Army Explains How Merops Interceptor Drone Became Program Of Record In Just 142 Days

The U.S. Army turned the Merops interceptor drone into a formal program in just 142 days, an acquisition milestone that highlights efforts to speed the service’s response to emerging threats and get combat-proven capabilities into the hands of troops and allies. The Merops soon won accolades for its role in defending against Iranian barrages of Shahed-136 one-way attack munitions in the Middle East.

Speaking at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention in Washington, D.C., where TWZ is in attendance, Col. Christopher Hill, director of the Army’s Global Tactical Edge Acquisition Directorate (G-TEAD), described the Merops effort as “an example of how we can move fast when we need to.”

The Merops is a small, relatively low-cost counter-UAS system designed to rapidly intercept long-range, one-way attack drones in flight. It was originally developed under the U.S.-backed Project Eagle initiative, with contributions from Swift Beat, a company associated with former Google CEO Eric Schmidt. The system uses Surveyor drones as airborne interceptors, with onboard sensors to track targets and the ability to operate autonomously or under remote control. The interceptors can destroy enemy unmanned aircraft through direct impact or a proximity-detonated explosive warhead.

The interceptor was initially brought to the Army’s attention after drone incursions involving two NATO partners prompted a senior commander to demand an urgent response. The system was not part of the commander’s original acquisition plan, Hill explained, but its demonstrated performance in Ukraine made it a compelling candidate.

“He said, ‘I want this capability in the hands of our partners within 14 days,’” Hill recalled. “Everyone looked around the room, and he looked over at me, and I nodded my head like, ‘We’ll figure it out.’”

The Army did not quite meet that deadline. Hill said acquisition personnel and soldiers went into the theater to evaluate the capability, ultimately getting it into the hands of NATO partners within approximately 21 or 22 days.

That initial effort has since expanded. Hill said the Army procured additional Merops systems in partnership with the Joint Interagency Task Force, which procured 13,000 of the interceptors. The effort also progressed from providing the capability to NATO partners to supplying mobile Merops firing teams to a second theater — presumably U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

In CENTCOM, the U.S. military has been confronting the threat posed by Iran’s Shahed-136 and other one-way attack drones, which have been used in barrages against American and allied forces and installations in the Middle East. Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll has previously highlighted Merops as a particularly attractive option for countering such threats because of its relatively low cost and the speed with which it can be acquired.

You can watch Driscoll’s testimony on Merops at the 36-minute mark of the video below:

During congressional testimony, Driscoll said the Army was able to purchase 13,000 Merops interceptors within approximately eight days after the conflict with Iran began. He put the cost at about $15,000 per interceptor, with the potential for that figure to fall below $10,000 as production scales. In a separate interview with Bloomberg, he suggested larger orders could eventually push the price down to between $3,000 and $5,000.

Shahed drones have been estimated to cost tens of thousands of dollars apiece, while traditional air defense interceptors are far more expensive. Using comparatively inexpensive drones to defeat them can improve the economics of air defense while preserving more sophisticated interceptors for threats that require them.

Ukraine has employed Merops alongside domestically produced interceptor drones to counter Russian Shahed/Geran one-way attack drones. The system’s battlefield use has helped demonstrate the potential of a new class of air defense weapons designed to defeat these kinds of drones without relying exclusively on costly surface-to-air missiles.

However, Hill cautioned that success in Ukraine does not automatically mean a system will perform equally well in every operational environment.

“On the Merops, it absolutely was influenced by [Ukraine]. I mean, that’s where it came from. That’s where we saw the capability,” he said. “But that’s one of the things where the employment of the system really matters.”

Hill noted that the system’s effectiveness will vary depending on where it is used, including differences between desert environments and the urban areas where it has operated in Ukraine. The objective, he said, is to get the capability into the Army’s inventory so commanders can make informed decisions about how and where to use it.

“Once we get it into our hands, now we can make a decision in Europe. Where does it go? Do I even need it?” Hill said. “It’s getting it in our hands. So that was the key for the Merops. The speed of getting it, then we can make the decision of how we employ it.”

That approach reflects a broader change in how the Army wants to manage emerging technology. Rapid fielding is important, but the service also wants to avoid acquiring a capability for an urgent operational need only to leave it without a clear path toward long-term funding, production, and support.

Hill said G-TEAD’s process is designed to involve the organizations that will eventually take responsibility for a capability from the outset. Program acquisition executives, or PAEs, are involved early, while the Army’s test and evaluation community and soldiers provide feedback as the system is assessed. The goal is to identify a transition partner upfront rather than wait until after an initial fielding effort to determine who will take ownership.

“We want to make sure that we’re giving commanders capability that we know works,” Hill said.

He described the directorate’s standard process as a 180-day effort, with the objective of reaching a decision on whether a capability should become an Army program within that period. The Merops effort, at 142 days, moved faster than that target.

The process is also intended to address what acquisition officials often call the ‘valley of death’: the gap between getting an emerging capability into the hands of operational units and the point at which a program office takes over and provides the funding and contracting structure needed to scale it.

“We will work to fill that valley of death gap between the time that we put capability into the hands of units and the time that the PM picks it up and actually [provides funding],” Hill said. “There’s a gap there. So we can do that intermediate scaling portion before it fully transitions.”

The effort builds on the Army’s wider push to streamline acquisition, an issue Driscoll has also emphasized. The Army secretary previously described an old process involving 16 decision-making steps, each with the ability to veto a proposal and send it back through the system. That structure could leave the service waiting two to seven years to purchase a capability.

The Merops experience suggests that some of those delays can be reduced when acquisition professionals work directly with operational units and the organizations responsible for evaluating and sustaining new equipment.

But rapidly acquiring an interceptor is only part of the challenge. The Army must still determine where it offers the greatest value, how it fits into existing air defense architectures, and how to produce and sustain enough systems to meet operational demand.

Low-cost interceptors are also not a replacement for every layer of air defense. They are, however, an increasingly important option against large numbers of relatively inexpensive attack drones, particularly when the alternative is expending missiles worth hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars to defeat each target.

For the Army, Merops is therefore serving two purposes: providing an additional tool against the growing one-way attack drone threat and demonstrating a faster route from an emerging battlefield capability to a formally supported military program.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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