’t we simply agree on what a loss is? In economics, where strict science meets the complexity and flexibility of human nature, almost everything is ambiguous. Therefore, it’s not so straightforward, but can still be honest.

That’s why, while ‘1+1’ equals two everywhere in the world, the success of an economic policy is not consistent everywhere. Even the mighty IMF and World Bank cannot guarantee a perfect outcome in their interventions. There is always an X-Factor.

1.0 LOSS OR NO LOSS?

From an accounting perspective, the establishment of loss is simply total revenue (TR) minus total cost (TC). If TC is greater than TR, you have a loss. In finance, there is sometimes a slight shift. Instead of TR or TC, you may be considering the present value of TR and TC, which may require a discount factor (in layman’s terms, an interest rate) to determine. Let me give an example to explain: imagine investing Ghs100 in a venture at the start of the year and receiving Ghs110 at the end of the year. In accounting terms, you have made a Ghs10 profit. It is as simple as that. However, financial economics looks at it differently. It first considers the opportunity cost — what else you could have done with that money?. Let us say you could have invested in treasury bills or notes at 15% p.a. This means you could have earned Ghs15, not just Ghs10. Since you earned less than the Ghs15 you could have made, you have effectively incurred an economic loss. I am sure you will agree that that book long ‘na wahala’.

In economic policy, it is an entirely different game. Every economic policy intervention must be evaluated on its incremental economic value and aligned with its economic objectives. That is why expenditure on education is not viewed as a cost but as an investment to maintain the quality of labour, which in turn drives and sustains economic growth into the future. This explains why we discuss primary surpluses and deficits or economic costs and benefits, rather than accounting losses or profits.

Each economic policy intervention’s impact, as planned, must align with the desired economic outcomes. For example, an economic policy of promoting exports through export subsidies (a cost to taxpayers) must align with its objectives, which may include inflation, exchange rate stability, GDP growth, employment, socio-economic equality as measured by the Gini and Human Development Indices, etc.

A loss in economic policy terms should be assessed based on the economic outcomes the intervention seeks to achieve, compared to the actual measurable results. The evaluation should consider not only the policy’s costs but also its benefits.

Simply put, “an accounting loss or financial loss is not an economic loss! So not all loss be loss and not all profit na benefit!” 

2.0 THE GOLDBOD

Prior to the formation of the GOLDBOD, one thing was certain: Ghana was not fully benefiting from its gold output. According to the United Nations COMTRADE, the United Arab Emirates imported USD7.1 billion worth of gold from Ghana in 2022 and 2023. Ghana, however, reported official data of USD4.8 billion. Using the UAE (a major importer of our ASM gold) as a benchmark, about one-third (almost 33%) of our production was smuggled and left unaccounted for.

In years past, Ghana had to rely on borrowed foreign exchange through Eurobonds and Syndicated Loans to COCOBOD to build its foreign reserves, mainly due to overdependence on primary exports. The underperformance of cocoa exports and the retention of export receipts offshore (part of Ghana’s stability agreement with foreign mining companies) by Ghana’s foreign-dominated mining companies meant that even if gold production and gold exports improved, it could not support the building of Ghana’s reserve buffers. In the end, Ghana could not borrow itself into perpetuity and ended up with the Domestic Debt Exchange Programme (DDEP) and an external debt restructuring programme, which were integral parts of Ghana’s IMF-supported reforms programme under the broader debt restructuring programme.

The GOLDBOD was set up with clear monetary policy-related objects.

1. Generate foreign exchange for the country; and
2. Support the accumulation of gold reserves by the Bank of Ghana.
3. Oversee, monitor and undertake the buying, selling, assaying, refining, exporting or other related activity in respect of gold.

The policy rationale for these objects is to centralise gold trade, optimise forex inflows, accelerate gold reserve accumulation, and generate national benefits from the entire value chain of the country’s gold resources for economic revitalisation and sustainable growth.

Ghana’s GOLDBOD sources gold from mainly licensed artisanal and small-scale miners, using a regulated network of authorised buyers and aggregators. It pays in cedis based on the Bank of Ghana’s reference rates and either exports the gold or allocates it to the Bank of Ghana for reserve accumulation.

3.0 HAVE WE REALISED OUR OBJECTS?

The year 2025 marked the inception of GOLDBOD, and in just one year, Ghana’s Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) gold export value has increased from 63.6 metric tons (mt) in 2024 to 101mt as of 23rd December 2025. Reference is made to actual export volumes in metric tonnes to ensure that the current higher gold prices do not distort our analysis. It should be noted that this is not just a result of a significant surge in production but rather an optimisation of the accounting of Ghana’s gold production by drastically reducing smuggling. This achievement is due to GOLDBOD’s work, and we must acknowledge their contribution. GOLDBOD and its practices have successfully optimised our ‘official’ gold trade.

According to the IMF, the BoG has had to recognise a trading loss of USD214mn (GHS2.4bn). This is undoubtedly an accounting loss. We are also told that it has been due to GOLDBOD disincentivising smuggling by buying at world market prices, thereby being unable to cover its operational costs. From a pure trading perspective, this does not make sense. The pricing strategy to offer world-market prices to miners for buying their gold output is to incentivise them to sell to GOLDBOD rather than to the foreign gold buyers who had become entrenched in the market and were offering prices 1-2% below international prices. This is thus an aggressive entry into the market to break the entrenched foreign dominance in Ghana’s gold trading market, without which the GOLDBOD would have struggled immensely to penetrate. Indeed, it is through this pricing strategy that smuggling has been significantly reduced, and Ghana is fully reaping the benefits of gold exports.

Thus, from a policy perspective, the USD214mn (GHS2.4 bn) trading loss must be viewed differently, not through a financial or accounting lens. For instance, the forex inflows from the reduced smuggling can be transformative and more beneficial to the broader economy, so incurring ‘the loss’ makes sense and becomes an economic policy cost required to yield greater economic policy benefits.

From what I gather in my research and interviews with market players, the ‘trading losses’ also arise from the differentials demanded by gold producers for the difference between open market exchange rates and the Bank of Ghana interbank rates used to price the ASM gold. To this, if the Bank of Ghana’s interbank FX rate is set at Ghs11.0 to US$1.00 and the open market rate stands at Ghs12.0 to US$1.00, producers will demand Ghs12.0, not Ghs11.0. GOLDBOD will increase its buying price to miners, often midway through the differential, through a ‘so-called bonus’ to ensure producers do not lose out on their market reality.

For example, if the world price is $100, the BoG rate is Ghs11.0 to US$1.00, and the open market rate is Ghs12.0 to US$1.00, producers will receive Ghs1,100. If the same producer sells his gold to a smuggler at $100, he will receive GHs1,200 at the open market rate of Ghs12.0 to US$1.00. To disincentivise producers from smuggling, the GOLDBOD adjusts its prices upwards by offering a bonus of about Ghs50 (often about 50% of the FX differential), so producers receive Ghs1,150 and minimise the risk of selling to smugglers. This ‘Ghs50’ is a major reason for the reported ‘trading losses’. This is effectively, a foreign exchange loss.

4.0 DOMESTIC GOLD PURCHASE PROGRAMME (DGPP): LOSS OR NO LOSS?

What we know for sure is that the DGPP policy operation through GOLDBOD has cost us USD214mn and possibly counting. Various explanations have emerged, but the fact is that GOLDBOD is a policy institution tasked with supporting the operationalisation of the DGPP’s monetary policy intervention.

The IMF in its latest staff report stated that, “The scaling up of the Domestic Gold Purchase Program (DGPP) has allowed the BoG to meet its program reserve accumulation objectives, reaching the 2028 reserve coverage target in 2025.” That is a commendation by all standards.

Gross international reserves are always at the core of a currency’s stability. So, the lower the Gross international reserves, the lower the value of a currency in a floating FX rate regime. The DGPP programme has led to an increase in the BoG’s gross reserves from USD8.98bn in 2024 to $11.12bn as of October 2025, and they are projected to reach about $13bn by year-end 2025.

The IMF, in its own papers, have attributed the nominal exchange rate appreciation to the building of reserves and our FX inflows, which is widely known to be driven by the surge in official gold export receipts. Our receipts have surged from two fronts.

1. The surge in official gold export quantity. We have recovered our one-third loss to smuggling by moving official volumes from 63mt in 2024 to 101mt in 2025. This is attributable to the GOLDBOD policy intervention.
2. Surge in global gold prices. Prices moved from about an average of $2,386/oz (LBMA data) in 2024 to $3,439.37/oz in 2025, marking a 44% increase.

Undoubtedly, the stars have aligned with our own actions to realise the blessings of the now.

Without any fear of contradiction, our foreign exchange bounce back has been a well-orchestrated home-grown strategy and alignment of monetary and fiscal policy anchored on the productivity of the GOLDBOD under the BoG’s DGPP programme! This is why any discussion of the cost of the GOLDBOD intervention must be carried out together with an evaluation of the enormous economic benefit to Ghana in 2025.

To evaluate the economic benefits of this policy intervention, we will examine these key indicators.

1. Impact on the USD/GHS exchange rate
2. Impact on Government debt service savings
3. Impact on Government’s foreign exchange expenditure savings
4. Inflation
5. The import bill

• Impact on the USD/GHS exchange rate

Ghana moved from an actual BoG interbank GHS/USD average rate of GHs14.2 to US$1.00 in 2024 to 12.53 in 2025, marking a 13% average appreciation. On a year-on-year basis, Ghana moved from a year-end of Ghs14.7 to US$1.00 in 2024 to GHs11.2 to US$1.00 in 2025, marking a 32.47% appreciation.

What is most instructive is the average exchange rate forecast in the IMF’s supervised 2025 budget, which projected a depreciation of about 9%. The 2025 budget was built on the assumption of an average GHS/USD rate of GHs15.95 (which, to be fair, was about the street-market rate as of December 2024). GHs15.95, therefore, serves as the policy benchmark for any fair analysis of the performance of the policy benefits from relevant exchange rate-related policy interventions.

• Impact on Government’s external debt service

 

2025 External Debt Payments	Amount (USD)	GHS Amt @Budget Average Rate (15.95)	GHS Amt @Realised Average Rate (12.53)	Savings
Interest	504,880,793	8,052,848,642	6,326,156,331	1,726,692,311
Amortization	605,846,212	9,663,247,087	7,591,253,040	2,071,994,046
Eurobond	709,025,252	11,308,952,764	8,884,086,404	2,424,866,360
Total	1,819,752,257	29,025,048,493	22,801,495,775	6,223,552,718

The table above summarises our external debt service position as at mid-December 2025. What it tells us is that our ability to reverse the trajectory of the Ghana cedi from a projected year average of Ghs15.95 to a realised average of GHs12.53 has saved the Ghanaian economy over GHS6.2billion. At year-end closing rates, this saving is USD560mn. This is not a profit but an economic benefit from GOLGBOD policy actions. As stated earlier, in economic policy terms, we focus on policy benefits and costs and not profits or losses.

• Impact on the Government’s foreign exchange expenditure savings

To assess this, we should ideally examine the government’s foreign-exchange-based expenditure and evaluate the benefits of the Ghana cedi’s appreciation. These will include payments to independent power producers (IPPs), imports by government agencies and vendors, including capital expenditure vendors. Extracting this accurately may be complex at this stage, so I will stick to a single item I can pull out: IPP payments for 2025.

 

 

Forex Payment	Amount in US$	Amount in GHS using @Budget Average Rate GHs15.95 -US$1	Amount in GHS using @ Realised Average GHs12.53 -US$1	Savings in GHS
IPPs	1,887,862,617	30,111,408,740	23,654,918,590	6,456,490,150

 

From the above we have realised a saving in excess of GHS6.45bn. At year closing rates, this saving is USD582mn.

