{"id":586,"date":"2013-01-11T03:16:00","date_gmt":"2013-01-11T03:16:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/ghana-mma.com\/?p=586"},"modified":"2013-01-11T03:16:00","modified_gmt":"2013-01-11T03:16:00","slug":"a-new-year-resolution-for-every-ghanaian","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ghanamma.com\/2013\/01\/11\/a-new-year-resolution-for-every-ghanaian\/","title":{"rendered":"A new Year Resolution for every Ghanaian"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/a><\/p>\n

Feature Article of Thursday, 10 January 2013<\/p>\n

Columnist:<\/strong> Addo, Kofi<\/a><\/p>\n

Hi ,<\/p>\n

I came across this book last year and I sent some reviews to some of my friends. I have started reading it and I believe every Ghanaian should read it. I will help us to understand why we are still poor and what we can do to change that situation to be develop like the developed countries that we flock to sweating and using our energies to develop. He gives the example of Ghana after independence on page 65, he mentions Drs Nkrumah and Busia and why they did not do what will have really taken to transform our nation.<\/p>\n

The earlier we learn why it is so important to change our governments if the fail to perform is linked to the economic development and prosperity the better.<\/p>\n

That is why is is extremely important that the supreme court will be unbiased in its ruling on the election case before it. Any biasness in it ruling will set the nation back several years and will cause a lot of people to lose faith it our legal system.Private people will move their monies out of the country and foreign investors will be deter from investing in the country.That is why all those who are saying Fama Nyame “give it to God”, live it, let it go, we want peace let move on are not helping the nation. They are storing up big trouble for the nation. We all remember what happened in June 4th 1979.<\/p>\n

We need to let Justice, Truth and Honesty come out and it will bring a lot of changes to our political institutions that will cause change to our economic institutions. That is the key to prosperity. The political institutions affects economic institutions. But the key is for this to happen there should be a process to change the political institutions us we have being doing in elections in the past 20 years. It is through this constant changes that well bring the refinement that is need to start affecting the economic institutions for Ghana to take off. But if we cannot change our politicians and institutions through, free, fair, transparent,rig and manipulation and corruption free elections the there is no way that our dear nation will move forward. We will still be in the economic situation that we are in.<\/p>\n

I pray that every Ghana will this year at least resolve to read one book and be it this one to help to make our nation great.<\/p>\n

Why \u2018Why Nations Fail\u2019 Fails (Mostly): Review of Acemoglu and Robinson – 2012’s Big Development Book Submitted by Duncan Green on Wed, 12\/12\/2012 – 15:56<\/p>\n

Every now and then, a \u2018Big Book on Development\u2019 comes along that triggers a<\/p>\n

storm of arguments in my head (it\u2019s a rather disturbing experience). One<\/p>\n

such is Why Nations Fail, by Daron Acemoglu (MIT) and James Robinson<\/p>\n

(Harvard). Judging by the proliferation of reviews and debates the book has<\/p>\n

provoked, my experience is widely shared.<\/p>\n

First, what does the book say?<\/p>\n

\u2018The focus of our book is on explaining world inequality\u2019, which is<\/p>\n

essentially a phenomenon of the last 200 years (certainly at its current<\/p>\n

extreme levels) \u2013 the average income of a conquistador was only about twice<\/p>\n

that of a citizen of the Inca empire.<\/p>\n

Inclusive Institutions rock: \u2018Countries like Great Britain and the US<\/p>\n

became rich because their citizens overthrew the elites who controlled<\/p>\n

power and created a society where political rights were much more broadly<\/p>\n

distributed, where the government was accountable and responsive to<\/p>\n

citizens, and where the great mass of people could take advantage of<\/p>\n

economic opportunities.\u2019<\/p>\n

Politics trumps economics: \u2018While economic institutions are critical for<\/p>\n

determining whether a country is poor or prosperous, it is politics and<\/p>\n

political institutions that determine what economic institutions a country<\/p>\n

has.\u2019<\/p>\n

Failure is the norm: \u2018To understand world inequality we have to understand<\/p>\n

why some societies are organized in very inefficient and socially<\/p>\n

undesirable ways. Nations sometimes do manage to adopt efficient<\/p>\n

institutions and achieve prosperity, but alas, these are the rare cases.<\/p>\n

Most economists have focused on \u2018getting it right\u2019, while what is really<\/p>\n

