The missing factories in Nigeria’s $538m farm plan

The missing factories in Nigeria’s $538m farm plan

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Read History Go to My Account Log Out Enhanced by Google Agriculture The missing factories in Nigeria’s $538m farm plan It is harvest week in northern Kaduna. A farmer loads baskets of ripe tomatoes onto a lorry heading for markets

Listen to this article Share It is harvest week in northern Kaduna. A farmer loads baskets of ripe tomatoes onto a lorry heading for markets in the south. The road is long, the baskets are stacked high, and there is hardly a cold room along the way. By the time the lorry arrives, some of her tomatoes have split, bruised or rotted. She sells the rest cheaply, because every farmer around her harvested in the same week. A few months later, her family may be buying tomato paste imported from abroad. She is an illustration, but her problem is real. Nigeria grows food, then loses much of it before it can be processed. When the African Development Bank (AfDB) studied the problem in 2021, it estimated that 30 to 50 per cent of harvests are lost after they leave the farm.

The Special Agro-Industrial Processing Zones programme, known as SAPZ, was designed to fix that. The idea is simple: build factory estates, or “hubs”, close to where food is grown, so farmers can sell straight to processors before their crops spoil. Kaduna’s hub, for example, was meant to process tomatoes, maize, soybeans and ginger. Five years after the programme was approved, the question is plain: where are the factories?

The verdict: still waiting for the factory gate

Phase I of SAPZ is a $538.05m programme, approved in December 2021. It was meant to run from 2022 to 2026 and be finished by April 2027. It is well behind that timetable. The AfDB’s 2021 plan expected building work to be half done by the third quarter of 2024 and largely finished by early 2025. In reality, construction was only formally launched in Kaduna on 8 April 2025, in the very quarter the works were supposed to be wrapping up. The finish line has since moved. The Nigeria Development Cooperation Dashboard, the government’s public record of donor-funded projects, now lists the end date as 31 December 2028, as does the AfDB’s 2025 country portfolio review. That is 20 months later than first planned.

The public record reviewed for this article does not show any of the eight planned hubs running as a working factory estate, with private processors buying and processing farm produce. That does not mean nothing has happened: contracts have been signed and site work has started in places. But a groundbreaking ceremony is not a factory. The test of this programme is whether produce goes in and processed goods come out.

Phase I covers seven states and the Federal Capital Territory: Cross River, Imo, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Ogun, Oyo and the FCT. According to the programme’s own summary, it promised:

• Eight factory hubs, each supplied with roads, power, water and internet, so that private companies can move in without building basic infrastructure themselves

• Fifteen Agricultural Transformation Centres, smaller collection and service points closer to farms

• 2,300 hectares of irrigated land and farm-to-market roads

• Seeds, fertiliser, training and an updated legal framework for the zones

Each hub was matched to local crops. Kaduna would take tomatoes, maize, soybeans and ginger. Kano’s Bagauda hub would take tomatoes, rice, groundnuts and sesame. Ogun and Oyo would focus on cassava and rice, Cross River on cocoa, cassava and rice, and the FCT, Kwara and Imo on livestock. The promised results were ambitious: about $1bn in private investment, hundreds of thousands of jobs, and post-harvest losses in the target areas cut from around 50 per cent to 10–20 per cent. The planning documents are not always consistent, however. The AfDB’s appraisal report quotes different job numbers in different places, from at least 400,000 jobs in its main text to 100,000 direct jobs in its results table. It also counts 15 transformation centres in one section and eight in another. Clear, fixed targets matter: without them, it is hard for anyone to say whether the programme has succeeded.

The delays began early. The 2021 plan expected the money to start flowing in May 2022. The programme office’s records show the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), one of the lenders, made its first payment only in November 2023. The clearest recent snapshot comes from the AfDB’s progress report of November 2025. At that point:

• Kaduna and Cross River had signed contracts for companies to design, build and run their hubs.

• Ogun and Imo were still settling on hub sites and completing environmental studies.

In other words, four years after approval, two of the eight hub locations were not yet final. The same report said the programme had not advanced far enough to measure its outcomes, such as jobs created or losses reduced.

Work continued into 2026. The programme office published resettlement plans for people affected by the Kaduna hub and by a proposed hub at Adiabo in Cross River, and issued further tender notices. The AfDB has since published a newer progress report, covering May 2026. Any state-by-state verdict should be checked against it. Still, the central point stands: progress should be judged by working factories, signed tenants, produce bought from farmers and jobs created, not by contracts and ceremonies.

Who is paying, and how much has been spent?