The IMF country director, Dr Adrian Atler, in a recent interview with Benard Avle of CitiFM, explained that the strengthening of the local currency has played a pivotal role in restoring price stability, helping inflation fall from 24% in 2024 to 6.3% in November 2025, which is the lowest level in four years. He further argued that the contrast between last year’s rapid currency depreciation and this year’s modest appreciation clearly shows how exchange rate management has shaped the inflation path.

There is no denying that the GOLDBOD-inspired currency appreciation is a major contributory factor to the BOG’s ability to reduce inflation from 24% to 6.3% as of the end of November 2025 (Ghana Statistical Service).

Ghana’s import bill is projected to end 2025 at about USD17.7bn. This projection is based on official January to October data.

Forex Payment	Amount (USD)	Amount in GHS using @Budget Average Rate GHs15.95 -US$1	Amount in GHS using @Realised Average GHs12.53 -US$1	Net Benefit (GHS)
2025 Import Bill (est)	17,784,000,000	283,654,800,000	222,833,520,000	60,821,280,000

 

From the analysis above, the comparative saving exceeds GHS60bn for the Ghanaian importer and consumer (including government consumption) and for the economy as a whole. This saving has improved the real spending power of Ghanaians, which Fitch estimates at +2.5% (as at June 2025), over 120% increase from the spending power growth of +1.1% realised in 2024. With inflation heading further down, we can only estimate a larger increase in the Ghanaian’s real spending power.

1. The appreciation of Ghana Cedis is foremostly a result of the BoG’s domestic gold purchase programme (DGPP) operated by GOLDBOD. In other words, it is a GOLDBOD-inspired currency appreciation.
2. The direct fiscal savings from the GOLDBOD-inspired appreciation are in excess of 6bn (US$1.142bn), more than 5 times the policy cost of US$214mn (Ghs2.4bn). Ghs6.22bn on external debt service and 6.45bn on IPP payments. If we were to add savings on import-related capex and goods and service expenses across the central government and state-owned enterprises, this would significantly increase.
3. According to the Bank of Ghana ACT, 2002 (ACT612), the primary object of the Bank of Ghana is to maintain stability in the general level of prices. Achieving 6.3% inflation from 24% in less than a year is a policy outcome success driven by its DGPP programme.
4. Over GHS60bn savings on our import expenditure have been realised and accrued to the economy.
5. The US$214mn (Ghs2.4bn) is a policy cost and not a loss, as its economic policy outcomes outweigh its financial cost.

5.0 THE IMF AND THE ‘LOSS’

Let us get it clear, there is no issue with the IMF flagging the US$214mn. It is their estimate of the policy cost. I do not subscribe to the view that the Bretton Woods institutions are haters and wreckers. If it were so, China would not be where it is today. Achieving all the economic benefits without spending US$214mn would have been ideal. These institutions will always push economies to optimise, and that is what they were doing.

Having said that, I am clear that the recovery is a shock to the IMF. A significant and swift depreciation is often the starting point of resolving a balance-of-payments (BoP) problem (Culiuc and Park, 2025). This is the view and expectation within the IMF, as duly captured by the authors who are IMF executives. In their study, which analysed worldwide data from 1971 to 2024, they concluded that “Equilibrium REER depreciations are largest when an IMF-supported program is put in place after the initial depreciation takes place.” Simply put, when countries enter IMF programs, the magnitude of currency depreciation increases, suggesting that depreciation is part of the adjustment mechanism.

Consequently, our currency appreciation is a surprise and an outlier because it happened too soon. Of course, it’s commodity price-driven, without much structural transformation, but the stability is welcome. What they missed is the Ghanaian’s behavioural nature and propensity to smuggle. There is no need to be antagonistic. Just like I said in the beginning, “while ‘1+1’ equals two everywhere in the world, the success of an economic policy is not consistent everywhere”. They are aiding us with what they know, and our homegrown policies must shape what they learn in ways that are practical and unique to Ghana. We have brains too! We are writing the rulebook in Ghana and not in Washington, and this is real progress!!! (to borrow from Harvard Economist Prof Dani Rodrik).

6.0 CONCLUSION

On the back of the realisation of the policy outcomes of low inflation, real fiscal savings and import bill savings, I do not consider the $214mn or GHS2.4bn spent on the DGPP a loss. It is a policy cost worth the spend if it was spent legitimately. Having said that, I must admit that policy must move to reduce or zero out this cost to enable us to maximise the economic benefit from the policy.

The existence and quantum of disparities between Bank of Ghana foreign exchange rates and open market rates are counterproductive and lead to foreign exchange losses. It is imperative that the BoG moves to converge the exchange rates on the market to eliminate room for foreign exchange losses.

In addition, we need to build resilience and transform the economy’s structure to sustain the gains realised so far. We cannot continue to be commodity-dependent!!!

 Economic policy is not accounting; evaluating its impact requires a more holistic approach, or we risk knowing the price of everything and the value of nothing.

 Senyo K. Hosi

Entrepreneur, Finance & Economic Policy Analyst

31^st December 2025

 References:

1. Currency Crises in the Post-Bretton Woods Era: A New Dataset of Large Depreciations, WP/25/222, October 2025
2. Microsoft Word – Bank of Ghana Act 2002, Act 612.doc
3. Ghana’s consumer boom: Household spending to hit GH¢129.7bn – Graphic Online
4. Ghana Imports
5. PRESS-RELEASE-GHANAS-MACROECONOMIC-PROGRESS-PRAISED-BY-IMF-GOLD-LOSS-CLAIMS-SPECULATIVE-251225.pdf
6. Cedi stability key to Ghana’s inflation turnaround – IMF
7. *Ghana: Fifth Review Under the Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, Requests for Modification of the Monetary Policy Consultation Clause and Program Extension, and Financing Assurances Review-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Ghana; IMF Country Report No. 25/343; December 3, 2025
8. Ghana: Fourth Review Under the Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, Financing Assurances Review, and Monetary Policy Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Ghana in: IMF Staff Country Reports Volume 2025 Issue 175 (2025)
9. 2025 BUDGET SPEECH
10. Rodrik, Dani (2008): “is there a new Washington Consensus?” Project Syndicate 11, June 2008

Manchester City are close to agreeing terms with Bournemouth to sign Antoine Semenyo for £65m – but Andoni Iraola insists the forward has “definitely not” played his last game for the Cherries.

City’s move for the Ghana forward, 25, is at an advanced stage with talks over the past 48 hours aimed at closing the finer details of the deal.

They have agreed to meet Semenyo’s £65m release clause, while the player’s representatives were in Manchester on Monday finalising personal terms.

Discussions continued on Tuesday, with sources indicating a total agreement is now close with the January transfer window due to open on Thursday.

Semenyo, who played the full 90 minutes of the 2-2 draw with Chelsea on Tuesday, has been keen for his future to be resolved by 1 January.

However, Iraola is adamant the attacker will play against Arsenal on Saturday, 3 January.

“He is a massive player for us and he will still be with us,” the Bournemouth boss told BBC Match of the Day.

“It is not the last game he has played for us, definitely not.”

Sources have told BBC Sport Bournemouth want him to play against the Gunners and then Tottenham on Wednesday, 7 January before the release mechanism in his deal elapses on 10 January.

As reported by BBC Sport on Sunday, Liverpool retain an interest in Semenyo but, unless the Premier League champions launch a late bid, he is heading to City.

Despite interest from five clubs, including Chelsea, Manchester United and Tottenham, City remain the only one to have made formal contact with Bournemouth.

‘It is like losing two or three players’

Although Semenyo conceded a penalty in the draw at Chelsea, he showed what Bournemouth will be missing should he leave with his two long throws into the box leading to the visitors’ two goals.

At the end of the match, he applauded the away fans in what appeared to be a goodbye to them, with several of his team-mates also coming over to hug him.

Semenyo has scored nine goals and provided three assists for Bournemouth this season, and team-mate David Brooks said his departure will be a big loss.

“I’m not going to sit here and say he doesn’t leave a hole,” the Wales international told BBC Match of the Day.

“He’s our top scorer and he’s been a very, very good player for us over the past couple of years.

“Everyone loves Ants in our team and if he’s going to join someone else we wish him all the best, he’s earned it.”

Former Chelsea and Blackburn striker Chris Sutton added on BBC Radio 5 Live: “Three and a half outstanding seasons as a Bournemouth player – the issue Andoni Iraola’s got is how do you replace him? How do you replace his numbers?

“A phenomenal player who’ll go with the Bournemouth fans’ best wishes. He’s been a top player for them.”

Ex-Aston Villa and Manchester United striker Dion Dublin said Semenyo’s exit would feel like losing more than just one player for Bournemouth.

“As a manager you can think to yourself, ‘bring the money in, I back myself as a coach’, and I’m sure Iraola does,” he added.

“But Semenyo is such a big player that it is like losing two or three players.”

DISCLAIMER: The Views, Comments, Opinions, Contributions and Statements made by Readers and Contributors on this platform do not necessarily represent the views or policy of Multimedia Group Limited.

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DISCLAIMER: The Views, Comments, Opinions, Contributions and Statements made by Readers and Contributors on this platform do not necessarily represent the views or policy of Multimedia Group Limited.

Two of the suspects and the items seized from them

The Ghana Police Service has reportedly intercepted thousands of rounds of ammunition heading for Walewale in the North East Region.

According to a report by Asaase Radio, in addition to the over 2,000 rounds of bullets, the police also intercepted bulletproof vests and other items.

The bullets and the other intercepted items were discovered in a vehicle heading for Walewale.

Three people, including the driver of the vehicle, were arrested during the operation.

“Ashanti Region police intercept Grandbird bus with 2,600 AK-47 rounds bound for Walewale; driver and two others arrested, with bulletproof vests and other gear seized,” the media house wrote on X on December 30, 2025.

The post also contained a picture of the suspects and the items they were allegedly transporting illegally to Walewale, including the bullets and the vests.

Police intercept over 130 cartons of ammunition being trafficked out of Ghana

BAI

The Minority in Parliament has called for a bipartisan investigation into the reported $214 million loss by the Bank of Ghana under the Gold-for-Reserves programme.

Kojo Oppong Nkrumah, Member of Parliament for Ofoase Ayirebi addressing journalists in Accra on Monday December 29 stated that the inquiry should be conducted by a parliamentary ad-hoc committee with the power to subpoena all contracts, licenses, intermediaries, and related entities.

He said the committee should require the Bank of Ghana and the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) to disclose their fee structures, pricing formulas, aggregator selection criteria, and foreign exchange arrangements linked to the programme.

He further called for the suspension of permits in forest reserves and the introduction of strict traceability measures, citing concerns that state funds may have been used to purchase gold from illegal mining activities.

He added that where negligence or corruption is proven, prosecutions must follow and all recoverable funds returned to the state.

“We are demanding the following: a bipartisan parliamentary inquiry into the circumstances under which the republic of Ghana has lost $214 million heading to $300million to be done here by the parliament of Ghana. We are asking for a parliamentary adhoc investigative committee with power to subpoena all contracts, licences, intermediaries including this power rock monopoly.

“Under this bipartisan enquiry we will be expecting the BoG and the GoldBod to publish the fees structure, the pricing formula, the aggregator selecting criteria and all foreign exchange arrangement that they have tied to this scheme which has led to this loss.

“…One of the things we will be asking for is the suspension of permit in forest reserves and the introduction of serious measures on traceability because as at now we have every reason to believe that state money is being used to buy Galamsey gold…Where negligence or corruption is proven, prosecutions must follow and all recoverable funds must be given back to the state,” Nkrumah stated.

The call by the Minority comes after the International Monetary Fund (IMF) raised concerns over the reported losses, describing them as a potential risk to Ghana’s macroeconomic stability. The IMF attributed the losses to transactions involving artisanal and small-scale mining dore gold and referenced alleged “GoldBod off-taker fees.”