needed is an explanation for why poor nations \u2018get it wrong.\u2019<\/p>\n

One of the core problems of most institutional arrangements is that those<\/p>\n

in power have \u2018a fear of creative destruction\u2019 \u2013 that the disruptive effect<\/p>\n

of innovation and capitalism will undermine their power base. The luddites<\/p>\n

in the presidential palace or the chamber of commerce do far more damage<\/p>\n

than the protesters on the streets. They therefore act to stifle it \u2013<\/p>\n

elites\u2019 interests are opposed to those of the long-term development of<\/p>\n

their country. An \u2018iron law of oligarchy\u2019 means that even when oligarchs<\/p>\n

are overthrown, the revolutionaries, like the pigs in Animal Farm, often<\/p>\n

come to resemble them. \u2018New leaders overthrowing old ones with promises of<\/p>\n

radical change bring nothing but more of the same\u2019. Understanding how<\/p>\n

change doesn\u2019t happen is as important as understanding why it does.<\/p>\n

In contrast, when a combination of institutional accident and inspired<\/p>\n

leadership leads to an elite that is willing to accept creative destruction<\/p>\n

(as, the authors argue, is historically the case in the US), then a take<\/p>\n

off can occur.<\/p>\n

The style is captivating \u2013 dotted with great historical accounts, amusing<\/p>\n

and telling anecdotes (in the 16th Century African kingdom of the Kongo<\/p>\n

\u2018taxes were arbitrary: one tax was even collected every time the king\u2019s<\/p>\n

beret fell off\u2019). Great use of contrasts and \u2018natural experiments\u2019 \u2013 Mexico<\/p>\n

v US at the border; Bill Gates v Carlos Slim.; North Korea v South. The<\/p>\n

pace is breakneck, hopping manically between countries and centuries, from<\/p>\n

the rise and fall of the Roman Empire to the disappearance of the Mayas to<\/p>\n

the rise of Japan, plucking examples to illustrate the thesis.<\/p>\n

The strongest part of the book for me was its focus on the dynamics of<\/p>\n

change. It almost feels like physics \u2013 path dependence is key; minor \u2018<\/p>\n

butterfly\u2019s wing\u2019 differences in initial conditions caused by gentle<\/p>\n

\u2018institutional drift\u2019 make a huge difference when a country hits a<\/p>\n

\u2018critical juncture\u2019 (e.g. the French Revolution, or the Black Death. in 14<\/p>\n

th Century Europe (left), which wiped out a large part of the labour force<\/p>\n

and so transformed economies), and can set them on diametrically different<\/p>\n

paths. \u2018The richly divergent patterns of economic development around the<\/p>\n

world hinge on the interplay of critical junctures and institutional drift.<\/p>\n

Existing political and economic institutions \u2013 sometimes shaped by a long<\/p>\n

process of institutional drift, and sometimes resulting from divergent<\/p>\n

responses to prior critical junctures, create the anvil upon which future<\/p>\n

change will be forged.\u2019<\/p>\n

The problem is, much of this only really works in hindsight \u2013 almost by<\/p>\n

definition, there are always lots of minor differences floating around, and<\/p>\n

it\u2019s impossible to tell in advance which are going to provide the<\/p>\n

butterfly\u2019s wing that determines that (for example) the industrial<\/p>\n

revolution takes place in Britain and not Spain. This is a book written<\/p>\n

almost entirely in the rear view mirror.<\/p>\n

The trouble with these grand theories is that when they coincide with your<\/p>\n

own prejudices, they feel like a flawless romp through history. But if you<\/p>\n

are uncomfortable with the numerous assumptions, explicit and implicit, you<\/p>\n

get a sense of suspicion and vertigo \u2013 it feels like you\u2019re being conned<\/p>\n

(and the complete absence of footnotes make it harder to check the source<\/p>\n

of some of the sweeping claims). The reader is being asked to take an awful<\/p>\n

lot on trust here. And I kept hearing a phrase of Thandika Mkandawire\u2019s in<\/p>\n

my head: \u2018a theory that explains everything, explains nothing.\u2019<\/p>\n

The book\u2019s biggest problem (at least for me) is the authors\u2019 love affair<\/p>\n

with the American Dream (though not perhaps, American Reality). In their<\/p>\n

account, successful institutions bear a remarkable resemblance to America\u2019s<\/p>\n

constitution, separation of powers etc etc. That means that the China<\/p>\n

question hovers over the book throughout, and their fairly perfunctory<\/p>\n

attempt to answer it is deeply unconvincing. China is portrayed as on the<\/p>\n

wrong side of history, pursuing \u2018authoritarian growth\u2019, while trying to<\/p>\n

