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Despite being a unitary state, the colonial British Government appreciated that a country having such a vast land mass and consisting of ethnic nationalities with disparate backgrounds, languages and cultures could not live under a centralized government for long. Sir Arthur Richards, the then Governor, broached the issue of federalism before the proclamation of the Richards Constitution of 1946: “To create a political system … within which the diverse elements, may progress at varying speeds, amicably and smoothly, towards a more closely integrated economic, social and political unity, without sacrificing the principles and ideals in their divergent ways of life.”
Sir John Macpherson, who replaced Governor Richards, pointedly asked: “Do we wish to see a fully centralised system with all legislative and executive powers concentrated at the centre, or do we wish to develop a federal system under which each different region of the country would exercise a measure of internal autonomy?” Nigerians endorsed the latter.
Besides, as a result of the constitutional-cum-political crises that trailed the ‘self-government’ motion in 1953, it was evident that a full-blown federalism was inevitable in the country. Both the London Conference of 1953 and the Lagos Conference of 1954 agreed on a full-scale federal constitution. Hence the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954, Independence Constitution of 1960 and the Republic Constitution of 1963 were truly federal in nature.
Subsequent military regimes progressively destroyed the federal principle and halted the march of development of the various regions/ states of Nigeria. The present system, disguised as federalism, has led to avoidable political crises, militancy, ethnic and separatists’ agitation; it has entrenched corruption and arrested the development of component states, nay the country.
We are opposed to any bill that seeks, under any guise, to erode the federal principle and turn the country into a unitary state.
It is possible that a segment of the Senate has succumbed to the subtle Federal Government’s campaign that most state governments are not spending the huge revenue they now receive from the Federation Account after the removal of subsidies on providing the infrastructure and social services needs of the people. However, the same accusation is equally levelled against the Federal Government.
Either way, there is constitutional division of powers between the centre and components states in a federation. No tier (federal or states) is subordinate to the other but each derives its powers and exercise them within the confines of a written constitution. The increasing ‘supervisory role’ of the Federal Government over the states, likened to the headmaster and school pupils, is anomalous in a federal arrangement. The acquisition of more powers and roles by the central government may ultimately pose a danger to the political and economic survival of the country.
Indeed, we are exercised by the continuous governance system towards concentration of powers at the centre. The Federal Government should not receive additional allocation from the Federation Account. The general opinion is that the statutory allocation to the Federal Government should rather reduce. It is time it rationalized the size and number of its duplicated departments and agencies. It should concentrate on the core federal matters and rightfully devolve powers to the states.
According to Paragraph 32, Part 1, Third Schedule of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), “the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) shall have power to – (b) review, from time to time, the revenue allocation formulae and principles in operation to ensure conformity with changing realities: Provided that any revenue formula which has been accepted by an Act of the National Assembly shall remain in force for a period of not less than five years from the date of commencement of the Act.”
Given the provisions of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), it is RMAFC that has the power to review the revenue allocation formula with the National Assembly retaining the power of consent.
It is not exactly clear how an abstruse Private Bill or a constitutional amendment bill to hike the revenue allocation formula in favour of the Federal Government will achieve its goal. The former will usurp the constitutional mandate of the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission while the latter will amount to a futile exercise, as it will be easier for a camel to pass through the eye of the needle than for such an absurd proposal to receive the mandatory two-thirds endorsement from the state legislatures across the country.
The senate should rather devote its time to matters that will return the country to a true federation and make the economy productive.
Concluded
