Professor H. Kwasi Prempeh has clarified that proposals to extend Ghana’s presidential term from four years to five would not apply to President John Mahama if adopted, explaining that constitutional amendments cannot retroactively alter the conditions under which a sitting president was elected. The chairman of the Constitution Review Committee said Mahama was elected under the existing framework stipulating a four year term, making it legally impossible to change his current tenure even if Parliament and voters approve the proposed extension.
Speaking in an interview with JoyNews on December 25, 2025, two days after presenting the committee’s report to President Mahama, Professor Prempeh emphasized the principle underlying this position. He said that in an earlier draft of the committee’s report, they had explicitly stated the five year term would take effect only after Mahama’s current tenure ends. The clarification aims to address speculation that the proposal might be designed to benefit the incumbent president or any specific political figure.
The Constitution Review Committee presented its final report at the seat of government in Accra on December 22, 2025, after 11 months of deliberations that included visits to all 10 regions and consultations with academics, trade unions, former presidents and citizens. Among numerous recommendations touching on governance structure, state enterprises and the Council of State, the proposed extension of presidential tenure emerged as one of the most consequential and publicly debated proposals.
Professor Prempeh explained that the committee received strong feedback from individuals who had worked closely with the 1992 Constitution, including some who had occupied the presidency. These eminent persons argued that four years proved insufficient to assemble a competent government and govern effectively. The committee weighed this input against public skepticism, with some citizens arguing that if four years isn’t enough, the real problem lies in governmental inefficiency rather than inadequate time.
Comparative evidence played a decisive role in the committee’s thinking. Professor Prempeh noted that Ghana now belongs to a dwindling group of countries maintaining four year presidential terms, particularly among new democracies in Africa. The global norm in presidential systems has shifted from four to five years, with most African nations following this pattern. In West Africa specifically, Ghana and Nigeria represent outliers with their four year cycles, while Benin and Liberia operate six year terms, and most others have adopted five year presidencies.
The committee identified serious management and timing problems under the current system. New presidents require approximately six months to settle into office, a period consumed by appointing cabinet members, convening the Council of State, conducting consultations and completing other administrative requirements. At the other end of their term, presidents spend nearly a year campaigning for re election, leaving a narrow window of perhaps 30 months for actual policy implementation and governance.
To address these constraints, the committee proposed regulating campaign seasons to establish definite periods before which electioneering cannot occur. Professor Prempeh referenced Senegal’s model where strict campaign timing prevents the continuous political activities that currently distract from governance in Ghana. Combined with the five year term, these reforms aim to create an environment where governments receive adequate time to implement policies without constant campaign pressure.
Professor Prempeh rejected the notion that extending the term makes life easier for presidents. He argued the opposite, describing the five year system as tougher on incumbents and more demanding. Under the current four year arrangement, Ghana has developed what he characterized as a tradition where virtually every president receives eight years, with voters accepting arguments that four years provided insufficient time to complete work. This pattern has created an unhealthy expectation of automatic second terms regardless of performance.
A five year term changes that calculation fundamentally. Professor Prempeh said that if a president hasn’t performed well in five years, Ghanaians are unlikely to entertain the idea of granting additional time. The longer initial term removes the excuse of inadequate time while raising voter expectations for visible results. According to the committee’s analysis, this shift could disrupt the eight year tradition, potentially leading to more presidents serving only five years rather than the current near automatic eight.
The professor addressed concerns that multiplying five by two equals 10, suggesting the proposal simply extends presidential rule. He dismissed this arithmetic as missing the political reality, explaining that earning a second five year term will prove far more difficult than securing re election under the four year system. The 10 year total becomes harder to achieve because voters judge performance over a longer initial period with higher standards.
President Mahama received the report and indicated it would be published soon, though he provided no specific date. He said he doesn’t want the document kept like a nuclear secret, signaling transparency about the committee’s recommendations even as the actual reform process begins. The president acknowledged that some proposals are far reaching but necessary to strengthen Ghana’s democratic order, particularly given strains on constitutional governance elsewhere in the sub region.
Article 66(2) of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution strictly limits the presidency to a maximum of two four year terms. The Constitution Review Committee deliberately avoided reopening debates about this provision, finding no public demand or political appetite for a third term. Professor Prempeh said the committee looked extensively for arguments supporting additional terms but concluded that even President Mahama opposes such changes. Rather than addressing term limits, they focused on improving governance efficiency within existing constraints.