GoldBod, however, has denied incurring any losses, describing the IMF claims as inaccurate. In a response issued earlier this month, the Board’s CEO, Sammy Gyamfi, stated that GoldBod expects an income surplus of no less than 600 million cedis for the 2025 financial year and clarified that it does not charge off-taker fees. He explained that GoldBod’s role is limited to purchasing, assaying, and exporting gold on behalf of the Bank of Ghana, while all trading and sale agreements with off-takers fall under the central bank’s mandate.

Mr. Gyamfi highlighted that GoldBod has contributed over 10 billion dollars in foreign exchange in 2025 through the purchase of more than 100 tonnes of artisanal and small-scale mining gold for the Bank of Ghana. He also noted the Board’s support in purchasing output from large-scale mining companies, which has helped boost Ghana’s foreign reserves and strengthen the cedi.

From the return of HBO’s award-winning medical drama to a new Game of Thrones prequel and the latest Harlan Coben mystery on Netflix.

1. The Night Manager

It has been nearly a decade since the dynamic adaptation of John le Carré’s 1993 novel became a huge critical and popular success. At last, a second season continues the story of Jonathan Pine, the efficient hotel night manager who became an even more efficient spy. But that first run took the story to the end of the novel, and le Carré died in 2020 – so its adapter David Farr had to start from scratch for this one. Tom Hiddleston once again stars as Pine, whose looks, charm and quick wit enabled him to take down an arms dealer. He is now entrenched at MI6, working quietly in a London office, when he goes rogue and follows yet another arms dealer all the way to Colombia. Olivia Colman returns in a supporting role as Angela Burr, who recruited Pine to the agency last time. Among the new characters, Diego Calva plays Teddy Dos Santos, the season’s wily villain, Camila Morrone is his glamorous cohort and Hayley Squires is an MI6 agent working with Pine. Le Carré may be gone, but his novel’s DNA remains, and a third series has already been ordered.

The Night Manager premieres 1 January on BBC One in the UK and 11 January on Prime Video internationally

2. Run Away

The latest of many Netflix adaptations of Harlan Coben novels stars James Nesbitt as Simon, whose college-age daughter, Paige (Ellie de Lange), runs off. His search for her takes him to an underworld of drugs and, when Paige’s controlling boyfriend is murdered, into the kind of cloak-and-dagger mystery Coben is known for. Minnie Driver plays Simon’s wife, Ingrid. Alfred Enoch is Detective Isaac Fagbenle. And Ruth Jones (co-creator and star of Gavin & Stacey) plays Elena, a private investigator who is also searching for Paige, although Simon didn’t ask her to. They form a team with its own energy. “It’s a really lovely onscreen relationship because, well, spoiler alert, it’s not a romance,” Jones said at the series’ London premiere. “It’s refreshing to see that male-female friendship.”

Run Away premieres 1 January on Netflix internationally

3. The Pitt

On paper, The Pitt might have sounded like just another medical drama, but its first season proved to be one of the year’s best shows, full of realism, with lives lost and saved, as doctors, nurses, medical students and patients endlessly grappled with stress. The second season is once again built around Noah Wyle’s character, Dr Robby, whose PTSD is leading him to take a sabbatical. The series’ setting isn’t called the Pittsburgh Trauma Medical Center for nothing. The new season – and its 15 episodes following a single working day in real time – takes place on his last shift before that break, and the show’s creators have added more peril by setting it on the Fourth of July. Wyle tells EW that the holiday will bring “fireworks, alcohol-related accidents, bad judgments [and] celebrations gone awry” as patients stream into the hospital. The new season is set 10 months after the last, which means that most of the previous cast are still around, including Katherine LaNasa as Nurse Dana Evans, Taylor Dearden as empathetic Dr Mel King, Fiona Dourif as Dr Cassie McKay and Patrick Ball as Dr Frank Langdon, just back from rehab.

The Pitt premieres 8 January on HBO Max in the US

4. His & Hers

Small-town murder investigations don’t get more closed-circle than this. Tessa Thompson plays Anna Andrews, a television anchor who leaves Atlanta to report on a killing in her hometown of Dahlonega, Georgia. Jon Bernthal is Jack Harper, an investigator in Dahlonega’s sheriff’s department, who is tackling the murder case there after being forced out of a big city job. Each suspects the other of being the killer, and because they are married to each other (it is fiction) but estranged, each probably has a good instinct about what the other is capable of. Or maybe suspecting an estranged spouse of murder is the ultimate revenge. William Oldroyd, director of the terrific 2016 film Lady Macbeth, with Florence Pugh – not based on Shakespeare, it’s another fraught story of marriage and murder – directed the first episode and is a writer on the show, based on the 2020 novel by Alice Feeney.

His & Hers premieres 8 January on Netflix internationally

5. Industry

This intense, compulsively watchable series dared to blow itself up at the end of last season. The ambitious, sexually voracious, ruthless young friends and rivals at the London investment bank Pierpoint scattered when the firm was taken over by another company, leaving the show to reconstruct itself in this fourth season. Most of the familiar cast returns, including Marisa Abela as Yasmin, last seen getting engaged to the wealthy and wonderfully named Sir Henry Muck (Kit Harington). Her true love, Robert, played by Harry Lawtey, is the one main character not in the new season. Harper (Myha’la) sets out on a business venture of her own. And Max Minghella joins the cast as a tech mogul, creator of a payment processing company called Tender (think PayPal if that helps). Kiernan Shipka plays his executive assistant and Kal Penn the company’s CEO. The show’s creators, Mickey Down and Konrad Kay, have said that this season was influenced by “conspiracy and erotic thrillers”, which should ramp up the enjoyable tension even more.

Industry premieres 11 January on HBO and HBO Max in the US and January on BBC One in the UK

6. Hijack

If you happen to be on a hijacked anything – plane, train, whatever – just hope that Idris Elba is there too. In season two of this taut thriller, he returns as Sam Nelson, the business negotiator who talked and stormed his way into saving a hijacked plane full of passengers last time. Now he is in Berlin, searching for the fugitive he holds responsible for that hijacking, when he steps onto an underground train with a bomb attached to it. There are plenty of twists and questions, as the German police and British security services suspect Sam himself is part of the plot. New cast addition Toby Jones and a returning Archie Panjabi play British officials who have their own agenda. Elba is, as always, a charismatic hero, who is savvy enough to manipulate anyone with schemes that aren’t always obvious. “This is a game of poker,” Sam says. “You don’t have to have the best hand to win, you just have to have the best bluff.”

Hijack premieres 12 January on Apple TV internationally

7. Agatha Christie’s Seven Dials

Agatha Christie is always in fashion and her novels always seem to draw superb casts to their screen adaptations. This three-part series, based on The Seven Dials Mysteries, is set in 1925 at that most reliable and cinematic of murder-mystery settings, a large country house. A prank gone wrong at a house party leads to death, and Lady Eileen Brent, known as Bundle, sets out to discover who did it. Mia McKenna-Bruce (who made her breakthrough in the 2023 film How to Have Sex) plays Bundle, whom James Prichard, Christie’s great-grandson and an executive producer of the series, has described as “one of my great-grandmother’s raft of interesting, humorous, and sharp young female characters”. Helena Bonham Carter plays Lady Caterham and Martin Freeman is Superintendent Battle in the show, which was written by Chris Chibnall, the creator of a great, darker television mystery series, Broadchurch. “Someone in this room knows more than they are telling us,” one character says in the trailer to the gathered guests. Of course they do. That cosy familiarity is what makes Christie such fun.

Agatha Christie’s Seven Dials premieres 15 January on Netflix internationally

8. Ponies

Emilia Clarke (forever the Mother of Dragons on Game of Thrones) is Bea and Haley Lu Richardson (from The White Lotus’s Sicily season) is Twila in this mismatched-buddy spy thriller set in Moscow in 1977, a year that explains Twila’s giant mop of curly hair.  Bea is a reserved, educated Russian speaker, daughter of Soviet émigrés to the US, and Twila is a brash rebel from a working-class background. Both are now living in the USSR because their husbands are undercover CIA operatives, but when the men are killed in a suspicious plane crash, Bea and Twila go undercover themselves to find out what happened. They are Persons of No Interest, PONIs in spy-talk, whose low profiles as US embassy secretaries, a job they both hate, makes them the perfect underestimated people to infiltrate the KGB. Adrian Lester plays the CIA’s head of the Moscow station and their handler, who figures that together they might make one good agent. There is a dash of wit that comes from Bea and Twila’s contrasting personalities, but the espionage drama dominates as they tangle with some nasty Soviets.

Ponies premieres 15 January on Peacock in the US

9. A Knight of the Seven Kingdoms

This Game of Thrones prequel is set 100 years before the events of that series, and about a century after House of the Dragon, but don’t expect the same palace intrigue. Based on George RR Martin’s novellas Tales of Dunk and Egg, the show follows Ser Duncan the Tall (Peter Claffey), known as Dunk, and his squire, called Egg (Dexter Sol Ansell). Egg is, by contrast, extremely short, because he is still a child, and readers of the novellas will know that he has a secret connection to the Targaryens, who sit on the Iron Throne. The series puts us in the point of view of Dunk, who has a relatively low status as a hedge knight, unattached to any household. Ira Parker, the series’ showrunner, has described him as “somebody who grew up in the slums of King’s Landing as an orphan”. And unlike the other GOT dramas, this one is quite short, with six half-hour episodes. “It’s not the big, sprawling Game of Thrones that we’ve come to know and love,” Parker said. “This is close and this is intimate.” Still, there is a big jousting tournament as an action centrepiece, and some familiar names, with Bertie Carvel playing Baelor Targaryen, heir to the throne, and Daniel Ings as Ser Lyonel Baratheon.

A Knight of the Seven Kingdoms premieres 18 January on HBO and HBO Max in the US and 19 January on Sky Atlantic in the UK

10. The Beauty

He’s back. And so soon! Producer Ryan Murphy’s most recent series, the campy legal drama All’s Fair, dropped in November and was widely reviled by critics with descriptions such as “the worst TV drama ever”. It quickly became a hit. Here he is with another buzzy series, this time set in the high-fashion world, where a sexually-transmitted virus turns people into examples of physical beauty and perfection. Of course, there’s a deadly catch, reminiscent of last year’s film The Substance. Evan Peters and Rebecca Hall play FBI agents looking into what nefarious plot might be behind it all. Ashton Kutcher is a villainous tech billionaire (is there any other kind on screen?), creator of a drug called The Beauty, and Anthony Ramos is his employee, known as The Assassin. Guest stars include Isabella Rossellini, Bella Hadid and Ben Platt. Set in Paris, Venice, Rome and New York, the show is based on a graphic novel series by Jeremy Haun and Jason A Hurley, and considering how often Murphy’s over-the-top characters are deliberately cartoonish, that sounds about right.

The Beauty premieres 21 January on Hulu in the US and 22 January on Disney+ in the UK

11. Shrinking

With Harrison Ford as its droll standout, this sophisticated comedy has one of the best ensemble casts on television, along with the rare ability to be funny and touching while avoiding any sappiness. The plot has grown from its early focus on Jimmy (Jason Segel) and his unconventional psychiatric methods as he spirals after his wife’s death.  In this third season, Paul (Ford), Jimmy’s friend and mentor, deals with the increasing symptoms of Parkinson’s, while Jimmy seems ready to move into a relationship. Jeff Daniels guest stars as Jimmy’s dad and Michael J Fox plays a Parkinson’s patient, a role tailored to his own well-known experience living with that condition. But it’s the regular cast that shines. Jessica Williams, Luke Tennie, Michael Urie, Christa Miller and Ted McGinley are more comfortable than ever as the friends and neighbours who are endlessly, comically, meddling in each other’s lives. As Bill Lawrence, the show’s co-creator, told TV Insider: “This is a show about a tiny found family that built a nuclear safety bubble around themselves” – and that continues to evolve.