Almost all the money is borrowed. Of the $538.05m in the appraisal’s financing plan, foreign lenders provide $520m and Nigeria’s federal and state governments just $18.05m.

That makes Nigeria’s own share 3.4 per cent. The AfDB normally expects a borrower to fund at least half of a programme. It waived that rule here, citing the pressure on Nigeria’s public finances after Covid-19. Spending has been slow. The AfDB’s November 2025 report shows that only about 8 per cent of its own $210m package (the $160m AfDB loan plus the $50m Africa Growing Together Fund) had been paid out, roughly $17m as of 10 November 2025. That figure covers the AfDB package only, not the whole $538m programme. By the original plan, 86 per cent of the whole programme’s budget was due to be spent by the 2025/26 year.

Delay also has a price. Lenders typically charge a small yearly fee on loan money that has been approved but not yet used. As a rough illustration, a fee of 0.25 per cent a year on $200m of unused money would cost about $500,000 a year. The real figure depends on each loan’s terms and how much remains unspent. One small accounting point: the appraisal’s year-by-year spending plan adds up to $539.21m, about $1.16m more than the headline cost. This is a documentation issue, not evidence of wrongdoing, but it should be reconciled.

On 1 December 2025, the AfDB board approved $200m as the first instalment of SAPZ Phase II. This first instalment covers 10 more states, and the full plan aims to reach 27 states over three instalments. The Bank says the expansion will keep up momentum and attract private investment, with jobs for young people and women.

Starting a second phase before the first is finished is not wrong in itself; large infrastructure programmes often overlap. But it raises a fair question. The original plan said SAPZ would expand to new states once they met readiness criteria, using lessons from Phase I. If no Phase I hub is yet running as a working factory estate, what operational lessons are shaping Phase II? A sensible safeguard would be to release later Phase II money only as Phase I hits checkable milestones: finished infrastructure, signed private tenants and factories actually processing produce.

Why the delay matters to ordinary Nigerians

The cost of delay is felt far beyond the project sites.

• Farmers without nearby processors must sell at harvest, when prices are lowest, or watch their produce rot.

• Food businesses face high costs for power, transport and storage, which discourages investment.

• Consumers pay more when food is wasted and when processed foods have to be imported. The AfDB noted that Nigeria spent $4.7bn importing food in the year before construction began.

The AfDB’s appraisal estimated that the programme could deliver economic benefits worth about $8.73bn over 20 years, a return of nearly 31 per cent a year. These are projections, not results. They only arrive once factories are built, tenants move in and farmers start selling to them. Every year of delay pushes those gains further away.

The new 2028 deadline buys time. Five steps would help make sure that time turns into working factories.

1. Publish a progress scorecard for every hub, every quarter. The Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security and state programme offices should report, hub by hub, how much building work is done, whether power and water are connected, which companies have signed up, and whether processing has started.

2. Show the money. Federal and state governments should publish how much of their counterpart funding they have paid, what is still owed, and what compensation displaced landowners have received.

3. Tie Phase II money to Phase I results. Where the loan agreements allow, the AfDB and the federal government should link later Phase II instalments to verified Phase I milestones, such as finished hubs, signed tenants and produce being processed.

4. Give the zones a legal footing. The government and the National Assembly should settle the rules for the zones, covering investors’ rights, land, who runs the infrastructure, environmental standards and incentives. Investors need certainty before committing for decades.

5. Build for use, not for ribbon-cutting. A finished shed without reliable power, water, roads or tenants will not transform anything. If more delays come, revised schedules should be published, with a clear plan and clear responsibility.

The real test is whether the factories work

SAPZ is still a worthwhile idea. Nigeria grows a great deal of food but processes too little of it, and linking farms to factories could raise incomes, create jobs and cut waste. But the programme should not be judged by loans approved, contracts signed or ceremonies held. It should be judged by factories running, produce bought from farmers, jobs sustained and losses reduced. For the tomato farmer in Kaduna, the test is simple: can she sell her harvest to a working factory down the road? Until she can, Nigeria’s $538m farm-to-factory promise remains only partly kept.

Oluwatobi Ojabello, PhD, is a dynamic and multi-dimensional Assistant Editor for Economy and Markets with over two years of professional journalism experience. He delivers authoritative, data-driven coverage of fiscal policy, financial institutions and capital markets, using clear analysis to explain Nigeria’s most complex economic developments. His work focuses on macroeconomic policy, financial stability and corporate performance, turning technical issues into accessible narratives that inform both experts and everyday readers.

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Reported by businessday.ng.

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