Nigeria-INEC must stop delaying electronic voting
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Read History Go to My Account Log Out Enhanced by Google Columnists Nigeria-INEC must stop delaying electronic voting In Africa, Nigeria is often reported to conduct the most expensive election. The 2023 general election cost about N355.3 billion.
Listen to this article Share In Africa, Nigeria is often reported to conduct the most expensive election. The 2023 general election cost about N355.3 billion. For the 2027 general election, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) proposed a budget of almost N873.8 billion, including N209.2 billion for technology.
From the above, we can conclude that our electoral system urgently needs a fundamental rethink. For too long, these same “expensive” elections have been associated with disputed results, ballot-box snatching, vote buying, violence, endless litigation and allegations of manipulation. Yet, technology has transformed banking, commerce, communication and even professional association elections (The Nigerian Bar Association – NBA). Why, then, should the conduct of national elections remain so vulnerable to human interference?
Earlier this year, we argued in this column that Nigeria must look beyond its traditional approach to elections. If the NBA can conduct electronic elections to select its leaders, the INEC should be able to develop a reliable e-voting system for a nation of more than 200 million people. The scale is certainly greater, but it should inspire better planning rather than serve as an excuse for continued delay.
Brazil offers a useful example. Its e-voting system has enabled the nation to process votes and publish results rapidly. In its 2022 presidential election, e-voting helped establish the results of a contest involving millions of voters across a vast territory.
Earlier this month, Brazil went into an election. By 1:30 am the next morning, the result was out. The incumbent, Lula da Silva, got 45 percent of the votes, while his challenger, Flavio Bolsonaro, got 47 percent. Neither could meet the constitutional requirement to be declared the winner. So, they are going for a run-off on October 25.
The election was electronically conducted. No ‘INEC chairman’ reading out manual results state by state. Not a single report of election violence. No going periodically for the voter’s card and verification (which saves much money). No ballot box snatching. No report of vote buying. No case of harassment or aiding and abetting by security agents. And no candidate is being advised to go to court.
Funny enough, Brazil is still classified as a “developing nation” like Nigeria, with a developing economy and social and institutional challenges of its own, yet it has invested in electoral technology. Nigeria should study that experience carefully instead of treating e-voting as an unattainable ambition.
E-voting can accelerate the counting and transmission of results, reducing the long intervals during which figures are collated manually, and suspicions of manipulation flourish. It reduces the logistical burden of transporting and securing enormous quantities of paper ballots. Although electronic systems still require reliable infrastructure, equipment and personnel, the earlier we adopt them, the sooner we perfect them.
Well-designed e-voting can improve transparency and public confidence. Voters should be able to verify that their votes have been recorded as intended, while independent observers and authorised auditors should be able to examine the process without compromising ballot secrecy. Properly implemented technology can also strengthen safeguards against duplicate voting and make certain forms of interference more difficult.
There are nations from which Nigeria can learn. Estonia permits internet voting in national elections, alongside other voting methods. Brazil and India (with about 2 billion people) use e-voting machines, while Switzerland has conducted limited e-voting trials under specified conditions. These examples demonstrate that technology can support different electoral models; they do not establish that one system is suitable for every nation. Their experiences also show why security, accessibility and public trust must remain central to electoral design.
The central question is why Nigeria continues to struggle with electoral reforms despite spending enormous sums on elections. Is the obstacle financial, technological, legal or political? There is no single explanation, but the persistence of institutional weaknesses and disagreements over the scope of e-voting cannot be ignored.
E-voting could reduce opportunities for manipulation, but it would also not automatically remove political intimidation or vote buying automatically. Where political interests benefit from opaque processes, meaningful reform may face resistance. This is a concern that demands public scrutiny, not an assumption that every delay is deliberate, I must say.
Consider the inflammatory rhetoric attributed to Jarrett Tenebe, Edo State chairman of the All Progressives Congress, in which he invoked machine guns and AK-47s while discussing efforts to secure votes for President Bola Tinubu. Such language, if accurately reported, is unacceptable in a democracy and warrants appropriate investigation. Electoral competition should be about persuading voters, not intimidating them. E-voting alone would not prevent political threats, but transparent procedures, credible results and effective law enforcement could help reduce the opportunities for electoral abuse.
The same principle applies to politicians who boast of influencing electoral outcomes. No individual should be able to claim ownership of voters’ choices or suggest that political influence can determine results independently of the electorate. An auditable electoral system would make such claims easier to test against verifiable evidence.
In case we decide to go the e-voting way, we must also learn from the US, where authorities have repeatedly warned about foreign interference in elections. In November 2024, US intelligence agencies reported Russian influence operations intended to undermine confidence in the electoral process. However, a joint assessment of the 2022 midterm elections found no evidence that detected foreign activity had compromised election infrastructure or changed votes.
This distinction matters. Technology can simplify voting, but it also creates cybersecurity risks. Nigeria must therefore avoid replacing manual vulnerabilities with digital ones. Independent security testing, encrypted transmission, strong access controls, backup systems and voter-verifiable paper records should be integral to any e-voting style.
Sadly, INEC’s budget for the 2027 election is more than enough to roll out an e-voting system across our nation (ask the experts). INEC should begin with transparent pilot programmes, independent audits and public demonstrations. It should consult political parties, civil society, cybersecurity experts and election observers, while ensuring that voters in rural communities and people with disabilities are not excluded. Results should remain independently verifiable, with clear procedures for recounts, disputes and system failures.
Finally, Nigeria should embrace e-voting as a carefully managed reform, not a technological shortcut. The National Assembly, INEC and other relevant institutions must establish a clear timetable, adequate safeguards and measurable implementation milestones.
The question is no longer whether technology can assist elections. It is whether Nigeria can summon the institutional will to use it responsibly. Democracy belongs to the people, and its procedures must make their choices count accurately, transparently and without fear.
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