Shrinking premieres 28 January on Apple TV internationally

12. Bridgerton

Season four belongs to the second Bridgerton son, the licentious, artistically-minded  Benedict (Luke Thompson). According to the rules of his society (and of historical romances on TV) it is time for him to grow up and settle down. At a masked ball, he spies a young woman he calls The Lady in Silver, and is instantly taken with her. We soon know, and Netflix has revealed, what he doesn’t: Cinderella-style, she has made her way into the ball but is actually a lowly maid. How will he ever find her unless she loses a shoe? Yerin Ha plays the mysterious love interest, Sophie Baek. She works for another new character, the harsh Lady Araminta Gun (Katie Leung, Cho Chang in the Harry Potter films), who has two daughters to marry off. The regular cast returns, including (for at least a bit) Jonathan Bailey as Anthony Bridgerton, along with Claudia Jessie as the spirited Eloise and Nicola Coughlan as Penelope, now married to Colin Bridgerton and having admitted that she has been the gossiping Lady Whistledown all along. Half of the season premieres this month, and the remaining four episodes on 26 February.

Bridgerton premieres 29 January on Netflix internationally

DISCLAIMER: The Views, Comments, Opinions, Contributions and Statements made by Readers and Contributors on this platform do not necessarily represent the views or policy of Multimedia Group Limited.

DISCLAIMER: The Views, Comments, Opinions, Contributions and Statements made by Readers and Contributors on this platform do not necessarily represent the views or policy of Multimedia Group Limited.

Samuel Osei Kuffuor plays for Nations FC

Nations FC defender Samuel Osei Kuffuor is reportedly in Dormaa to finalise a transfer to Aduana FC.

The centre-back is set to join the two-time Ghanaian champions. His arrival is expected to bolster Aduana FC’s defensive options as they look to strengthen their squad for the remainder of the 2025/26 season.

The transfer is seen as a strategic acquisition for Aduana FC, who are keen to shore up their backline with an experienced and proven defender.

Kuffuor’s leadership and composure at the back were instrumental in Nations FC’s impressive campaign last season, qualities that Aduana FC manager Aristide Cioaba values highly.

For Nations FC, the potential departure represents a notable loss to their defensive unit but also reflects their growing reputation for developing talent that attracts interest from bigger domestic clubs.

The transfer fee and contract length have not been disclosed, but both clubs are understood to be at advanced stages of negotiations.

If completed, the move would mark one of the more prominent domestic transfers of the January window, with Kuffuor expected to be available for Aduana FC’s upcoming league fixtures once the deal is officially confirmed.

The New Patriotic Party (NPP) has announced the commencement of a nationwide exhibition of its voter register ahead of the party’s 2026 presidential election as part of efforts to ensure transparency, accuracy, and credibility in its internal electoral process.

In an official release issued by the party’s Presidential Elections Committee (PEC), the NPP disclosed that the 2026 Presidential Elections Voter Register has been distributed to all constituencies across the country through the various Regional Secretariats.

According to the statement dated December 29, 2025 and signed by William Yamoah, Secretary of the Presidential Elections Committee, the exhibition exercise is intended to give party stakeholders, particularly delegates, the opportunity to verify their details in their respective constituencies and regions.

The exercise is aimed at identifying and correcting errors such as omissions, misspellings of names, incorrect or missing photographs, absent images, and other clerical inaccuracies that could affect participation in the presidential election.

The party has directed Regional Executive Committees and Constituency Executive Committees, acting through their designated IT officers, to formally report any discrepancies detected during the exhibition period for prompt rectification.

The verification exercise is scheduled to begin on Wednesday, December 31, 2025, and end on Monday, January 5, 2026.

To ensure a smooth and transparent process, the NPP has called on Regional and Constituency Executives, Members of the Constituency Council of Elders, Constituency Patrons, and Electoral Area Coordinators to actively support and facilitate the exhibition across all constituencies.

In furtherance of fairness and openness, the party has also invited all presidential aspirants to appoint representatives to observe the exhibition exercise at the constituency level.

The NPP reiterated that the initiative reflects its commitment to upholding a free, fair, transparent, and credible internal electoral process as it prepares for the 2026 presidential contest.

DISCLAIMER: The Views, Comments, Opinions, Contributions and Statements made by Readers and Contributors on this platform do not necessarily represent the views or policy of Multimedia Group Limited.

DISCLAIMER: The Views, Comments, Opinions, Contributions and Statements made by Readers and Contributors on this platform do not necessarily represent the views or policy of Multimedia Group Limited.

Amerado (L) and Black Sherif are among the artistes who had frights on stage in 2025

Among many things that are inevitable when it comes to live performances of artistes, stage slips and accidents are ones that mostly top the list.

In 2025, a number of Ghanaian artistes had their fair share of stage accidents, some very hilarious while others were very scary. In this list are some of them.

1. Amerado

Amerado’s stage collapsed during a live performance at Baidoo Bonsoe Senior High Technical School.

In a video that circulated online, the artiste was seen energetically performing before the stage collapsed beneath him, causing him to fall.

The rapper sustained some injuries but has recovered well now.

2. Olivetheboy

“Goodsin” hitmaker Olivetheboy, at the 2025 edition of Tidal Rave, slipped and fell butt-first on stage while performing his hit song “Asylum”.

The artiste made a light-hearted joke out of the incident and continued with his session without sustaining any major injuries.

3. Wendy Shay

Singer Wendy Shay suffered a stage mishap that resulted in her falling while performing live at the 2025 GMB grand finale.

The singer didn’t suffer any injuries and light-heartedly laughed it off.

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4. Sefa:

Singer Sefa, while performing at the 40th birthday celebration of business mogul Richard Nii-Armah Quaye on a levelled platform, nearly fell.

She, however, picked herself up and continued her performance.

5. Black Sherif

“Iron Boy” Black Sherif, at the 2025 edition of his annual concert, Zaama Disco, had a brief moment of stage mishap where he slipped.

He, however, got back on his feet to continue his electrifying performance without suffering any injuries.

PAT/BAI

The National Democratic Congress (NDC) has announced plans to commemorate the 44th anniversary of the 31st December Revolution in Ada in the Greater Accra Region.

The event is scheduled to take place on Wednesday, December 31, 2026, at Asafotufiam Park in Ada, beginning at 8:00 a.m.

According to the party, this year’s commemoration will be held under the theme: “Consolidating the Reset Agenda: Reflections on the Gains of the 31st December Revolution.”

The anniversary celebration is expected to bring together party leadership, government officials, party faithful, and sympathisers from across the country to reflect on the historical significance of the 31st December 1981 Revolution and its impact on Ghana’s political, social, and economic development.

The annual event traditionally serves as a platform for the NDC to assess the legacy of the revolution and reaffirm its commitment to the principles of accountability, social justice, and national development.

Party officials say the 2026 commemoration will also provide an opportunity to align the ideals of the revolution with the party’s current “reset agenda” and broader governance priorities.

Facing escalating conflicts across numerous areas, the Dangote Refinery is fighting for survival while competitors stand firm. Each day brings renewed resistance, ranging from blocked access to crude oil and persistent fuel imports to confrontations with labour unions. Yet recent events have arguably solidified the founder’s reputation as a tenacious combatant. This report by DARE OLAWIN examines the refinery’s ongoing quest for calm and solid footing following many months of severe challenge.

If he had had a premonition of the battles that awaited him in the refining sector, Alhaji Aliko Dangote himself testified that he would not have built the Lekki $20bn plant. But despite this regret, the billionaire businessman remains resolute; he said he had been fighting battles all his life, though he confessed that the mafias in oil are stronger than the mafia in drugs.

When the $20bn oil refinery came on stream in 2024, Nigerians heaved a sigh of relief. For decades, the nation had endured long queues and the shame of importing petroleum products despite being Africa’s largest crude producer. This was because the government-owned refineries remained dormant despite billions of dollars spent on turnaround maintenance. The Dangote refinery was hailed as the game-changer, a 650,000-barrel-per-day behemoth that would finally break the chains of fuel dependency.

But two years on, the refinery found itself locked in battles that threaten its promise. Instead of a smooth take-off, it grappled with opposition on all fronts, from alleged crude supply denials and international oil traders to entrenched unions and import cartels.

At one time, it was the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited; at another time, it was the regulator. Later, the marketers, depot owners and importers joined the battle. When it seemed the refinery had begun to know peace and stability, the workers’ union mobilised tanker drivers to picket it over allegations of disallowing unionisation among its workers.

Aliko once said he planned to build a refinery after the government of the late Umaru Yar’Adua stopped the acquisition of the Port Harcourt and Warri refineries by a consortium of which he was a part. Since inception, the facility, which was initially designed to be sited in the Olokola Free Trade Zone in Ogun State, faced a three-year delay due to the inability of the Dangote Group and the Ogun State Government to agree on issues.

Last year, Dangote disclosed that the delay in securing a site for his petrochemical facility in Ogun State resulted in a $500m loss for his conglomerate. He attributed the financial setback to the protracted process of acquiring Olokola land for a petrochemical facility, which cost him $500m out of the $2.5bn initial drawdown on bank loans.

After the three years wasted in Ogun, the company secured land in the Lekki Free Zone, Lagos, and the journey started. The billionaire recalled how he encountered difficulties in getting capable and trusted engineering, procurement and construction contractors to handle the project, noting that one of the global contractors once tried to sabotage the project.

After about 10 years, the deed was done. The plant was ready. Nigerians were eager to have access to affordable fuel. It was a historic moment for a nation whose refining capacity was almost zero for decades. Unaware of what was on the minds of the existing traders in the downstream, Dangote went to the CEO Forum in Rwanda to say Nigeria would no longer import any fuel.

“Nigeria shouldn’t import anything like gasoline; not one drop of a litre. We have enough gasoline to give to at least the entirety of West Africa and diesel to give to West Africa and Central Africa. We have enough aviation fuel to give to the entire continent and also export some to Brazil and Mexico,” he said.

When Dangote made this comment, the NNPC was the sole importer of petrol due to subsidy payments. The comment triggered a subtle competition in the sector. Dangote refinery was supposed to start petrol production in June 2024, but the crude producers reportedly exported their product, forcing the 650,000-barrel-per-day facility to import feedstock.

Crude war

In June 2024, the Vice President of Oil and Gas at Dangote Industries Limited, Devakumar Edwin, accused international oil companies of plans to frustrate the survival of the refinery. Edwin said the IOCs were “deliberately and wilfully frustrating” the refinery’s efforts to buy local crude by hiking the cost above the market price, thereby forcing the refinery to import crude from countries as far away as the United States.

He added that though the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission was trying its best to allocate crude oil for the refinery, “the IOCs are deliberately and wilfully frustrating our efforts, making the refinery pay a $6 premium above the market price.”

Edwin said, “It appears that the objective of the IOCs is to ensure that Nigeria remains a country which exports crude oil and imports refined petroleum products.”

The refinery also traded words with the NUPRC, accusing the upstream regulator of failing to enforce the domestic crude supply obligation. The NUPRC defended itself, arguing that it had facilitated the domestic supply of crude oil to the Dangote refinery and other refineries using the monthly production curtailment platform.

However, oil producers, under the aegis of the Independent Petroleum Producers Group, warned against being forced to sell crude oil to the Dangote refinery. The IPPG said some of its members already owned and were supplying crude oil to local refineries but insisted that the NNPC was in a good position to mitigate the crude supply shortfall faced by local refiners by leveraging its statutory crude allocation for meeting local domestic consumption.

The IPPG said some of its members received letters from the Dangote refinery for crude supply nominations and faulted the approach as bringing them under an obligation, saying it conflicted with the spirit of the willing-buyer, willing-seller framework prescribed by the Petroleum Industry Act 2021.