The committee’s broader recommendations extend beyond presidential tenure. They propose ending what they describe as the hybrid relationship between executive and legislature, favoring clearer separation between these arms of government. Changes targeting the public sector aim to reduce partisan influence, including placing state owned enterprises under constitutional oversight through a body similar to the State Interests and Governance Authority. Professor Prempeh explained that the economic weight and systemic risks of such enterprises justify closer constitutional regulation to protect them from over politicization.
The Council of State would receive expanded authority under the proposals, moving closer to its original 1969 conception as a co guarantor in presidential appointments. These structural changes complement the five year term by creating institutional checks that prevent concentration of power while giving governments adequate time to implement policy without excessive interference or the constant distraction of electoral politics.
Implementation of any constitutional amendments requires a complex process involving parliamentary approval, national referendum and broad political consensus. The 1992 Constitution cannot be amended easily, requiring two thirds parliamentary support and voter approval in a referendum where participation must exceed 40 percent of registered voters. This high threshold ensures that fundamental changes reflect genuine national consensus rather than partisan advantage.
Political reactions to the five year proposal have varied. Some commentators, including lawyer Martin Kpebu, have publicly rejected the extension, arguing it could create opportunities for abuse or entrench poor performers for longer periods. Supporters counter that comparative evidence and governance efficiency concerns justify the change, particularly given how much effective governing time presidents lose under the current arrangement.
The timing of these proposals carries significance beyond their technical merits. Ghana faces substantial governance challenges including economic recovery following International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervention, debt restructuring, security concerns in northern regions and broader questions about institutional effectiveness. Constitutional reforms touching on term lengths, separation of powers and state enterprise oversight speak directly to these challenges by attempting to create structures that promote competent, accountable governance regardless of which party holds power.
Whether Parliament and voters ultimately embrace the five year term remains uncertain. The proposal requires navigating political calculations, public opinion and competing visions of optimal governance structures. Opposition parties must weigh whether supporting an extension initiated under National Democratic Congress (NDC) government serves their long term interests, while the ruling party must demonstrate the proposal advances national interests rather than partisan advantage.
Professor Prempeh’s clarification that the change won’t apply to President Mahama attempts to remove one potential objection. By making clear the sitting president receives no personal benefit, the committee signals that the proposal flows from principle rather than political convenience. Whether this reassures skeptics depends partly on broader trust in the constitutional review process and confidence that reforms aim at institutional improvement rather than partisan engineering.
The debate highlights fundamental tensions in constitutional design. Term lengths involve tradeoffs between giving governments adequate time to implement policy and maintaining regular accountability through frequent elections. Four years privileges frequent democratic refreshment but potentially sacrifices policy continuity and effective implementation. Five years grants more governing time but extends the period before voters can render judgment on performance.
International experience offers no definitive answer. Countries have adopted various presidential term lengths based on their specific histories, political cultures and governance challenges. What works effectively in one context may prove problematic in another. Ghana’s task involves determining which approach best serves its democratic development at this particular moment, considering both comparative evidence and distinctive national circumstances.
The Constitution Review Committee spent nearly a year gathering input, analyzing evidence and formulating recommendations. Professor Prempeh presented their work as the product of inclusive, structured engagement rather than elite imposition. Whether Ghanaians perceive the proposals this way will significantly influence their ultimate fate. Constitutional amendments require not just technical soundness but political legitimacy flowing from genuine consultation and transparent deliberation.
As Ghana begins processing these recommendations, attention will focus on several questions. Does extending presidential terms genuinely improve governance or simply entrench power? Will voters hold five year presidents to higher standards or treat extended terms as entitlements? Can campaign regulations actually limit electioneering to defined periods? Will structural reforms reduce partisan influence over state institutions or merely reshuffle existing power arrangements?
For now, Professor Prempeh has laid out the committee’s vision for constitutional reform centered on governance efficiency, institutional integrity and democratic accountability. The five year term stands as perhaps the most visible element of a broader reform package that touches multiple aspects of Ghana’s constitutional order. Whether this vision becomes reality depends on the complex political process ahead, where technical arguments, partisan calculations and popular sentiment all play roles.
The clarification that President Mahama would remain unaffected by the five year term if adopted removes one line of criticism but leaves substantive debates about the proposal’s merits intact. Ghana faces choices about fundamental governance structures with implications extending far beyond any single presidency. How these choices are made and what they ultimately produce will shape the country’s democratic trajectory for decades to come.