defy an inexorable push towards matching economic inclusion with the<\/p>\n

political equivalent.<\/p>\n

But can this book really be arguing that China\u2019s economic transformation is<\/p>\n

substantially more fragile than that of, say, Brazil? Apparently so.<\/p>\n

\u2018Growth under extractive political institutions, as in China, will not<\/p>\n

bring sustained growth and is likely to run out of steam\u2019 is a hell of a<\/p>\n

throwaway line, especially when you don\u2019t say whether that might be in one<\/p>\n

year or a hundred. Nor do they buy into the optimistic liberal account that<\/p>\n

holds that China\u2019s growth will create pressure for political reform \u2013 A & R<\/p>\n

think it will hit a growth ceiling before that reform happens, with<\/p>\n

unforeseeable, but chaotic consequences.<\/p>\n

More generally on the role of the state, the book seems to swallow the<\/p>\n

rather discredited argument of the \u2018East Asian Miracle\u2019 school that \u2018South<\/p>\n

Korea is a market economy, built on private property.\u2019 (Dani Rodrik and<\/p>\n

Ha-Joon Chang beg to differ.) The authors systematically downplay the role<\/p>\n

of industrial policy and a hands-on state in its take-off . \u2018[The] process<\/p>\n

of innovation is made possible by economic institutions that encourage<\/p>\n

private property, uphold contracts, create a level playing field and<\/p>\n

encourage and allow the entry of new businesses\u2026. It should therefore be no<\/p>\n

surprise that it was South Korea, not North Korea, that today produces<\/p>\n

technologically innovative companies such as Samsung and Hyundai.\u2019. There<\/p>\n

is no real attempt to explore the concept of \u2018developmental states\u2019, a term<\/p>\n

originally coined to describe Japan\u2019s take-off, but one which is<\/p>\n

increasingly interesting a range of developing countries as they see the<\/p>\n

more liberal capitalist economies being rapidly overtaken by \u2018state<\/p>\n

capitalists\u2019 like China and Brazil. But for A & R, the high growth figures<\/p>\n

of countries like South Korea are always \u2018in spite of\u2019 a hands-on state,<\/p>\n

not \u2018because of\u2019.<\/p>\n

Which all reminds me of a baffling exchange in 2003 with the FT\u2019s Guy de<\/p>\n

Jonquieres, as we looked out over the beach at the WTO summit in Cancun<\/p>\n

(NGO advocacy\u2019s a tough gig sometimes). Me: \u2018how can you say state<\/p>\n

intervention destroys economies, when South Korean industrial policy has<\/p>\n

been so successful\u2019. Guy: \u2018But think how much better South Korea would have<\/p>\n

done if the state had stayed out of it.\u2019 Err, right.<\/p>\n

Overall, the book left me with a sensation of raised expectations, which<\/p>\n

were then disappointed. That was summed up in the book\u2019s bizarre finale.<\/p>\n

After a hyperactive romp across the millennia this purported survey of what<\/p>\n

works fizzles out, pinning its hopes on \u2013 wait for it \u2013 the media, Facebook<\/p>\n

and Twitter. Oh dear. All that history ends not with a bang but a tweet.<\/p>\n

For more erudite reviews and arguments, with my entirely unscientific<\/p>\n

assessment of the star rating they give the book (I guess I\u2019d give it<\/p>\n

three, slightly above the average), take your pick from<\/p>\n

References<\/p>\n

1. ^.<\/p>\n

http:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/arts-entertainment\/books\/reviews\/why-nations-fail-by-daron-acemoglu-and-james-a-robinson-7785734.html<\/p>\n

2. ^. http:\/\/whynationsfail.com\/<\/p>\n

3. ^. http:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/programmes\/b01kprq6<\/p>\n

4. ^. http:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=uyBMI0UwwU4<\/p>\n

5. ^. http:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=ZlovTtskPfY<\/p>\n

6. ^.<\/p>\n

http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/entertainment\/books\/book-review-why-nations-fail-by-daron-acemoglu-and-james-a-robinson\/2012\/04\/20\/gIQAcHs8VT_story.html<\/p>\n

7. ^.<\/p>\n

http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/books\/2012\/mar\/11\/why-nations-fail-acemoglu-robinson-review<\/p>\n

8. ^.<\/p>\n