Naira-for-crude deal

As the battle for local crude supply escalated, President Bola Tinubu waded in, ordering the NNPC to sell crude to the Dangote refinery in naira. The idea was to strengthen the naira by reducing spending of foreign exchange earnings on the importation of crude and fuel into Nigeria.

The President’s Special Adviser on Revenue, Mr Zacch Adedeji, who also serves as Chairman of the Federal Inland Revenue Service, said the move would mitigate Nigeria’s heavy reliance on foreign exchange for crude oil imports, accounting for roughly 30 to 40 per cent of its forex expenditure.

The revenue chief said that by denominating crude oil transactions in naira, the government expects to significantly lighten its forex burden, with estimated annual savings of $7.3bn. It is also expected to reduce monthly forex expenditure on petroleum products to $50m from approximately $660m.

“Monthly, we spend roughly $660m on these exercises, and if you analyse that, that will give us $7.92bn in savings annually,” he stated.

War over direct fuel distribution

During President Tinubu’s visit to the refinery in June, Dangote revealed plans to do something that would shake the country. He later announced the deployment of 4,000 CNG-powered trucks to distribute fuel directly to filling stations and bulk buyers. This marked the beginning of another serious battle against the refinery.

Truck drivers, middlemen, DAPPMAN and others affected by the decision reacted angrily. The sector was truly shaken. Members of the Nigerian Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers shut down refineries and depots nationwide over allegations that drivers were not allowed to join the union.

The National Association of Road Transport Owners said they had lost all their customers to the Dangote refinery. They cried out over job losses. DAPPMAN said the refinery’s price reductions were designed to stifle importers whose cargoes were already at sea.

Depot owners alleged that Dangote sold petrol to international traders at ₦65 cheaper than it sold to local off-takers, claiming the company refused to sell to its members.

But Aliko Dangote said he had to protect his investment because marketers were not buying from him. According to him, DAPPMAN members demanded an annual subsidy of ₦1.5tn to enable them to match the refinery’s gantry prices.

The refinery alleged that its refusal to comply with the subsidy demand was the real reason behind the public criticisms and attacks in October. It reiterated that it had sufficient capacity to meet domestic demand and support exports, with about 500 million litres of fuel monthly.

Between June and September, it said the refinery exported 3,229,881 metric tonnes of petrol, diesel and aviation fuel, while marketers imported 3,687,828 metric tonnes within the same period.

From DAPPMAN, the refinery entered another battle with the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria, which picketed oil and gas facilities over allegations that Dangote sacked about 800 workers who joined the union. Dangote said those dismissed were sabotaging the refinery.

Expansion amid crisis

Amid the crisis, Aliko Dangote said he had begun expanding the refinery from 650,000 to 1.4 million barrels per day. This came as a surprise to many. The courage to expand despite crude shortages and stiff opposition was seen as highly ambitious.

But Dangote appears to have deep confidence in President Bola Tinubu. It appeared the duo held a closed-door meeting where undisclosed agreements were reached.

15% fuel import duty drama

A few days after Dangote announced the expansion plan, the Federal Government imposed a 15 per cent duty on imported petrol and diesel. The policy was meant to discourage fuel imports and support local refining. While refiners welcomed the move, importers warned it could raise fuel prices.

However, less than two weeks later, the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority announced that “the implementation of the 15 per cent ad valorem import duty on imported premium motor spirit and diesel is no longer in view.”

Though the government said the duty would be reintroduced in the first quarter of 2026, refiners expressed disappointment.

Otedola backs Dangote

Dangote’s billionaire friend, Femi Otedola, emerged as one of his strongest supporters during the crisis. He backed Dangote against accusations of monopolistic tendencies and criticised those resisting reform.

“But times have changed… With the Dangote refinery now supplying fuel locally, the old business model is crumbling,” Otedola said.

Officials of DAPPMAN told our correspondent that “Otedola is entitled to his opinion.”

Dangote winning?

With the resignation of regulators, some argued that Dangote had won the battle, but the war may be far from over. Dangote himself believes the vested interests he is confronting are powerful, but he insists he will never give up.

Conclusion

After months of bruising battles over crude supply, pricing, regulation, distribution, union politics and market share, the Dangote refinery appears to have carved out space for itself through persistence, political backing and an aggressive operational strategy.

Despite crude shortages, price wars, regulatory run-ins and lawsuits, the refinery has stabilised domestic supply, forced long-overdue market adjustments and compelled powerful players in the downstream sector to rethink their old models. Each confrontation tested the strength of the project and the resolve of its founder.

Yet, instead of retreating, Dangote doubled down, not only pushing ahead with production but also embarking on a massive expansion that signals confidence rather than fear.

The refinery may not yet have won the war, but it has survived its most turbulent phase and appears to be entering a more predictable terrain. Its success or otherwise will depend on how major stakeholders adjust to its growing dominance and how the government enforces policies to protect both consumers and local production.

But one thing is clear: most players in the industry are not opposed to the refinery; rather, everyone is fighting for survival — and that is where collaboration becomes critical.

As Adetunji Oyebanji of 11 Plc put it, all players want to recover their costs, which explains why it appears they are fighting Dangote.

For now, the battle seems to have subsided, but experts said it has not ended, especially as parties struggle for survival in an industry long ruled by ‘powerful’ stakeholders.

In an unprecedented display of religious fervour and endurance, scores of Christians from across the country transformed the Accra Sports Stadium into a massive open-air sleeping camp on the eve of the Alpha Hour Convocation with Pastor Agyemang Elvis.

As early as Monday evening, December 29, 2025, the perimeter of the stadium was teeming with ‘Alpharians’ (devotees of the popular online prayer ministry), many of whom arrived with mats, sleeping bags, and pillows, determined to secure a seat for the historic gathering.

The 2-day Alpha Hour Convocation programe was scheduled for December 30 and December 31, with the first day starting at 3 pm, but even before the stage was set up, many had pitched camp in the evening ahead of the church service.

The Stadium Sanctuary: Sleeping Under the Stars

By midnight, the inner stands of the Osu-based stadium were carpeted with scores of congregants, some wearing Alpha Hour t-shirts.

For these believers, the physical discomfort of sleeping on concrete floors or in plastic chairs was a small sacrifice compared to the spiritual renewal they sought.

“I travelled from Kumasi and arrived at 4:00 PM,” said Martha Mensah, a middle-aged trader. “I knew that if I didn’t come early, I wouldn’t get inside. Sleeping here is part of the blessing; it shows my ‘intentionality’ in seeking the face of God for 2026.”

The atmosphere was a unique blend of a campsite and a cathedral.

While some slept, others were seen in clusters engaging in fire prayers, their voices echoing towards the quiet Osu Cemetery, while some recited scriptures under the glow of their mobile phones.

The Alpha Hour Convocation has become a phenomenon in Ghana’s religious landscape, moving from a midnight YouTube and Facebook livestream to filling the nation’s largest venues.

The “Everyday” Faith of 2025

The event marks the climax of a year that has seen the Alpha Hour ministry grow into a dominant cultural force.

Pastor Agyemang Elvis, the founder of Grace Mountain Ministry, has consistently used his platform to advocate for spiritual discipline and national transformation.

The convocation theme reflects the ministry’s core practice of midnight intercession.

Many at the stadium noted that the overnight stay was a physical manifestation of the consistency they have maintained online throughout 2025.

What to Expect: The Convocation Schedule

The session is expected to feature:

• Continuous Intercession: Non-stop prayer chains.
• Testimony Segments: Evidence of breakthroughs recorded by members throughout the year.
• National Prophetic Mandate: A special session dedicated to peace and prosperity for Ghana in 2026.
• Worship and praises: Singing and dancing to glorify God.

DISCLAIMER: The Views, Comments, Opinions, Contributions and Statements made by Readers and Contributors on this platform do not necessarily represent the views or policy of Multimedia Group Limited.

DISCLAIMER: The Views, Comments, Opinions, Contributions and Statements made by Readers and Contributors on this platform do not necessarily represent the views or policy of Multimedia Group Limited.

Nigerian billionaire Femi Otedola has sold his controlling stake in Geregu Power Plc, one of Nigeria’s key electricity producers, in a $750 million deal.

In a landmark $750 million transaction, Otedola has fully exited Geregu Power Plc, one of the country’s most strategic electricity generation companies, marking one of the largest private power-sector divestments in Nigeria’s history.

The sale closes a 12-year investment cycle and significantly boosts Otedola’s standing among Africa’s top billionaires.

The divestment followed a restructuring of Amperion Power Distribution Company Limited, Geregu Power’s majority shareholder.

Through the deal, MA’AM Energy Limited, an Abuja-based energy company, acquired a 95% equity stake in Amperion, effectively taking control of 77% of Geregu Power previously held indirectly by Otedola.

The transaction, which closed on December 29, 2025, did not involve a direct transfer of Geregu shares on the Nigerian Exchange (NGX), leaving the company’s listed shareholding unchanged.

A consortium of Nigerian banks led by Zenith Bank reportedly financed the acquisition, with BlackBirch Capital serving as financial adviser.

The $750 million sale confirms Otedola’s full exit and represents a profit of roughly $618 million, underscoring the scale of value creation in Nigeria’s privatized power sector.

From Commodities to Power

Otedola, who first built his fortune in commodities trading, sold his controlling stake in Forte Oil in 2019 to pivot aggressively into the power sector, making Geregu Power the centrepiece of his strategy.

After acquiring the plant during Nigeria’s power sector privatisation in 2013, he increased his stake to more than 95% before gradually selling down holdings in 2022 and 2023 to bring in institutional investors.

Those investors included the Nigerian government, Afreximbank’s Fund for Export Development in Africa, and China’s State Grid Corporation, a move that strengthened Geregu’s balance sheet and governance profile ahead of its listing on the NGX.

Until the latest transaction, Otedola retained indirect control of about 77% of Geregu Power, overseeing its growth into one of Nigeria’s most profitable power producers.

The sale to MA’AM Energy marks his full exit, concluding a 12-year investment cycle that delivered one of the largest private equity-style returns in Nigeria’s energy sector.

Building a Powerhouse

Under Otedola, Geregu grew from a 40-megawatt plant into a 435-megawatt powerhouse, contributing roughly 10% of Nigeria’s national grid and consistently generating ₦20 billion ($133 million) in annual dividends.

Following the transaction, Geregu Power announced a board reconstitution, with a new chairman and several new directors, while the outgoing executive team stepped down, signalling a complete leadership transition.

Financially, the company remains strong. For the nine months ending September 30, 2025, Geregu reported ₦131.47 billion ($877 million) in revenue, up nearly 17% year-on-year, and a profit after tax of ₦25.1 billion ($167 million), reflecting resilience amid rising costs.

The company is currently valued at ₦2.85 trillion ($1.9 billion) and trades at ₦1,140 ($7.60) per share, making it one of the most capitalised and profitable firms on the NGX.

Wealth and the Bigger Picture

For Otedola, the exit also boosts his personal wealth. Now worth approximately $1.6 billion on the Forbes list after adding roughly $100 million this year, he is expected to climb further in Africa’s billionaire rankings.

He remains chairman and the largest individual shareholder of First HoldCo Plc, where he is focusing more capital on financial services — a strategy reflected in previous exits, including Forte Oil.

When outspoken politician and businessman Kennedy Agyapong, during an outreach engagement in the Central Region in December 2025, said the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) must stop intimidating entrepreneurs and instead support job creation, he struck a nerve.

“The GRA should stop treating Ghanaian businessmen like criminals. When people try to build companies in this country, they go through too much frustration. How do we expect to create jobs when the very institutions meant to help are scaring business owners?”

The NPP presidential hopeful is not alone. Similar concerns have been raised before.

