What I learned traveling with US Special Forces in the most dangerous parts of the world
In the days following the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, American special operations forces infiltrated Afghanistan from the K2 airfield in Uzbekistan to meet up with the Northern Alliance. Over the next two decades, as a journalist and researcher, I spent years in the battlefields of the Global War on Terrorism to observe and report on US Special Operations Forces. As the country reflects on the lessons of 25 years of war, several fundamental SOF Truths and hard-earned lessons carry great salience for today.
The US defense machine has much to learn from SOF. As I traveled with SOF units in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, I became familiar with the special operatorsā shorthand for their approaches to war.
Three sayings in particular unveil how these elite soldiers relied as much on savvy and wit as on brute force.
āHumans are more important than hardware,ā the first SOF truth, conveys the central principle of working with local populations to develop partnership.
āUse the weapon between your earsā was the admonition to think strategically, not tactically.
And āwork your way out of a jobā was the ultimate objective. In other words, their primary mission was to help the country build capable security forces to leave behind a lasting solution for peace and security.
That last objective was one reason that President Trump was re-elected ā to get the country out of forever wars. These three sayings reveal what really make the SOF such a powerful body: Its secret sauce is imparting expertise to indigenous forces and working with other cultures to understand what would and would not create lasting security.
That worked in rural parts of Afghanistan, where village-level pacts were struck and sons of tribal leaders defended their homelands. It worked in the Philippines’ southern Mindanao region, where Abu Sayyaf ā a Jihadist militant group ā gave way to the Bangsamoro Accord and peace. And it worked in the late phase of the war in Iraq, where Special Forces combat advisers supported Iraqi and Syrian Kurds in the ousting of ISIS.
Had the Special Forces’ approach been enshrined in the overarching policy and strategy of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the major missteps of the long war on terrorism would have been averted.
Instead, money flowed and emphasis shifted to hardware and other costly “things” that would supposedly win the war. A focus on body count supplanted an understanding of why and how the terrorist leadership continued to regenerate. SOF commanders recognized that mowing down recruits was counterproductive: for every one terrorist you kill, you create a handful of new recruits out of his neighbors, friends and family. SOF calls this COIN math ā counterinsurgency math.
In other words, “lethality” ā the ability to kill ā has been mistaken as a winning strategic concept. Wiser commanders know you cannot kill your way to peace. An overreliance on sheer military power does not create lasting victory.
Special-operator culture is pragmatic and solution-oriented. Among the innovations introduced during the Afghan fight was the use of women in combat formations as a vital tool to understand and interact with rural Afghans. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, credited these women’s contributions during his confirmation testimony.
Last year, a Navy officer was selected to become the first woman promoted to lead a unit in the Naval Special Warfare command. At the last minute, her promotion was yanked for inexplicable reasons. Many in the Navy believed her gender was the reason for the reversal, although the Pentagon denied this. If it is the case that her promotion was denied based on her gender, then it’s clear that senior defense leadership has no grasp on what makes SOF successful.
These and other women have served in combat with distinction, contrary to the erroneous claims that they have not met the standard. Many in uniform know that it’s detrimental to the US military and US national security to sideline women who are performing invaluable service on the battlefield. Besides their ability to fight, their talent for working with local cultures was vital to SOF successes in the Middle East.
That skillset is what makes SOF necessary for the country’s national security. SOF has certainly not been without its lapses during the 21st century’s long wars and deployments. But its ethic and mindset are vital to the upholding of US national security, and its value cannot be overstated.
Linda Robinson is the author of three books on special operations and the long wars. A new edition of “Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces,” will be republished on Oct. 13 by PublicAffairs Books.
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