In 2024, during an interaction with members of the Ghana Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Vice President Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia also accused the Authority of harassing businesses under the guise of tax collection.

According to Dr. Bawumia, the problem lies in the GRA’s practice of setting unrealistic revenue targets for its officers — a situation that results in overtaxing existing businesses instead of expanding the tax base.

“They are harassing businesses. That harassment is coming from the sort of targets that are created at their office. They are setting unrealistic targets. Because the tax base is narrow, officers are given monthly targets and are left wondering where to find the money.”

“So they return to the same taxpayers — people already paying — and come up with new reasons for them to pay more.”

But beyond the politics and soundbites, one question matters most:

How do Ghanaian businesses actually feel about the GRA’s impact on their survival and growth?

To find out, Business Outlook with Vivian Kai Lokko put the question directly to the public across its social media platforms.

The responses reveal a story that goes far deeper than a simple for-or-against tax debate.

The Verdict from the Polls

Across LinkedIn, X (Twitter), TikTok, and Instagram, one message stood out clearly:
many businesses feel more pressure than support.

LinkedIn — a platform dominated by professionals and formal business operators — showed a more nuanced response:

• 56% say the GRA is hurting businesses
• 33% say it is both helping and hurting
• 11% believe it is helping
  On X (Twitter), opinions were split and uncertain:
• 38% say hurting
• 38% say both helping and hurting
• 19% are not sure
• 6% say helping
  However, on platforms closer to everyday business activity and informal enterprise, the verdict was far less mixed.
  TikTok
• 79% say hurting
• 21% say helping
  Instagram
• 100% say hurting

What the Data Really Tells Us

This is not a tax-rejection poll.
It is a lived-experience poll.

The closer respondents are to daily cash-flow pressures, informal trading, and survival-driven entrepreneurship, the more negative their perception of the GRA becomes. Platforms like Instagram and TikTok — home to micro-entrepreneurs, traders, creatives, and side hustlers — delivered the harshest verdicts.

Meanwhile, LinkedIn users, often salaried professionals or operators within the formal sector, acknowledged the importance of taxation but still expressed deep frustration.

The message is clear:
the problem is not taxation itself — it is how tax enforcement is experienced.

Supportive or Punitive? That’s the Real Debate

Businesses are not arguing against paying taxes. They are questioning whether the system:

• understands their cash-flow realities,
• supports growth during difficult economic cycles, and
• treats them as partners in development rather than targets for extraction.
  When compliance feels intimidating instead of enabling, the cost is not just frustration — it is slower growth, job losses, and discouraged entrepreneurship.
  As of 2024, SMEs in Ghana contributed about 70% of GDP and accounted for roughly 92% of all businesses — making their survival a national economic priority.

Why This Matters for Ghana’s Economy

Small and medium-sized enterprises are the backbone of Ghana’s economy. They create jobs, drive innovation, and sustain communities. If these businesses consistently feel pressured rather than supported, the long-term consequences go far beyond tax revenue.

A tax system that works must do two things at once:
collect revenue efficiently and build trust with the businesses that generate that revenue.

Right now, trust appears to be the missing link.

The Bottom Line

Kennedy Agyapong’s comments may have reignited the conversation, but the polls suggest the issue is far bigger than politics.

For many Ghanaian businesses, the real question is not:
“Should we pay taxes?”
It is:
“Does the system help us survive long enough to pay them?”

Until that gap is addressed, the perception of the GRA — fair or not — will continue to tilt toward hurting rather than helping.

By Vivian Kai Lokko


The author is the Editorial Lead for Business Outlook with Vivian Kai Lokko, a high-impact digital platform for smart conversations on business, leadership, and the economy.

DISCLAIMER: The Views, Comments, Opinions, Contributions and Statements made by Readers and Contributors on this platform do not necessarily represent the views or policy of Multimedia Group Limited.

DISCLAIMER: The Views, Comments, Opinions, Contributions and Statements made by Readers and Contributors on this platform do not necessarily represent the views or policy of Multimedia Group Limited.

Scene from one of the galamsey sites visited by NAiMOS

The National Anti-Illegal Mining Operations Secretariat (NAiMOS) has intensified the fight against illegal mining (galamsey) in the Western and Western North Regions.

A task force from NAiMOS recently stormed several illegal mining sites at Hiawa in the Amenfi Central District of the two Western Regions.

The task force destroyed assorted illegal mining equipment, including makeshift structures, water pumping machines, and wooden gold washing platforms, among others.

The task force has intensified its anti-galamsey crackdown in areas currently reoccupied by illegal miners, causing severe havoc to water bodies, forests, and farmlands in complete disregard of all environmental laws and regulatory oversight.

The National Democratic Congress (NDC) has announced plans to commemorate the 44th anniversary of the 31st December Revolution in Ada in the Greater Accra Region.

The event is scheduled to take place on Wednesday, December 31, 2026, at Asafotufiam Park in Ada, beginning at 8:00 a.m.

According to the party, this year’s commemoration will be held under the theme: “Consolidating the Reset Agenda: Reflections on the Gains of the 31st December Revolution.”

The anniversary celebration is expected to bring together party leadership, government officials, party faithful, and sympathisers from across the country to reflect on the historical significance of the 31st December 1981 Revolution and its impact on Ghana’s political, social, and economic development.

The annual event traditionally serves as a platform for the NDC to assess the legacy of the revolution and reaffirm its commitment to the principles of accountability, social justice, and national development.

Party officials say the 2026 commemoration will also provide an opportunity to align the ideals of the revolution with the party’s current “reset agenda” and broader governance priorities.

Professor Mensah has accusing them of talking without offering practical solutions

Professor Kobby Mensah, an Associate Professor at the University of Ghana Business School (UGBS) and Chief Executive Officer of the Ghana Tourism Development Company Limited, has criticised the Minority in Parliament following their press conference held on Monday, December 29, 2025.

The Minority, led by former Minister of Information, Kojo Oppong Nkrumah, accused the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) government of lacking originality and competence in economic management, particularly in relation to the Bank of Ghana’s Gold-for-Reserves programme.

However, reacting to the claims in a post on X, Professor Mensah dismissed the Minority’s criticisms, accusing them of talking without offering practical solutions.

Responding directly to Kojo Oppong Nkrumah, the professor questioned the track record of the Minority while they were in government.

“Which of your ‘old’ ideas reduced the pound sterling from 23 cedis to 14? The dollar from 16 cedis to 11? Or reduced fuel from 20 cedis per litre to 10.37? Talk, Talk Party,” he wrote.

‘No new ideas, just rebranding’ – Minority lashes out at government

The Minority’s press conference focused on what they described as a significant financial loss to the state estimated at $214 million under the Gold-for-Reserves programme managed by the Bank of Ghana.

They are calling for a bipartisan parliamentary inquiry to investigate the circumstances surrounding the losses and to recommend safeguards to prevent a recurrence.

Addressing the media, Kojo Oppong Nkrumah argued that the government has failed to introduce new or superior economic ideas, claiming it has merely repackaged policies inherited from the previous administration.

“The truth about this government is that they have not introduced any superior economic ideas. All they have been doing is rebranding, renaming old things and sometimes even hiding the details until we, the Minority, bring them to the public’s attention,” he said.

He further questioned what innovations the government would introduce once the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme ends in mid-2026.

“So, when the IMF is no longer here by the middle of 2026 and they are finished rebranding the ideas they inherited, which new ideas would they be introducing? Which old ideas would they now be left with to copy, and who will be shepherding them?” he asked.

Beyond the inquiry, the Minority is also demanding the establishment of a parliamentary ad-hoc investigative committee to probe the Gold-for-Reserves transaction in detail.

They insist that the Bank of Ghana and the Ghana Gold Board must disclose the full fee structure, pricing formula, selection criteria for aggregators, and all foreign exchange arrangements linked to the programme.

According to the Minority, environmental concerns must also be addressed, including the suspension of mining permits in forest reserves and the enforcement of strict traceability measures.

“At present, we have every reason to believe that state money is being misused,” Kojo Oppong Nkrumah stated.

The Minority further expects the Governor of the Bank of Ghana and the Chief Executive Officer of the Ghana Gold Board to appear before the proposed committee to answer questions regarding the transaction.

Which of your “old” ideas reduced the pound sterling from 23 cedis to 14? Dollar from 16 to 11 cedis; Or reduced fuel ⛽️ from 20/liter to 10.37 🤷‍♀️ Talk Talk Party https://t.co/gy0TVazbCp

— Prof. Kobby Mensah (@thePOE_T) December 29, 2025

AM

Also, watch below Amnesty International’s ‘Protect the Protest’ documentary as the world marks International Human Rights Day 2025

Public policy advocacy is a constant wrestle between precision/rigour and clarity. I thought my recent piece on the GoldBod losses saga was comprehensive, and therefore convenient. But even finance-steeped friends reached out to advise that I need to get more focused.

Three key questions, in their view, are confusing people, and clearing them up would do far more good for the important debate than discussing “accounting treatment” disputes.

The Questions

1. How exactly did GoldBod incur losses?
2. Even if GoldBod incurred losses, are they significant?
3. But even if significant losses have occurred, aren’t they vastly offset by the benefits of the Cedi’s stability in recent years?

Questions 2 and 3 are, obviously, tightly linked.

I will try and be super-focused and just walk readers through my reasoning without any philosophical meandering.

The Answers

Part I: How did the losses come about

1. According to the IMF, GoldBod sold about $5 billion to the Bank of Ghana (BoG) “aggregated” from small-scale and artisanal (ASM) gold miners.

2. It also bought $2.6 billion from legacy sources, including large-scale mining companies, outside the GoldBod channel.

3. It then spent about $10 billion intervening in the foreign exchange (FX) market to deliver the Cedi stability Ghanaians are now enjoying.

4. It still has ~$11.4 billion of “reserves”, of which at least $3.58 billion is made up of gold bullion. I say “at least” because BoG uses a conservative valuation for its gold holdings. Using spot prices today (not advisable) would imply $5.3 billion of gold in over $13 billion of reserves.

5. Trust me, all these numbers are relevant. You will soon see, so keep track.

6. The IMF says that the gold that was bought from local ASM miners led to a loss of 4.28% ($214 million). That is to say the dollar value of the Cedis supplied by the BoG to the miners through GoldBod and the dollars delivered to the BoG from the overseas buyers (we shall call them “off-takers”) don’t match; there is a shortfall.

7. (Note: we are all dependent on the IMF’s data because the IMF is the only entity the government would give such data to.)

8. How that arises is not difficult to explain at all. I will walk readers through two hypothetical transactions using real market numbers for two separate days.

9. Let’s start with 10^th December 2025.

• The LBMA benchmark for 24 carats/K gold (think of this as the “global price for pure gold”) was: USD 4,196 per troy ounce (think of this as the unit in which gold is sold internationally).
• The official exchange rate used by GoldBod: 11.42 GHS/USD
• GoldBod price per Ghana pound (23 carats/K) was: GHS 11,446 (the “Ghana pound” is the main local unit for gold; 23 carats is the usual assay benchmark locally).
• The now famous bonus offered by GoldBod to local miners to encourage them to sell: GHS 650 per Ghana pound of 23K.
• Convert 23K “pound” to 24K equivalent = 11,943.652 GHS per Ghana pound of 24K
• Convert Ghana pound to ounces = 47,934.078 GHS
• Convert to USD = USD 4,197.380
• The result is a tiny premium (GoldBod is paying more for local gold than it can sell internationally).
• Premium vs 4,196 = USD 1.38/oz; Percent = +0.033%
• Now add the bonus on top of the 23K price per Ghana pound: 11,446 + 650 = 12,096 GHS (23K)
• Convert to 24K equivalent = 12,621.913 GHS (per Ghana pound of 24K)
• Convert to troy oz = 50,656.178 GHS per troy oz (24K)
• Convert to USD = USD 4,435.742
• Premium = 4,435.742 − 4,196 = USD 239.742 per ounce
• Percent = 239.742 / 4,196 = 5.714%

10. So, on that day, GoldBod lost 5.714% just on the buying side. Even if it had sold at the full international price, it would still have lost money. We shall explain in a moment why it can’t really sell at the full international price, either.

11. Now, let’s take today, the 29^th of December.

• GoldBod quotes GHS 11,467 per Ghana pound
• Per ounce equivalent = GHS 46,023.112
• Per USD per ounce at official exchange rate of 11.10 = USD 4,146.22
• Compare to the “world market price” of USD 4,325
• Implied Discount (GoldBod is making a marginal profit) = USD 178.774
• In percentage terms = 4.13% discount
• But remember the bonus!
• With bonus = GHS 12,117 total per Ghana pound
• Ounce equivalent = GHS 48,631.789
• USD equivalent = USD 4,381.242
• Implied Premium = USD 56.242
• Premium % = 1.30% premium (GoldBod is making a loss of 1.30% per trade)

12. It should be obvious what is happening here: ASM gold was a relatively efficient market in Ghana for many years with many buyers and many sellers until GoldBod was imposed on the system. The miners were used to getting as much of the “world price” as possible. They sold through lean, mean, and highly efficient intermediaries with very low costs who could time the onward sale to maximise their margin.

13. In the current model, GoldBod buys all the gold in the ASM market and must be ready to buy at all times and deliver to offtakers in all weather. It must offer close to market rate across the board all lose to smugglers or from miners and local traders just hoarding the gold. On the domestic, buying, side, things are that simple.

14. On the external, selling, side, GoldBod must sell at a discount to World prices because one has to factor in freight, insurance, and the assay verification and other costs on the importer’s side since this is the dore (raw gold) market outside a trusted exchange. The importer/offtaker takes a risk and must be compensated.

15. The importer/offtaker also advances dollars to the Bank of Ghana/GoldBod because the liquidity needs of the BoG are pressing and fast settlement is vital for that reason. That is also a risk that the offtaker must be compensated for.

16. In India, dore gold has favourable customs treatment because the Indian government wants to promote refining in India. If the gold was being refined in Ghana, GoldBod would have been hit by additional discounts because the importer/offtaker’s custom duties would have increased.

17. In short, when you displace a large, heterogenous, group of buyers, sellers, and intermediaries, with a very concentrated ecosystem of a super-aggregator (Bawa Rock), a few mega offtakers in India and Dubai, and one ultra-intermediary (GoldBod), you can get efficiency but risks can also concentrate and by the time you compensate for those risks, there would be losses.

Part II: Are the losses even significant?

18. If GoldBod was operating strictly using its own capital, yes!

 19. In 2025, GoldBod was allocated $279 million as working capital but the Finance Ministry did not disbursed. We can interpret this to mean that the Ministry was unclear about its trading strategy of model.

20. But assuming it had disbursed and this was the only fiscal buffer available to the GoldBod, not the limitless-seeming Bank of Ghana tap. Then:

• Consider losses on the ASM doré leg at US$214 million through end-Q3 2025 (i.e. about 9 months).
• Annualising that run-rate gives roughly:

– Now assume GoldBod’s only loss-absorbing capital is the Ministry of Finance allocation of US$279 million.

• Time to wipe-out (straight-line, assuming no recapitalisation)

• In effect, it would take 12 months for GoldBod to become functionally insolvent if it continued operating at the same scale and loss structure.
• Do you realise though that the Ministry of Finance would be forced to recapitalise it due to political reasons? You see why some of us are arguing that this is a fiscal subsidy that must be transparently borne by the policy owners?
• In fact, a more conservative “functional insolvency” trigger is when half the buffer is gone.
• Half of US$279m = US$139.5m.
• At ~US$285m/yr loss rate:

• Operationally: you would expect serious stress within ~6 months, and likely failure within ~12 months, absent a bailout or a major restructuring of the model.

21, Remember that Cocobod is a policy institution too. Yet, we have all been witnessed to how capital stress has damaged it.

22. Using SIGA and Auditor General reports, we have attempted to construct similar loss-per-turnover numbers for Cocobod below.

23. See the numbers for Cocobod below:

24. As readers can judge themselves, Cocobod records significantly lower losses benchmarked against the reported GoldBod losses.

25. The self-evident implication is that even as a policy organ of the government of Ghana (GoG), a consistent near- 5% loss on annual turnover by any would seriously stress its sponsoring government.

26. Bear in mind that the loss prospect could amplify if a single off-taker refused delivery, a prospect far from remote given the current level of concentration.

Part III: But don’t the benefits far outweigh the costs?

27. This is obviously the most complex part of the analysis. But if readers bear with me and follow the numbers, they should be fine.

28. It is a trivial point for everyone to grasp regardless of their economics knowledge that no one factor alone explains exchange rate movements. Surveys of economists by popular research houses normally surface more than 15 major factors.

29. In Ghana, we know that the fiscal deficit and how it is financed, inflation, export performance, and a whole host of factors both influence the exchange rate and are in turn influenced by it.

30. No serious person would thus attribute the stability being enjoyed by the Cedi so far to just one factor, such as the policy innovation represented by the GoldBod.

31. The right question thus is: how much of the Cedi’s stability should we attribute to the GoldBod and through what mechanism has it been exerting its influence? (Some of us have held the position for a while now that the Ghana Cedi is overvalued, and that it has moved from a generally managed float regime to a substantially managed peg one. But that is a separate debate. What is relevant is twofold: a) how the government found the capacity to manage the peg (never a trivial undertaking as the UK learnt on Black Wednesday) and b) whether macro-indicators, such as inflation, move in a manner that makes the peg sustainable.)

32. First, we know that the only plausible mechanism is through the “gold dollars” the GoldBod has diverted from commercial banks and parallel forex markets (which used to get most of the dollars from ASM gold, including even the smuggled portion since smugglers still need Cedis eventually to continue their nefarious trade) to the central bank. The BoG uses these dollars to cushion the Cedi.

33. Remember, however, that only about half of the funds used by the BoG to intervene in the FX market comes from the GoldBod. The remaining 50% comes from other exporters and large-scale gold mines, as well as IMF and other official financial flows. So, whatever impact we attribute to the BoG’s interventions (and remember that intervention alone can never halt depreciation), 50% is what we must attribute to the GoldBod.

34. Second, we know that gold prices have risen dramatically. This has nothing to do with the GoldBod but it is on course to nearly triple the amount of gold dollars in the system compared to, say, 2023.

35. If we use year-end values, the Cedi has risen from 14.7 (2024/12) to the US dollar to 11.14 to the US dollar (2025/12). That is a near -25% appreciation rate.

36. From the historical gold-Cedi relationship, we estimate a lagged effect of 3.9 percentage points appreciation in the Cedi if gold prices rise by 10%. The financial return on gold in 2025 is ~72%. Through a complex series of technical calculations to fix temporality and directionality, we estimate that 8.4% of the Cedi’s appreciation is due to the rise of the gold price through the export channel.

37. It is important to note that gold as a share of exports in Ghana has risen from the mid-30% range about two decades ago to roughly 65% today (double the long-run 2-decade average), a sign of insane overdependency on the commodity’s price rally.

38. The simple result of the above analysis to isolate the GoldBod’s effect is that of the ~25% appreciation rate, the GoldBod must share with other factors a maximal bound of 8% (that is half of the positive residual after accounting for the gold price rally’s effect on export performance).

39. A lot of other complex calculations follow to determine the impact to be allocated to the IMF-supervised fiscal consolidation and primary balance enforcement and its influence on money supply; the impact of the improved harvests (primarily a function of rainfall) on food inflation; the debt restructuring effort and the resulting relief from debt servicing; and the fall in interest rates, which appears to have been primarily driven by Finance Ministry policy. All these have had some complex direct or indirect effect on the Cedi.

40. It would be difficult in light of all the above to assign more than 3 percentage points of the 25% Cedi appreciation to the role the GoldBod has played in resourcing the Bank of Ghana’s FX market intervention capacity. Even those who will disagree with this specific estimate cannot dispute the logic of capping GoldBod’s contribution.

41. A 3% appreciation corresponds to about $600 million in relief on the import bill front. A significantly higher number than the $214 million we have been quarreling about.

42. Don’t get me wrong. It is a significant new development that we must all respectfully follow. But it serves no one’s interest, lest of all GoldBod management’s, if we start blowing up expectations. That would amount to setting them up to fail.

43. But we must not be oblivious about the costs of central bank intervention. The cost-benefit ledger extends to that aspect too. As I will show shortly, things don’t end at $600 million in “import burden relief”. Relax, I am not going to try and offset the relief with any speculative symmetric pressure on exporters. There is something more interesting to explore.

44. When BoG (via GoldBod) purchases gold locally in Cedis, it creates new Cedi liquidity. If BoG sterilises (mops up) that liquidity through Open Market Operations (OMO), it converts a monetary expansion into a recurring interest expense.

45. OMO simply means it borrows money from banks and other large institutions to “back” the paper money it has created (keeping things simple.) That money doesn’t come free.

46. On a US$5 billion gold purchase base, sterilising the Cedi created by that purchase through OMO transactions costs the central bank roughly GHS 11–13bn every year at realistic BoG OMO rates.

47. It is thus possible that the BoG will announce losses for this year. In addition to all the opacity and shadowy dealings, these fiscal stresses are the reason why some of us have been consistently wary and apprehensive about all these gold programs. Who has noticed that since the Gold-for-Oil program was terminated there has been no discernible impact at the fuel pumps? Who really was that program serving?

48. Remember also that we have only accounted for GoldBod losses in the Gold-for-Reserves intervention program. If even the other half of the intervention budget implies half of GoldBod’s trading losses, the total costs of the program would easily neutralize the $600 million in import burden relief calculated earlier (not accounting for sterilization costs of the other half of the intervention budget to avoid double-counting).

49. In simple terms, the GoldBod-backed intervention program yields no net benefit to the extent that it does not cover enough of the BoG’s need nor alleviate import burden sufficiently.

50. But that is still in neutral territory. It implies, at worst, that the GoldBod approach once its full costs become transparent cease being the miracle that on the surface it appears to be.

51. There is a more worrying issue. The GoldBod-backed intervention program is generally cost-neutral only whilst the price of gold remains elevated.

52. Readers may recall that the BoG stores some of the gold in its reserves and relies on a liquidity conversion cycle to turn the gold dollars into a cedi cushion in the domestic FX markets. Imagine a sudden drop in the price of gold, perhaps to its historic two-decade mean in the $2000-ish range.

53. Because of the policy commitments, BoG cannot simply suspend the program in its entirety. Not when funds have been advanced and long- or medium-term supply obligations have been established.

54. In such a bear market downside scenario, the BoG’s gold reserves would suddenly lose value in the multibillion-dollar range.

55. Gold bought at the height of the market could then only be liquidated for Cedi cushioning at less than half their value. That would imply printing even more Cedis to underwrite the effort. It is unbelievable how pro-cyclical the whole thing is until you work through all the risk-scenarios.

56. To repeat: the whole GoldBod thing can persist in a reasonably contained manner if the price of gold stays high and volatility continues to tilt upwards than downwards most of the time.

57. A significant drop in the price of gold would hit the program very hard. But then again the entire export channel will implode anyway.

58. Gold is now the real risk-driver for the economy. An important lesson in all of this is that the country should stop bifurcating its budget design into oil and non-oil and use gold and non-gold.

59. As for GoldBod, the more transparency there is, the better prepared this country would be when the markets turn and deft navigation is needed to prevent it from skidding off the tracks.

60. Hopefully, this tightly focused piece has done a better job in addressing the three questions on the minds of many readers.

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DISCLAIMER: The Views, Comments, Opinions, Contributions and Statements made by Readers and Contributors on this platform do not necessarily represent the views or policy of Multimedia Group Limited.

Emmanuel Reagan Fynn is the Ashanti Regional NSS Director

The Ashanti Regional Director of the National Service Secretariat and Deputy Youth Organiser for the National Democratic Congress (NDC), Emmanuel Reagan Fynn, has expressed strong optimism for Ghana’s economic future, predicting the US dollar could dramatically drop to GH₵5.00 by 2026 under a John Dramani Mahama-led administration.

Fynn made these remarks during the NDC Island City Branch end-of-year party at the Island City in Ahenema Kokoben, within the Atwima Kwanwoma constituency of the Ashanti Region.

“Looking at the excellent work the John Dramani Mahama-led administration is doing, I wouldn’t be surprised to see the dollar drop to GH₵5.00 by 2026,” Fynn asserted to enthusiastic party members.

He further highlighted what he described as positive economic developments under the current administration, attributing improvements to the NDC’s policy influence. “Last year, the dollar was trading at 17 cedis, but due to our effective policies, it has now decreased to just over 11 cedis. This improvement has led to lower prices for essential goods such as rice and oil this holiday season compared to last year,” he stated.

Earlier in his address, Fynn expressed gratitude for the collective efforts that have contributed to the party’s electoral success, stating, “Our dedication has yielded results as we have transitioned from opposition to governance. This achievement is a significant milestone in Ghana’s political landscape, and every member deserves recognition for their hard work.”

He reaffirmed the NDC’s commitment to sustainable development over short-term financial assistance, promising substantial job-creation initiatives in the coming year. Fynn also contrasted the current government’s approach with that of previous administrations, which he claimed prioritised personal interests over the needs of dedicated party members.

The year-end celebration attracted a large audience of enthusiastic supporters, including notable figures like Baah Acheamfour, the Deputy Ashanti Regional Secretary of the NDC. Attendees enjoyed lively music, a variety of culinary offerings, and a strong sense of community throughout the event.

As a token of appreciation, the organisers recognised outstanding contributions from various branches, presenting gifts to individuals who have made significant sacrifices for the party over the years.

The Ashanti Regional Director of the National Service Secretariat and Deputy Youth Organiser for the National Democratic Congress (NDC), Emmanuel Reagan Fynn, has expressed strong optimism for Ghana’s economic future, predicting the US dollar could dramatically drop to GH₵5.00 by 2026 under a John Dramani Mahama-led administration.

Fynn made these remarks during the NDC Island City Branch end-of-year party at the Island City in Ahenema Kokoben, within the Atwima Kwanwoma constituency of the Ashanti Region.

“Looking at the excellent work the John Dramani Mahama-led administration is doing, I wouldn’t be surprised to see the dollar drop to GH₵5.00 by 2026,” Fynn asserted to enthusiastic party members.

He further highlighted what he described as positive economic developments under the current administration, attributing improvements to the NDC’s policy influence. “Last year, the dollar was trading at 17 cedis, but due to our effective policies, it has now decreased to just over 11 cedis. This improvement has led to lower prices for essential goods such as rice and oil this holiday season compared to last year,” he stated.

Earlier in his address, Fynn expressed gratitude for the collective efforts that have contributed to the party’s electoral success, stating, “Our dedication has yielded results as we have transitioned from opposition to governance. This achievement is a significant milestone in Ghana’s political landscape, and every member deserves recognition for their hard work.”

He reaffirmed the NDC’s commitment to sustainable development over short-term financial assistance, promising substantial job-creation initiatives in the coming year. Fynn also contrasted the current government’s approach with that of previous administrations, which he claimed prioritised personal interests over the needs of dedicated party members.

The year-end celebration attracted a large audience of enthusiastic supporters, including notable figures like Baah Acheamfour, the Deputy Ashanti Regional Secretary of the NDC. Attendees enjoyed lively music, a variety of culinary offerings, and a strong sense of community throughout the event.

As a token of appreciation, the organisers recognised outstanding contributions from various branches, presenting gifts to individuals who have made significant sacrifices for the party over the years.

Published:
Tuesday, 30 December 2025

Sudan take on Botswana on New Year’s Eve at the Mohammed V Stadium in Casablanca, in what will be a blockbuster clash for the second spot in Group E of the TotalEnergies Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON), Morocco 2025.

More than just three points will be at stake, as the clash will determine who clinches the second place in the group, with Algeria already assured of topping.

Both teams come into the fixture in a relatively comfortable position, having already secured qualification to the Round of 16. A tally of three points has proven sufficient to progress, either as second place or one of the best placed number three sides.

However, the importance of this fixture remains significant, as it will decide whether either side finishes second or third in the group, a factor that could influence the knockout-stage pathway.

The Falcons of Jediane, under the guidance of Kwesi Appiah, will be aiming to maintain their balanced performances. Tactical discipline, defensive solidity, and swift transitions have been the hallmarks of Sudan’s campaign so far.

Fine margins, such as positional awareness, set-piece efficiency, and game management are expected to play a crucial role in tilting the contest.

Burkina Faso, coached by Brama Traoré, will look to impose their style, drawing strength from a robust midfield, physical intensity, and the continental experience within their squad. With qualification pressure eased, Les Stallions will be driven by the desire to improve their group standing and respond positively after their recent defeat to Algeria.

A tactical duel is widely anticipated, with both teams keen to avoid costly errors. A single moment could prove decisive in shaping both the result and the final Group E rankings, underlining the competitive quality of the two sides at this edition of the AFCON.

What was said:

Kwesi Appiah (Sudan Head Coach):

“Our match against Burkina Faso will be an important one. They have players with real quality, but we also have a good team and we have prepared well. It will be an exciting game for everyone. As a coach, I always focus on the next match, not the past ones. Burkina Faso have a very strong squad, with many players based in Europe, so beating them will not be easy. We will give everything we have and raise our ambitions to make the Sudanese people happy.

“The situation is difficult for us, as everyone knows what Sudan is going through because of the war. Despite that, our players have given everything. Our goal is to bring a smile to the faces of Sudanese people and make them proud. When you qualify for a competition, you must show why you deserve to be there, and we will fight to win.”

Mohamed Issa (Sudan Player):

“We have prepared well for the Burkina Faso match and we are fully ready for this challenge. The atmosphere in the squad is excellent and everyone is focused on the next game. Before the Equatorial Guinea match, our aim was to win and qualify, and we achieved that. The celebrations after qualification were special. Our families and our people were very happy, and that is exactly what we wanted.”

Brama Traoré (Burkina Faso Head Coach):

“Every team here has made progress, and no one can say Sudan are not a good side. They have a well-known coach who played a major role in their qualification, so we consider Sudan one of the strong African teams. We will approach this match with all our resources and introduce new faces as we look for victory.

“We are progressing step by step and our plan is clear. We will play intelligently and adapt our approach to the opponent. Our supporters are everywhere, and our people are waiting for us to make them proud. That is what we will strive to do.”

Ibrahim Kaboré (Burkina Faso Player):

“We are fully focused on our match against Sudan and we know how important it is ahead of the next round. The choices are always the coach’s, and I respect them. I am always ready to give my best for my country, whether I start or come off the bench. For me, the most important thing is the collective effort.”

Match facts:

This will be the second official meeting between Sudan and Burkina Faso. It is their first encounter at the AFCON finals since the 2012 edition.

Their only previous AFCON meeting came in the group stage of AFCON 2012, when Sudan claimed a 2–1 victory over Burkina Faso.

KGL Foundation has donated building materials valued at over GHS 170,000 to Tamale Central Prisons in the Northern Region to support the rehabilitation of the correctional facility’s infrastructure.

Nii Ankonu Annorbah-Sarpei, Programmes Manager at KGL Foundation, presented the items on behalf of the organization on December 26, 2025. The donation included roofing sheets, wawa woods, buckets of paint, electrical and plumbing materials, and air conditioners aimed at enhancing the prison’s physical infrastructure.

Annorbah-Sarpei explained that the items would improve the rehabilitative architecture by providing dedicated, multi-purpose spaces for essential programs that help offenders develop skills and address personal challenges. He noted that the materials would support the creation of educational and vocational classrooms for inmates, enabling them to acquire practical skills during their incarceration.

Deputy Director of Prisons (DDP) Obed Kofi Acquaye, who received the donation on behalf of the Ghana Prisons Service, expressed gratitude to KGL Foundation for their support toward the Tamale Central Prison rehabilitation project. He emphasized that the contribution would directly improve conditions at the facility and enhance the quality of rehabilitation programs offered to inmates.

DDP Acquaye highlighted several challenges confronting the facility, including the need for expanded workshops to accommodate more vocational training activities. He also pointed to improved sanitation requirements, particularly the need for a septic emptier, and the urgent necessity of a consistent water supply during the dry season when the facility experiences severe shortages.

The Deputy Director called on other institutions and organizations to support government efforts for the rehabilitation of Tamale Central Prison, noting that partnerships with civil society organizations and private sector entities are critical to achieving sustainable improvements in Ghana’s correctional facilities.

Inmates at the facility also appealed for enhanced support in vocational training programs that would equip them with marketable skills upon release. They requested assistance with post release employment opportunities to help them reintegrate successfully into society and avoid recidivism. The inmates additionally called for provision of a water tanker to address persistent water supply challenges at the prison.

The donation represents KGL Foundation’s continued commitment to supporting correctional facilities in Ghana. The foundation, established as the corporate social responsibility arm of KGL Group, focuses on health, education, sports, arts and culture, and youth empowerment initiatives across the country.

KGL Foundation has been actively engaged with Tamale Central Prison through its Hope Beyond Walls project, which provides mental health and education support to short term inmates. The foundation has partnered with Savannah Alliance Ghana to implement comprehensive rehabilitation programs that address both mental wellness and practical skills development for incarcerated persons.

Tamale Central Prison, established in 1914 with an authorized capacity of 78 inmates, has faced chronic overcrowding and infrastructure challenges for decades. The facility serves as the primary correctional institution for the Northern Region and houses both remand and convicted prisoners.

The prison has benefited from various partnerships with civil society organizations and private sector entities in recent years. Next Door Ghana Limited previously donated office furniture for a newly established diagnostic center, while Fatih Foundation constructed a mechanized borehole to address water supply challenges. These collaborations reflect growing recognition of the need for multi-sector approaches to improving Ghana’s correctional system.

The Ghana Prisons Service has increasingly emphasized rehabilitation over punishment, aligning with international best practices in correctional management. This shift requires significant investment in infrastructure, training programs, and support services that enable inmates to develop skills and address underlying issues that contributed to their incarceration.

Vocational training programs at Tamale Central Prison have included skills development in carpentry, masonry, tailoring, and agricultural production. However, limited workshop space, inadequate equipment, and insufficient training materials have constrained the scale and effectiveness of these programs. The building materials donated by KGL Foundation are expected to expand the physical capacity for such activities.

The water supply challenge highlighted by DDP Acquaye represents a critical concern for the facility’s operation and inmate welfare. Inadequate water access affects sanitation, hygiene, food preparation, and basic dignity for incarcerated persons. The prison’s reliance on municipal water supply, which becomes unreliable during dry seasons, has necessitated emergency water deliveries that strain operational budgets.

The appeal for post release employment support reflects broader challenges in Ghana’s correctional system. Many released inmates struggle to find employment due to stigma, lack of formal qualifications, and limited connections to potential employers. Without economic opportunities upon release, formerly incarcerated persons face heightened risk of returning to criminal activity.

KGL Foundation’s intervention at Tamale Central Prison aligns with its broader mission to address social development concerns in Ghana and support vulnerable populations. The foundation has implemented projects across multiple sectors, including support for juvenile football development, healthcare initiatives, and educational programs in underserved communities.